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This dissertation contributes to practice and literature by studying how organizations can effectively 
contract and sell uncertain performance outcomes. In Chapter 2, I study whether supplier shirking in 
response to outcome uncertainty can be mitigated by combining performance and behavior specification 
and evaluation. Based on the findings of this study, I advise purchasing managers to invest in the 
evaluation of performance and behavior to contain suppliers’ opportunistic behavior. In Chapter 3, I 
study what causes performance achievement to be uncertain, and how buyers can attenuate the effects. 
Based on the findings, I explain that outcome uncertainty is related to the roles and activities of buying 
organizations in the service exchange. To remedy the negative effects, I advise buyers to coordinate 
relevant activities of their organization with suppliers. In Chapter 4, I study how emotions, which are 
triggered by a failure to achieve performance outcomes, affect suppliers’ future motivation. Based on 
the findings, I advise purchasing managers to take into account the context specific factors and resulting 
emotions in determining when and how to use performance-based contracting. In Chapter 5, I study 
the supply chain-wide implications of acquiring property rights and obligations associated with selling 
performance outcomes. Based on the findings, I advise manufacturers to minimize the subsequent 
financial risks by investing resources in the alignment of incentives and operations across supply chain 
actors. Overall, this dissertation makes important theoretical advancements concerning goal alignment 
across supply chain actors through the use of contractual controls and distributions of property rights.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
According to extant literature, organizations are faced with a choice between 
two main types of contractual mechanisms when buying goods and services: 
behavior-based contracting (BBC) or performance-based contracting (PBC) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). BBC is seen as a more classic approach to contracting 
in which buying organizations (hereafter referred to as buyers) specify the 
behavior (i.e., processes and inputs to be used) that suppliers should engage 
in (Sumo et al., 2016). BBC provides buyers with a lot of control over the 
actions of their suppliers. However, BBC provides no incentives for suppliers 
to engage in product, service or process innovation as they are to stick to the 
behavioral requirements specified by buyers. It is therefore that BBC 
generally does not result in innovative solutions but rather drives suppliers 
to deliver status quo products or services. On the other hand, PBC is seen as 
a more modern approach to contracting as it focusses on performance 
outcomes (e.g., efficiency, quality and uptime) to be delivered by suppliers 
(Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). To motivate suppliers to deliver superior 
products or services, PBC ties (a part of) suppliers’ pay to the achievement 
of performance outcomes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ouchi, 1979). It is 
through this contractual mechanism that PBC can significantly improve 
supplier performance (Guajardo et al., 2012; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018).  
These positive performance implications of PBC have resulted in 
considerable attention in practice. PBC has, amongst others, been widely 
applied in the construction sector, defence sector, infrastructure sector, and 
Chapter 1 
 
2 
 
healthcare sector (Adida and Bravo, 2018; Francart et al., 2019; Settanni et 
al., 2017; Sumo et al, 2016). However, empirical evidence reveals that buyers 
and suppliers have faced considerable challenges in realizing the promise of 
innovative solutions and improved supplier performance (e.g., Banker, Lee, 
Potter & Srinivasan, 1996; Ng & Nudurupati, 2010; Ssengooba, McPake & 
Palmer, 2012). Determinants of PBC effectiveness have therefore received 
renewed attention from academics (e.g., Glas, Raithel, and Essig, 2019; 
Kreye, 2018, 2019; Steinbach, Wallenburg & Selviaridis, 2018).   
A recent meta-analysis reveals that PBC effectiveness is task 
dependent (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018). In her seminal work Eisenhardt 
(1989a) proposed that the task characteristics listed in Table 1.1 determine 
whether BBC or PBC is most effective when contracting services.  
  
Table 1.1 
Proposed task characteristics that determine effectiveness of BBC and PBC 
 BBC PBC 
Risk aversion agent + - 
Risk aversion principal - + 
Goal conflict - + 
Duration of relationship + - 
Task programmability + - 
Information systems + - 
Outcome measurability - + 
Outcome uncertainty + - 
 
Of these task characteristics, outcome uncertainty – the extent to 
which variations in performance outcomes are not under the control of 
suppliers – has become a central topic of study in contracting literature 
(Steinbach, Wallenburg, and Selviaridis, 2018; Selviaridis and Norrman, 
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2014). The financial risk introduced by high levels of outcome uncertainty is 
said to drive suppliers to engage in opportunistic actions that are not in the 
interest of buyers. Thus, using PBC in contexts characterized by outcome 
uncertainty has been said to be counterproductive. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggested that PBC can be effective in motivating suppliers to 
deliver superior performance, even when they are exposed to financial risk 
due to outcome uncertainty.  
The insight that, in contrast to what literature would predict, PBC 
could be used successfully to contract and sell services characterized by 
outcome uncertainty is what inspired this dissertation. To develop knowledge 
about the PBC practices that organizations can engage in to successfully 
purchase and sell services characterized by outcome uncertainty, four 
empirical studies have been conducted. The next sections describe the 
theoretical frameworks that the four studies are grounded in and discuss the 
motivation behind each of the four studies.   
1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In extant PBC literature, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the 
seminal work by Ouchi (1979) on organizational control are some of the most 
widely used theoretical frameworks (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). 
Following this tradition, the first (Chapter 2) and second empirical study 
(Chapter 3) are grounded in agency theory and theories on organizational 
control. Both frameworks emphasize the choice that buyers need to make 
between PBC and BBC. Agency theory concerns itself with agency problems 
that result from conflicts of interest between the buyer and the supplier hired 
to complete a task (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise as 
both buyers and suppliers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers that 
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are risk averse and motivated by self-interest (i.e. willing to increase their 
own wealth with minimal effort) (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Suppliers are therefore 
said to engage in behavior motivated by self-interest that is not beneficial to 
the buyer, if the goals of these two parties are not aligned (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
Therefore, contracting scholars have studied how incentives can act 
as devices to align the buyer’s and supplier’s goals (Fayezi, O’Loughlin, and 
Zutshi, 2012). Alignment of incentives is pertinent to exchanges as two types 
of agency problems exist (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The first is a pre-
contractual problem referred to as ‘adverse selection’, which arises due to 
hidden information (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker Jr, 1992). As the supplier has 
superior information to the buyer, it can engage in opportunistic actions by 
misrepresenting its actual ability to be awarded a contract or achieve 
advantageous terms. The second is a post-contractual problem referred to as 
‘moral hazard’. This arises when the supplier engages in hidden opportunistic 
actions that are not in line with the buyer’s goals. It is also known as 
‘shirking’ as the supplier pursues its self-interest by shirking on costly efforts 
(Ross, 1973). It is said that buyers can mitigate adverse selection by engaging 
in information gathering to improve supplier selection (Bergen et al., 1992). 
Buyers can mitigate the second agency problem, moral hazard, by designing 
appropriate contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Previous studies find that 
through the implementation of PBC, buyer and supplier goals can be aligned 
(Datta and Roy, 2011; Jain, Hasija, and Popescu, 2013). Goal alignment is 
achieved by tying the supplier’s pay to the achievement of buyer-specified 
outcomes. 
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Theories on organizational control build on these insights by putting 
forth contracts as coordination devices (Macaulay, 1963). That is, buyers 
enforce control by implementing contractual controls to direct attention, 
motivate, and encourage suppliers to act in ways that are in line with the 
buyer’s goals (Long, Burton, and Cardinal, 2002; Tiwana and Keil, 2010). 
What makes this theoretical framework of specific importance to this 
dissertation, is the added focus on how buyers enact control by putting in 
place an evaluation process through which outcomes and behavior are 
monitored and evaluated (Ouchi, 1977). Therefore, these two theoretical 
frameworks are complementary. While agency theory provides insights into 
the factors that should be taken into account when designing contracts, 
theories on organizational control provide insights concerning the type of 
control mechanism that should be used to exercise control during the contract 
management phase.    
While these theoretical frameworks have provided critical insights 
for contracting research, the behavioral assumptions that they are based on 
have had to endure criticism (Bendoly, Donohue, and Schultz, 2006; 
Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2013). The primary criticism concerns the 
assumption that individuals are rational utility optimizers who are unfazed 
by emotions and cognitive biases. To gain a better understanding of the role 
that emotions and cognitive biases play in relation to PBC, Chapter 4 is 
grounded in attribution theory (Weiner, 1985). Attribution theory provides 
insights into how perceived causes of outcomes affect an individual’s 
behavior. Attribution theory originates in the insight that the fundamental 
cognitive processes through which people deal with uncertainty result in 
attributions, which individuals use to become more effective in dealing with 
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their environment (Heider, 1958). Based on this notion Weiner (1985, 1986) 
further developed attribution theory by focusing on how causal dimensions 
of attributional explanations affect emotions and behaviors of individuals. 
Understanding attributional explanations is crucial as individuals are thought 
to shape their future behavior to events according to a subjective 
understanding of what caused these events. That is, when a supplier is 
confronted with a failure in achieving a performance outcome specified by 
the buyer, causal attributions concerning the cause of failure will determine 
the supplier’s future behavior.  
To comprehend how ‘attributional explanations’ lead to 
psychological and behavioral consequences, Weiner (1985, 1986) suggests 
three basic properties based on which all causes of outcomes can be 
characterized: locus, controllability, and stability. Locus refers to the location 
of a cause (internal or external to the individual), controllability refers to the 
degree to which the cause is subject to volitional change (controllable versus 
uncontrollable by the individual), and stability pertains to the relative 
endurance of a cause over time (stable versus unstable). A classic example 
of a cause of success is ‘effort’, which is often considered to be ‘internal’ to 
the individual, ‘controllable’ by the individual, and ‘unstable’. On the other 
hand, ‘bad luck’ as a cause of failure is often considered to be ‘external’ to 
the individual, ‘uncontrollable’ by the individual and ‘unstable’. The causal 
placement on these three basic properties is said to result in a specific 
emotion that is experienced by individuals. While some causes trigger 
positive emotions that have positive behavioral consequences, others trigger 
negative emotions that have negative behavioral consequences. It is 
therefore, that attribution theory acts as a useful theoretical lens for Chapter 
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4 to determine behavioral consequences of outcome uncertainty inducing 
factors.  
The final empirical Chapter is grounded in property rights theory 
(Coase, 1960). Property rights theory acknowledges that contracts are by 
definition incomplete (Kim and Mahoney, 2002). That is, not every 
contingency can be captured in a contract ex ante. Building on this insight, 
property rights theory introduces ownership concepts in incomplete contract 
settings. More specifically, property rights theory argues that transactions 
between organizations revolve around exchanging ownership of property 
rights rather than products (Coase, 1960). Property rights here refer to the 
rights “to the use of resources … supported by the force of etiquette, social 
custom, ostracism, and formal legally enacted laws supported by the states’ 
power of violence or punishment” (Alchian, 1965, p. 817). By focusing on 
how organizations exchange ownership of property rights, this theoretical 
perspective differentiates itself from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) since it adopts a dynamic view on how economic inefficiencies can be 
addressed (Kim and Mahoney, 2005). That is, it studies how economic 
inefficiencies due to opportunism, bounded rationality, and information 
asymmetry can be minimized by allocating risks and rewards tied to property 
rights in an effective manner among organizations. Therefore, it provides 
detailed theoretical insights for Chapter 5 concerning the realignment 
objectives, incentives and activities in response to reallocations of property 
rights and obligations tied to selling performance outcomes. 
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1.3 MOTIVATION AND DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
1.3.1 Empirical study 1: Mitigating shirking when contracting 
performance outcomes in buyer-initiated service triads     
The first empirical study focuses on contract design and contract 
management practices that can be used to mitigate shirking behavior by 
suppliers. Existing contracting literature has predominantly focused on 
explaining functions of contractual mechanisms to develop knowledge about 
effective contract design (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). Yet, the actual 
execution of contracts during the contract management phase, has received 
little attention from scholars. Under the assumption that contract 
management activities are strictly in line with what has been specified in 
contracts, investigating the contracting phases separately would be futile. 
However, this assumption has been questioned since contracts being 
incomplete requires buyers to address unforeseen situations during the 
contract management phase. This makes contract management activities of 
particular importance in contexts characterized by outcome uncertainty. 
Therefore, we posit that contracting is to be conceptualized as contract 
design and contract management. This reconceptualization raises the 
following question: 
 
RQ1. In which manner should buyers combine PBC and BBC during 
the contract design and contract management phases to mitigate 
supplier shirking when contracting services characterized by outcome 
uncertainty? 
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This first empirical study aims to answer the formulated research 
question, by conducting a theory testing study. By adopting survey as a 
research strategy, data from a sample of organizations has been collected in 
a structured way such that several hypotheses could be tested (Groves et al., 
2009). Survey was selected as the appropriate research strategy since 
knowledge about combing contractual controls was reasonably well 
developed, the variables could be clearly defined, and since the purpose of 
this study was to test relationships between variables (Forza, 2009).  
1.3.2 Empirical study 2: Outcome attributability in performance-
based contracting  
Based on the findings of the first study, it becomes apparent that the use of 
contractual controls during the contract management phase can reduce 
negative performance effects of outcome uncertainty. However, Study 1 paid 
little attention to the manner in which outcome uncertainty comes about in 
buyer-supplier relationships. And more importantly, which actions can be 
taken by buyers to reduce outcome uncertainty. Based on previous studies 
we lack an understanding of the manner in which actions of buyers affect 
outcome uncertainty during the contract management phase. Eisenhardt 
(1989a) had proposed that outcome uncertainty arises due to the presence of 
environmental factors such as the economic climate and regulatory 
environment. By focusing on factors residing outside the buyer-supplier 
relationship, contracting literature had paid little attention to factors tied to 
the interaction between buyers and suppliers. These interactions are of 
particular relevance in services contracting, since buyers fulfill specific roles 
through which they provide suppliers with inputs essential to the service 
production process (Sampson and Froehle, 2006). It has, however, been 
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unclear how buyers fulfilling these roles impact outcome uncertainty. This 
insight raises the following question: 
 
RQ2. How does the outcome uncertainty of a service provision process 
relate to the roles of the buying organization in service design and 
production? 
 
When suppliers to a large extent depend on buyer inputs, variations 
in the quality and (timely) availability of buyer inputs may considerably 
increase outcome uncertainty. Previous studies predict that this in turn would 
drive suppliers to engage in opportunistic actions. The first empirical study 
finds that contract management activities can mitigate this effect. However, 
it was unclear how buyers engaging in contract management activities can 
increase the effectiveness of PBC. This insight raises the following question: 
 
RQ3. How and to what extent do specific contract management 
activities enhance the effectiveness of PBC? 
 
This second empirical study aims to elaborate on the findings of 
Study 1 and existing theory by conducting a multiple case study of 
organizations contracting uncertain performance outcomes. Theory 
elaboration does not seek to generate new theory or test existing theory 
but can be used to introduce new concept(s), examine boundary 
conditions, or investigate relationships between concepts (Ketokivi and 
Choi, 2014). Case study was selected as a research strategy since few 
empirical studies had been conducted about the phenomenon captured in 
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our research questions (Yin, 1994; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich, 2002; 
Voss, 2009). The case study methodology enabled us to investigate this 
phenomenon in a more detailed manner than was possible in Study 1 
based on contextually rich data from a bounded real-world setting 
(Barratt, Choi, and Lee, 2011). More specifically, it enabled us to answer 
‘how’ investigated concepts are related to each other through inductive 
reasoning (Yin, 1994; Voss et al., 2002; Voss, 2009).  
1.3.3 Empirical study 3: Uncovering behavioral effects of causal 
attributions and attributional biases in performance-based 
contracting  
The findings of Study 2 provide us with initial evidence that environmental 
factors and buyer actions each have negative performance effects, since they 
contribute to the rise of outcome uncertainty. However, due to limitations of 
the (non-longitudinal) case study methodology, causal relationships between 
these concepts could not be tested. Therefore, it remains unclear whether 
both causes of outcome uncertainty affect supplier behavior negatively. 
Adhering to theories originating in the field of economics (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), as contracting literature generally does (Selviaridis and 
Wynstra, 2015), would lead one to conclude that any factor that causes 
outcome uncertainty to arise, negatively influences supplier behavior. As has 
been discussed in the previous section, these conclusions are based on the 
assumption that managers are rational decision makers who are unaffected 
by emotions and cognitive biases (Bendoly et al., 2006; Katsikopoulos and 
Gigerenzer, 2013). Given that previous studies on the use of PBC have 
generally been conducted at the organization level, we lack an understanding 
of the behavioral effects of PBC at the individual level. More specifically, it 
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is unclear whether the prediction that managers respond rationally to 
outcome uncertainty inducing factors is representative of empirical reality. 
This insight raises the following question:  
 
RQ4. How do emotions triggered by environmental factors and buyer 
actions affect supplier behavior when uncertain performance 
outcomes are contracted? 
 
 Behavioral operations management literature has also proposed that 
cognitive biases can cause individuals to respond differently to certain 
factors (Bendoly et al., 2006; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2013). If 
individual managers were to respond differently to environmental factors 
and/or buyer actions, determining whether PBC is effective in contracting 
performance from a specific supplier could be far more complex than initially 
thought. That is, purchasing managers would have to take into account 
cognitive biases of key decision makers at suppliers to determine whether 
PBC is suitable to contract performance from a specific supplier. This raises 
the following question: 
 
RQ5. How do cognitive biases of supplier managers affect the ability 
of PBC to govern supplier behavior? 
 
The third empirical study combines an exploratory case study 
strategy of an organization contracting uncertain performance outcomes 
(Akkermans and Vos, 2003) with a scenario-based experiment with 
practitioners (Rungusanatham, Wallin, and Eckerd, 2011). The exploratory 
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case study methodology was used to further explore relationships between 
concepts of interest in an empirical setting. Based on the insights gained from 
Study 2 and by conducting the exploratory case study, testable hypotheses 
were developed. These hypotheses were then tested by conducting a 
scenario-based role-playing experiment. “A scenario-based role-playing 
experiment … is an experiment in which varying versions of a descriptive 
vignette are deployed to convey scripted information about specific levels of 
factors of interest (i.e., independent variables) to human subjects” 
(Rungusanatham et al., 2011, p. 9). By comparing the behavioral 
consequences of the factors captured in the vignettes, the formulated 
hypotheses were tested. In contrast to the case study methodology used in 
Study 2, this experimental methodology used in Study 3 enabled us to test 
causal relationships causes of outcome uncertainty and supplier behavior. 
1.3.4 Empirical study 4: Servitization: how property rights and 
obligations tied to selling performance outcomes drive 
manufacturers to engage in a supply chain realignment process  
The first three studies provide us with insights concerning contracting 
practices that buyers can engage in to mitigate negative performance effects 
of outcome uncertainty. What has received little attention, is the operational 
changes that suppliers need to undertake to be effective in selling 
performance outcomes. Servitization literature has studied transitions from 
product to services selling extensively. However, previous studies have paid 
little attention to property rights and obligations associated with selling 
equipment performance. Property rights theory helps explain how the 
partitioning of property rights and the distribution of income generated by a 
bundle of rights influence incentive alignment (or lack thereof) between 
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supply chain counterparts (Coase, 1960). While this theoretical framework 
has hardly been applied in operations literature (Walker et al., 2015), it 
provides important insights concerning incentives at play in a supply chain 
context. The acquisition of property rights by suppliers allows them to extract 
additional financial value from selling equipment performance. At the same 
time, the obligations associated with the acquisition of property rights 
exposes suppliers to considerable financial uncertainty. However, it remains 
unclear how resulting financial rewards and risks affect the alignment of 
objectives, incentives and operational activities across supply chain actors. 
Based on this insight the following question arises:  
 
RQ6. How do reallocations of property rights and obligations, tied to 
selling performance outcomes, drive manufacturers to realign 
objectives, incentives and operational activities across multiple 
supply chain tiers? 
 
This fourth empirical study aims to elaborate on the variance theory 
based insights from the first three studies and existing literature by 
developing process theory (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014; Langley, 1999). 
“Whereas variance theories provide explanations for phenomena in terms of 
relationships among dependent and independent variables (e.g., more of X 
and more of Y produce more of Z), process theories provide explanations in 
terms of the sequence of events leading to an outcome (e.g., do A and then B 
to get C)” (Langley, 1999, p. 691). Process research thereby enabled us to 
generate knowledge about how specific changes can be produced (Langley 
et al., 2013). A longitudinal Process theory complements single case study 
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about an organization transitioning towards selling performance outcomes 
has been conducted to answer the formulated research question (Barratt et 
al., 2011; Barratt and Barratt, 2011; Soundararajan and Brammer, 2018; 
Stuart et al., 2002). The longitudinal case study methodology was selected as 
it is well suited to study the process-based phenomenon captured in the 
research question.   
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CHAPTER 2  
Mitigating Shirking when Contracting Performance Outcomes in 
Buyer-initiated Service Triads2 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
With an average annual growth of twenty percent, the global market value of 
outsourced services will soon surpass that of physical products (Information 
Services Group, 2018). While outsourcing of services has generally 
strengthened the customer value propositions of organizations (Maglio and 
Spohrer, 2008), it has presented organizations with challenges in terms of 
how to manage outsourcing relationships (Modi et al., 2015). These 
challenges are particularly apparent in the context of buyer-initiated service 
triads (hereafter service triads), in which a buyer contracts a supplier to 
supply services directly to a third party, the buyer’s customer (Kowalkowski, 
Kindström, and Carlborg, 2016; Tate and Van der Valk, 2008). This 
differentiates service triads from more linear manufacturing supply chains, 
since in these triads each individual party in the supply chain has, at least 
initially, a direct connection with the other two parties (Li and Choi, 2009; 
Wynstra et al., 2015). An illustration of this would be an internet service 
provider (ISP) that contracts a maintenance service provider to handle 
technical issues faced by the ISP’s customers. Here the primary service 
interaction is between the maintenance service provider and the ISP’s 
                                                 
2 This chapter is a reworked version of a manuscript that has been submitted to the Journal 
of Purchasing and Supply Management.  
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customers, even though the customers have a contractual relationship with 
the ISP. This means that suppliers in triadic structures, in general, have ample 
opportunity to shirk their responsibility without being detected due to the 
inherent information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers (Hartmann 
and Herb, 2014; Li and Choi, 2009; Zhang, Lawrence, and Anderson, 2015). 
At the same time, customers will typically blame shortfalls in performance 
on the organization that is providing that particular product and value 
proposition (Modi et al., 2015; Nenonen, Ahvenniemi, and Martinsuo, 2014; 
Sengupta, Niranjan, and Krishnamoorthy, 2018). That is, the ISP’s 
customer will blame the ISP, rather than the contracted maintenance service 
provider, if technical difficulties are not appropriately dealt with.  
To manage these challenges, buyers have relied on performance-
based contracting (PBC) to align the goals of suppliers with their own goals 
and goals of their customers (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Selviaridis and Wynstra, 
2015). PBC is a contracting approach that relies on tying at least part of a 
supplier’s payment to its performance, thereby emphasizing outputs or 
outcomes rather than required inputs, activities or processes (Martin, 2007). 
While existing studies reveal that PBC is generally effective in improving 
supplier performance (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018; Sumo et al., 2016; Tiwana 
and Keil, 2007), PBC has been suggested to be less effective in incentivizing 
suppliers to deliver performance outcomes that are satisfactory to buyers in 
contexts in which suppliers are not fully in control of these performance 
outcomes (Nullmeier, Wynstra, and Van Raaij, 2016; Selviaridis and 
Norrman, 2014). This is often the case in service triads since (the behaviors 
of) the buyer and its customers introduce outcome uncertainty (Sengupta et 
al., 2018). Consequently, traditional theories on contracting such as agency 
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theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and theories on organizational control (Ouchi, 
1979) suggest that PBC will not be feasible or effective in service triads, and 
that in such situations behavior-based contracting will be more effective in 
achieving satisfactory performance outcomes. Behavior-based contracting 
(BBC) emphasizes rules and procedures that suppliers (agents, controlees) 
should follow in completing assigned tasks, and supplier performance is 
evaluated on adherence to these prescriptions (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; 
Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018). Insights on the relative effectiveness of PBC and 
BBC are based on the long-standing assumption that these contracting 
approaches are mutual substitutes. This assumption, however, has been 
criticized as artificial as it is not representative of empirical reality (Sitkin et 
al., 2010). Contemporary studies have therefore started to consider PBC and 
BBC as complements rather than substitutes (Nielsen, Kristensen, and 
Grasso, 2018; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018). This shift has enabled scholars to 
reach a better understanding of how organizations share different types of 
risks when operating in complicated settings (De Jong, Bijlsma-Frankema 
and, Cardinal, 2014). What still has received little attention is the 
complementarity of PBC and BBC during the different phases of the 
contracting process. Specifically, it remains unclear precisely what the 
effects are of combined contractual controls during the contract design phase 
versus the contract management (execution) phase.  A recent exploratory 
study by Sumo et al. (2016) is one of the first to make an explicit distinction 
between contract design and contract execution in hypothesizing the effects 
of PBC, but further empirical validation is needed. 
We make three main contributions to the contracting and service 
triads literature to further our understanding of the complementarity of PBC 
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and BBC in uncertain contexts such as service triads. First, as a baseline, this 
study investigates Eisenhardt’s (1989a) proposition that outcome uncertainty 
has a negative effect on PBC’s ability to achieve the desired performance 
outcome. While this proposed relationship has informed contracting research 
and its application in practice over the past decades, this relationship has not, 
to the best of our knowledge, been tested empirically. More specifically, this 
study increases our understanding of the behavioral mechanism by which 
outcome uncertainty makes PBC less effective in achieving performance 
outcomes. That is, we test whether outcome uncertainty leads suppliers to 
shirk their responsibilities and whether this in turn leads to unsatisfactory 
supplier performance. Secondly, and most importantly, this study identifies 
which combinations of performance- and behavior-based contractual control 
mechanisms are effective in decreasing shirking behavior by suppliers in 
response to outcome uncertainty that arises in service triads. Third, we 
investigate these combinations and their effects during respectively the 
contract design phase and the contract management phase.  
In the following section, we first summarize current research on PBC 
and service triads and outline how notions from agency theory can be used 
to hypothesize on the effective use of PBC in settings where there is a high 
level of outcome uncertainty. We then introduce our research design and 
methodology before discussing the findings from our survey data on Dutch 
buyer–supplier–customer service triads. Finally, we highlight the 
implications for theory and practice, and discuss limitations and directions 
for future research.  
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recently, there has been increasing interest in PBC both in practice and in 
the academic literature (Essig et al., 2016; Guajardo et al., 2012; Sumo et al., 
2016). PBC involves tying at least part of a supplier’s payment to its 
performance, thereby emphasizing outputs or outcomes rather than required 
inputs, activities or processes (Martin, 2007). Little or no research has been 
done on PBC in triadic relationships (Wynstra et al., 2015). Given the growth 
in the range of services that suppliers deliver directly to the buyer’s 
customers, buyer-initiated service triads have become an increasingly 
prevalent phenomenon in both the private and the public sector (Sengupta et 
al., 2018). The emphasis on performance outcomes makes PBC particularly 
challenging to implement in service triads, as particularly in these settings, 
performance outcomes are not always (fully) under the supplier’s control 
(Nullmeier et al., 2016; Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014).  
2.2.1 Outcome Uncertainty and Buyer Satisfaction  
Studies of contractual arrangements and control mechanisms in buyer-
initiated service triads usually draw on Agency Theory, which focuses on 
governance issues that arise from conflicts of interest between the principal 
and the agent hired by the principal to complete a task. Agency Theory treats 
contracts as a mechanism to align interests and incentives and to achieve risk 
sharing between the parties involved, particularly in situations of information 
asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory 
is also commonly used to study the choice between contracting on effort or 
behavior (behavior-based contracting, BBC) or contracting on output or 
outcomes (performance-based contracting, PBC) (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 
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2015). Buyer-initiated service triads involve a high level of information 
asymmetry between buyer, supplier and customer, all of whom have (partly) 
different goals (Sengupta et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2015).  
To address such conflicts of interest, agency theorists have 
investigated the situational characteristics that determine the optimal form of 
contract and control – performance-based or behavior-based – and have thus 
focused on the type of incentives to include in contracts in order to minimize 
adverse behavior by suppliers (Fayezi et al., 2012). Eisenhardt (1989a) 
suggested that PBC is more effective when performance outcomes are easy 
to measure, when the parties involved have very different goals, and when 
the buyer is risk-averse. BBC, on the other hand, is said to be more effective 
when there is high task programmability, high outcome uncertainty, high 
information availability, supplier risk-aversion, and a long-term relationship 
(Ouchi, 1979; Kirsch, 1996). Of these factors, outcome uncertainty has 
gained particular interested in recent research on PBC (Selviaridis and 
Wynstra, 2015).  
Outcome uncertainty arises when performance outcomes are only 
partly a function of the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Zu and Kaynak, 
2012). Early agency theory literature proposes that environmental factors 
such as economic climate, government policies and competitor actions – all 
factors that are external to the principal and agent – are key causes of 
variations in performance outcomes (Celly and Frazier, 1996; Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Moreover, in service outsourcing relationships, suppliers have to rely 
on customer inputs, including physical assets, information and actors (Chase, 
1978; Sampson and Froehle, 2006). These inputs form one of the key factors 
affecting how much outcome uncertainty a service supplier is exposed to. 
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Since suppliers that operate in service triads rely on buyer and end-customer 
inputs to the service delivery process (Wynstra et al., 2015), outcome 
uncertainty typically is quite high (Li and Choi, 2009; Niranjan and Metri, 
2008; Nullmeier et al., 2016). According to theory, the higher the outcome 
uncertainty that suppliers are facing, the less effective is PBC in achieving 
satisfactory performance outcomes (Gruneberg, Hughes, and Ancell, 2007). 
Moreover, Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, and Roodhooft (2012) found evidence 
that output controls – once implemented – have a negative effect on 
(perceived) supplier performance when services require intensive supplier-
customer interaction. In sum, when the actions of the buyer or final customer 
strongly influence the extent of the liability of the supplier for performance 
outcomes, contracting on performance is less effective in achieving 
satisfactory performance outcomes (Handley and Gray, 2013; Mayer, 
Nickerson, and Owan, 2004). Therefore, we posit that, in the presence of 
PBC, outcome uncertainty decreases the likelihood of achieving satisfactory 
performance outcomes. Thus, we formulate the following baseline 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. In service triads where the buyer-supplier relation is 
governed by a performance-based contract, outcome uncertainty is 
negatively associated with buyer satisfaction. 
 
In addition to this baseline hypothesis, we aim to investigate the 
process by which this effect comes about. According to Agency Theory, the 
presence of outcome uncertainty, in the context of PBC, is likely to induce 
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the supplier to act opportunistically by shirking (Ross, 1973; Wang and 
Yang, 2013). While acting opportunistically can refer to any type of adverse 
action characterized by self-interest with guile, shirking of responsibility is a 
specific type of opportunistic action (Fong and Tosi, 2007). Shirking – 
passive, but intentional opportunistic behavior – represents the extent to 
which a service provider is prone to underperform or withhold resources 
(Handley and Benton, 2012; Wathne and Heide, 2000). As Handley and 
Benton (2012, p. 55) argue: “[…] providers may be inclined to withhold 
resources or “under-invest” in the relationship if they believe the outsourcing 
firm is unable to detect such action (i.e. shirking).” Outcome uncertainty 
implies that the service performance achieved cannot be clearly attributed to 
the supplier; it can also be due to external circumstances, and to the behaviors 
and inputs of the buyer and customer. Therefore, the supplier may choose to 
underdeliver, since under PBC its efforts or behavior are not monitored. 
When suppliers shirk responsibility, they will likely fail to achieve what was 
agreed upon in the contract and buyers become unsatisfied with the services 
provided. Based on these insights, we formulate the following mediation 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. In service triads where the buyer-supplier relation is 
governed by a performance-based contract, shirking of responsibility 
by suppliers mediates the negative relationship between outcome 
uncertainty and buyer satisfaction. 
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2.2.2 Combined Effects of Performance-based and Behavior-based 
Contracting 
Most studies adopting agency theory are typically based on the longstanding 
assumption that PBC and BBC are mutual substitutes (Cardinal, Kreutzer, 
and Miller, 2017; Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003). This so-called singular 
view on contracting is increasingly criticized in the literature for not 
reflecting empirical reality where different forms of contracting or control 
co-exist in the same inter-organizational relationship (Sitkin et al., 2010), for 
instance in order to share different types of risks (De Jong et al., 2014). One 
example of a service triad in which PBC and BBC have been combined 
successfully concerns a train operator, which contracts the services of a 
cleaning services supplier. In this service triad, contracted cleaning services 
are delivered directly to passengers while trains are in service. The train 
operator combined PBC and BBC to ensure that cleaning quality targets were 
met (PBC) and that safety requirements were adhered to (BBC) (Nullmeier 
et al., 2016).  
A recent meta-analysis of controls, both in intra-organizational and 
inter-organizational settings, reveals that PBC and BBC have complementary 
effects on performance (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018). Specifically, for buyer-
supplier relations, Handley and Gray (2013) investigate the complementarity 
in use and in effectiveness of output (or performance) and process (or 
behavior) controls. In their study of quality management practices, they find 
support for a substitution effect in use between output-oriented quality 
controls and process-oriented quality controls. However, they also find 
moderate support for the complementary effectiveness of output-oriented 
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and process-oriented controls. In their multiple case study of contracting in 
service triads, Broekhuis and Scholten (2018) also suggest that combining 
PBC and BBC can help in achieving satisfactory performance. In a theory-
building study, Whipple and Roh (2010) identify four different outsourcing 
scenarios characterized by different levels of outcome measurability (i.e., the 
degree to which performance outcomes are difficult to measure or difficult 
to measure within a limited amount of time) and outcome uncertainty. Using 
these scenarios, they develop the proposition that a combination of PBC and 
BBC is most effective when both outcome measurability and uncertainty are 
low, or when both are high. Overall, however, there are very few empirical 
studies investigating the combined effects of PBC and BBC, let alone studies 
testing the specific contingencies or task characteristics affecting these 
interactions.  
We therefore propose and empirically validate the combined effects 
of PBC and BBC, in particular how that combination would affect the impact 
that outcome uncertainty has on supplier shirking, and thereby on buyer 
satisfaction. Moreover, building on the recent work of Sumo et al. (2016), 
we propose to distinguish two phases of contracting in investigating these 
effects: contract design and contract management or execution. The 
distinction between these two phases is important since behaviors and 
performance targets for outsourced services cannot always be fully defined 
in advance because of their dynamic nature (cf. Carson, 2007). It is therefore 
that what is monitored during the contract management phase can differ 
substantially from what was specified during the contract design phase 
(Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker Jr, 2002). While a buyer may have designed a 
predominantly performance-based contract at the start of an exchange, it may 
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introduce additional behavior monitoring during contract execution when it 
feels that performance targets are not met (Sumo et al., 2016). 
Distinguishing between these two phases is especially important in 
the case of service triads as the nature of triadic arrangements means that the 
buyer gradually relinquishes direct involvement in service delivery, 
delegating this to the service supplier (Li and Choi, 2009). Put differently, in 
the contract management phase, the supplier gradually positions itself 
between the buyer and the customer. While the contract that the buyer has 
established with the supplier during the contract design phase is expected to 
guide the exchange process between supplier and end-customer (by defining 
either the performance to be achieved, and/or the behavior/processes to 
adopt), these changing interaction patterns mean that during the subsequent 
contract management phase the opportunities for monitoring to ensure proper 
service delivery and appropriate supplier behavior may change (Van der Valk 
and Van Iwaarden, 2011; Li and Choi, 2009). When studying the effects of 
contracting on shirking behavior, it is therefore helpful to distinguish 
between what has been specified in a contract during the contract design 
phase and the type of control mechanisms that are actually used to measure, 
monitor and evaluate performance outcomes and behaviors during the 
contract management phase (Carson, 2007; Glas, Henne, and Essig, 2018). 
Hence, we use two pairs of constructs to capture what happens in the 
respective phases. For the contract design phase, we use performance vs. 
behavior specification, namely the ‘performance outcomes to be achieved 
and incentives tied to the achievement of outcomes’ and the ‘behaviors (i.e., 
processes and procedures) to be adhered to.’ For the contract management 
phase, we use performance vs. behavior evaluation, namely the 
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measurement, monitoring and evaluation of ‘performance outcomes 
achieved’ and ‘behaviors used to achieve performance outcomes’ (Dekker 
and Van den Abbeele, 2010; Ouchi, 1979).  
The contracting literature is somewhat divided on how shirking of 
responsibility is affected by specifying during the contract design phase not 
only the desired performance outcomes but also what behaviors are required 
of suppliers. On the one hand, adding behavior specification to the mix can 
be beneficial since it (1) reduces the information asymmetry between buyer 
and supplier, (2) reduces the risk for suppliers of not being rewarded for the 
effort invested and (3) enables buyers to use their specialist expertise to 
provide guidance to suppliers to complete specific tasks (Bello and Gilliland, 
1997; Ramaswami, 1996; Whipple and Roh, 2010). Following this line of 
reasoning, one would conclude that combining performance and behavior 
specification weakens the shirking inducing effect of outcome uncertainty. 
On the other hand, imposing specific procedures can be counterproductive 
since it places constraints on the supplier’s ability to use its expertise to 
structure processes in the most effective way (Bonner et al., 2002; Sumo et 
al., 2016; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, one 
would conclude that combining performance and behavior specification 
strengthens the shirking inducing effect of outcome uncertainty. Based on 
these insights, we formulate the following competing hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Behavior specification moderates the effect of 
performance specification such that this combination of contractual 
controls weakens the indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer 
satisfaction through shirking of responsibility by suppliers.  
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Hypothesis 3b. Behavior specification moderates the effect of 
performance specification such that this combination of contractual 
controls strengthens the indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer 
satisfaction through shirking of responsibility by suppliers.  
 
There is a similar division over how the shirking inducing effect of 
outcome uncertainty is affected by evaluating both performance and behavior 
during the contract management phase. Studies that adopt a singular view on 
contractual controls argue that performance evaluation decreases shirking, 
whereas behavior evaluation increases shirking (e.g., Aiken and Hage, 1966; 
Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan, 2007). Few studies have, however, researched 
how these two contractual controls interact. Hirst (1981, 1983) argues that 
contractual controls should not only signal to the supplier that performance 
outcomes have not been achieved, but should also be accompanied by some 
discussion of why those performance outcomes were not achieved and how 
this can be corrected in the future. Engaging in such constructive discussions 
about shortcomings in procedures is particularly important in service triads 
since suppliers are dependent on buyer and customer inputs (Li and Choi, 
2009; Niranjan and Metri, 2008).  
Therefore, evaluation of behavior can help to build mutual 
understanding and can help suppliers to feel they are being treated fairly 
(Long, Bendersky, and Morrill, 2011; Ramaswami, 1996). Following this 
line of reasoning, one would conclude that combining performance and 
behavior evaluation weakens the shirking inducing effect of outcome 
uncertainty. On the other hand, it has been argued that behavior evaluation 
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may be perceived as obtrusive since it limits the supplier’s autonomy 
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Sumo et al., 2016; Van der Valk and Iwaarden, 
2011). This may hinder the supplier’s ability to make adjustments needed 
during the early stages of a project and can ultimately result in performance 
outcomes that are unsatisfactory to the buyer. Following this line of 
reasoning, one would conclude that combining performance and behavior 
evaluation strengthens the shirking inducing effect of outcome uncertainty. 
Based on these insights, we formulate the following competing hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Behavior evaluation moderates the effect of 
performance evaluation such that this combination of contractual 
controls weakens the indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer 
satisfaction through shirking of responsibility by suppliers. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. Behavior evaluation moderates the effect of 
performance evaluation such that this combination of contractual 
controls strengthens the indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer 
satisfaction through shirking of responsibility by suppliers.   
 
These hypothesized relationships are depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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Fig. 2.1. Conceptual model 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Measure Development 
The unit of analysis in this study is the transaction or exchange of a specific 
service in a given service triad. Therefore, all of the constructs are measured 
at the transaction level. Construct and scale development took place in four 
stages as articulated by Saghiri (2011). First, we defined the constructs and 
their measured variables by conducting an extensive literature review. 
Operationalization of constructs has been achieved by using reflective as well 
as formative multiple-item measures. While formative indicators cause the 
latent variable, and are therefore referred to as cause indicators, reflective 
indicators are referred to as effect indicators and are chosen from a universe 
of items that are related to the construct (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 
2001). Items of formative constructs together form the latent construct. 
Formative indicators must be collectively exhaustive to form the latent 
variable reliably and are therefore not interchangeable (Diamantopoulos, 
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Riefler, & Roth, 2008; Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). Following 
prescriptions of Dillman (2000), we operationalized the constructs using 
single- or multi-item reflective measures based on scales used in previous 
research whenever possible.  
While we were able to identify existing scales to measure most of our 
constructs, no existing scales were available to measure buyer satisfaction, 
performance and behavior specification, and service importance. To 
operationalize these constructs, we developed formative scales since these 
constructs meet the following four criteria formulated by Jarvis, MacKenzie, 
and Podsakoff (2003): (1) the direction of causality is from the indicators to 
the construct, (2) the indicators are not interchangeable as each refers to a 
different and distinctive aspect of the construct, (3) the indicators do not 
necessarily co-vary, and (4) the nomological net of indicators is expected to 
differ for each of the sub-constructs. During development, we safeguarded 
validity of the formative constructs by ensuring that the measurement items 
conceptually capture a substantial part of the domain (Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer, 2001; Rossiter, 2002). Second, we sought help from scholars 
and practitioners with expertise in the area of performance-based contracting 
to validate – in particular – our newly developed measurement scales. In two 
discussion rounds, we met with a mixed group of six to eight individuals. 
After explaining the research and its key constructs, we introduced and 
discussed the initial measures for all developed measurement scales. This 
exercise resulted in modifications to the some of the scales (as we explain 
below when discussing our measures), as well as minor language changes.  
Finally, we pre-tested the survey in a pilot study with 16 purchasing 
practitioners selected from the sample frame of the large-scale survey. We 
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used the responses to evaluate the feasibility of the survey, the time taken, 
and any adverse events that occurred so that we could improve our study’s 
design prior to actual data collection. We also used the pilot study to evaluate 
and validate our measurement items.  
2.3.2 Measures 
All items were measured using five-point Likert-type rating scales (strongly 
disagree-strongly agree), with the exception of Relationship Continuation, 
which is categorical (yes/ no) (see Appendix A for an overview of our key 
constructs and measurement items).  
Independent variable 
To measure outcome uncertainty (OUTCUNC), we used an adapted four-
item reflective scale based on the works of Eisenhardt (1989a), Nilakant and 
Rao (1994) and Celly and Frazier (1996). Outcome uncertainty is measured 
by assessing the effect of external factors on service delivery outcome 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), fluctuation in the outcome experienced by the end-
customer and the difficulty of predicting the outcome experienced by end-
customer (Celly and Frazier, 1996), and the effect of supplier effort on the 
outcome experienced by end-customer (Nilakant and Rao, 1994).  
Dependent variable 
To measure buyer satisfaction (BUYSATIS), we developed a five-item 
formative scale. Building on services marketing literature (Edvardsson and 
Olsson, 1996; Grönroos (1982), and in line with Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 
(2010), we asked informants to what extent their organization is satisfied 
with the service delivery process and the overall service quality. More 
specifically, buyer satisfaction with the delivery process, quality of service 
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delivery, contributions to improving processes or services, realized cost 
savings, and contributions to improve margin, revenue or return together 
form the buyer satisfaction construct. 
Mediator 
To measure shirking of responsibility (RESPSHIR) when problems arise, we 
built on the eight-item reflective scale of observed opportunism by Wang, 
Kayande, and Jap (2010). Five items were dropped after the discussion 
rounds, as participants indicated these measures to reflect malicious intent 
rather than seeking self-interest with guile.  A three-item reflective scale 
remained assessing the extent to which the supplier sticks to its promises, is 
available, and informs the buyer when problems are encountered. 
Moderators  
To measure performance specification (PERFSPEC) and behavior 
specification (BEHSPEC), we developed two formative scales based on the 
empirical work of Martin (2007). We measured performance specification 
using a nine-item scale. Informants were asked to what extent performance 
targets relevant to the end-customer and the buyer, and bonuses and fines 
linked to these targets, had been specified in the contract. We measured 
behavior specification based on a four-item scale based on Argyres and 
Mayer (2007), who measure contractual detail in terms of task descriptions 
(i.e., operational, and management and control activities), communication 
(i.e., management reporting), and contingency planning. While our survey 
did include items for the latter, they were excluded from our measurement 
model as they were more generic in nature rather than specifically related to 
behaviors. Instead, we added (and maintained in our measurement model) an 
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item measuring the extent to which the contract contained provisions 
regarding supplier performance measurement.   
To measure performance evaluation (PERFEVAL) and behavior 
evaluation (BEHEVAL), we used five-item formative scales based on the 
work of Dekker and Van den Abbeele (2010). Performance evaluation was 
measured by asking informants to what extent the supplier’s performance 
was monitored and rewarded. Behavior evaluation was measured by asking 
informants to what extent the supplier operated according to specified 
procedures.  
Control variables 
Control variables were added to minimize the possibility of confounded 
results that limit the explanatory power of the model (Kish, 1959; Pedhazur 
and Schmelkin, 1991). We control for four variables that may affect the 
dependent variable, based on previous literature (see Atinc, Simmering, and 
Kroll, 2012; Specter and Brannick, 2011). First, we controlled for the buyer’s 
size (BUYSIZE), a natural logarithm of the number of individuals employed 
by the buyer (Carey, Lawson, and Krause, 2011; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). 
Firm size reflects the financial resources the firm has access to (Contractor, 
Kumar, and Kundu, 2007) and the bargaining power of the buyer over the 
supplier (Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger, 2008).  
Suppliers dealing with firms that have high bargaining power are 
expected to refrain from shirking, thus leading to higher buyer satisfaction. 
Second, we controlled for the buyer’s dependence (BUYDEP) on the 
supplier, measuring this using a four item reflective scale (Hernández-
Espallardo and Arcas-Lario, 2008; Jap and Anderson, 2007). Suppliers are 
expected to shirk more when dealing with buyers that are dependent on them 
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and these buyers are thus likely to be less satisfied. Third, we controlled for 
the continuation of the buyer-supplier relationship (RELCON) as this reflects 
the degree to which a relationship exists between buyer and supplier 
(Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000; Carey et al., 2011; Stouthuysen et al., 
2012). Longer-lasting relationships may help parties to build trust (Malhotra 
and Lumineau, 2011), which may affect shirking by suppliers and therefore 
buyer satisfaction. Fourth, we controlled for the relative importance of the 
contracted service in the buyer’s overall value proposition (SERVIMP), 
measuring this using a three item formative scale (Stouthuysen et al., 2012). 
Dependence on the supplier and the relative importance of the service are 
added as control variables as these reflect the degree of risk the buyer is 
exposed to when the intended performance outcomes are not achieved by the 
supplier. As PBC largely shifts that risk to suppliers, a service that is deemed 
to be highly important involves more risk for the supplier, which increases 
the likelihood of shirking of responsibility and decreases buyer satisfaction.  
2.3.3 Data Collection Procedure 
Data were collected in collaboration with the Dutch Association for 
Purchasing Management (NEVI) in 2013 by means of an online 
questionnaire. NEVI provided us with its membership list containing the 
names and telephone numbers of Dutch purchasing professionals. Working 
with a professional association membership list greatly increased our chances 
of getting informed individuals with relevant information and backgrounds 
(Montabon, Daugherty, and Chen, 2018). A total of 1,518 purchasing 
professionals were contacted by phone to establish (1) whether they were at 
that point in time involved in a buyer-initiated service triad, where 
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contracting was done through some form of PBC and (2) whether they would 
be willing to participate in the study. Individuals that met both criteria were 
asked to select a contractual relationship for which 1) they had been involved 
in purchasing the service, 2) the contractual relationship had been ongoing 
for at least a year, and 3) the supplier was the primary supplier and there were 
at most two other suppliers of the same service. The individual’s contact 
details and the selected contractual relationship (i.e., type of service and 
name of supplier) were then recorded. Informants were subsequently sent a 
link to the online questionnaire. To ensure that questions were answered in 
relation to the specific contractual relationship that had been selected, 
informants were reminded at the start of the questionnaire which service and 
supplier had been selected. Data for all constructs were collected from the 
perspective of purchasing managers since our constructs are monadic in 
nature (Flynn, Pagell, and Fugate, 2018). 
Of the 1,518 purchasing professionals we contacted, 410 indicated 
that they had experience with PBC in service triads. Of these 410 purchasing 
managers, 369 indicated their willingness to participate in our study. These 
informants were reminded three times; twice via email, then a final reminder 
via telephone. This resulted in responses from 120 purchase managers 
(response rate: 33 percent). After deleting responses with missing data, we 
had a final sample consisting of 92 responses (effective response rate: 25 
percent). Table 2.1 lists the industries and services represented in this sample. 
The organizations represented have an average total revenue of €2.2 billion 
(fiscal year 2012), and 69% of them employ more than 250 people. On 
average the purchasing spend of these organizations is €897 million (fiscal 
year 2012). All the buyers and their suppliers are located in the Netherlands, 
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which means that national cultural differences and geographic dispersion do 
not affect these outsourcing relationships.  
 
Table 2.1 
Industries and services represented in the sample 
Industry (SIC)    
Agricultural services 2% Health services 9% 
Amusement and recreation 
services 1% 
Heavy construction, excl. 
building 2% 
Business services 14% Insurance carriers 2% 
Chemicals and allied products 1% Oil and gas extraction 1% 
Communications 5% Railroad transportation 7% 
Educational services 14% Real estate 1% 
Electrical services 2% Service, NEC 1% 
Engineering and management 
services 13% Social services 1% 
Executive, legislative and 
general government 8% 
Transportation equipment 
services 1% 
Food and kindred products 1% Wholesale trade-durable goods 1% 
General building contractors 1% Wholesale-trade non-durable goods 2% 
Service    
Catering 9% IT 2% 
Cleaning 16% Legal 1% 
Consultancy 5% Maintenance and repair 9% 
Delivery 4% Marketing 2% 
Facility management 2% Production 1% 
Financial services 1% Software 1% 
Healthcare 4% Transportation 11% 
Home care 3% Other 17% 
Installation 7%   
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In terms of sectors our sample is quite heterogeneous, which is 
consistent with the relevant theoretical domain for our propositions: all 
buyer-initiated service triads that use some degree of performance-based 
contracting. As in any cross-sectional study, our findings may in principle be 
confounded by unobserved heterogeneity. That is why we explicitly control 
for (four) specific triad characteristics as mentioned above, which we 
explicitly motivate from previous research (see Atinc et al., 2012; Spector 
and Brannick, 2011). Based on the extant conceptual and empirical literature 
on service triads and contracting, we have no a priori reason to include the 
type of sector as a control variable. Nevertheless, we decided to run an 
additional check to see whether we could pool the data for the private and 
public sector observations; the data set contains data on both public (47.7 
percent) and private (52.3 percent) organizations. The t-test we conducted 
shows there to be no significant differences between means of our study 
variables when comparing public and private organizations: OUTCUNC 
(t(90)= -1.63, p = .106), BUYSATIS (t(90) = 1.20, p = .233), RESPSHIR 
(t(90) = .67, p = .507), PERFSPEC (t(90) = -1.92, p = .058), BEHSPEC (t(90) 
= -1.37, p = .175), PERFEVAL (t(90) = -1.94, p = .056), BEHEVAL (t(90) 
= -.131, p = .896). We therefore integrated the private and public sub-samples 
into a single sample.  
2.3.4 Non-response Bias 
To assess the possibility of non-response bias, we compared the responses of 
early respondents (before the first reminder) and late respondents (after the 
first reminder) in terms of our main predictor variables and the size of the 
organization (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Our t-test showed that there 
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were no significant differences between early and late respondents in terms 
of the means of OUTCUNC (t(90)= -.85, p = .400), BUYSATIS (t(90) = 
1.31, p = .193), RESPSHIR (t(90) = -.80, p = .423), PERFSPEC (t(90) = .09, 
p = .930), BEHSPEC (t(90) = -.63, p = .529), PERFEVAL (t(90) = .07, p = 
.947), BEHEVAL (t(90) = -.76, p = .449), and BUYSIZE (t(90) = .15, p 
=.880). It should be noted that this test is based on the assumption that late 
respondents are representative of non-respondents. To verify whether this 
assumption is met, an additional test can be conducted in which key 
characteristics of organizations contained in the sample are compared to a 
benchmark of all organizations in the sampling frame (Petersen, Handfield, 
and Ragatz, 2005). As we did not have access to this benchmark data (it is 
not in the NEVI membership records), such an additional test could not be 
conducted. The results of this non-response bias test therefore provide some 
support (but not clear-cut evidence) that our data are not affected by non-
response bias.    
2.3.5 Construct Measurement Qualities 
We assessed the reliability of the reflective constructs by calculating 
Cronbach’s α values. The reliability of each construct was satisfactory, with 
a composite reliability of at least .8 (Lance, Butts, and Michels, 2006; 
Nunnally, 1978). To assess convergent validity, we computed the average 
variance extracted (AVE) for each of the reflective constructs. As shown in 
Appendix A, all the AVEs exceeded the recommended minimum level of .5, 
indicating a sufficient level of convergent validity (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). Finally, to test the discriminant validity of the reflective constructs, 
we compared the correlation between constructs with the square root of the 
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AVE. Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for our constructs. This 
table demonstrates that the square root of the AVE for each construct was 
greater than the correlations, indicating a satisfactory level of discriminant 
validity. Overall, the measurement model thus exhibits sufficient reliability 
and validity. 
We safeguarded the validity of our formative constructs by 
examining content validity as well as the multi-collinearity among the 
measurement items (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; 
Diamantopoulos et al., 2008). The expert discussion rounds and the pretest 
had already demonstrated the suitability of formative measurement scales 
that had been developed (i.e., content validity). We assessed multi-
collinearity by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIF) and bivariate 
correlations between measurement items and the respective construct 
(Cenfetelli and Bassellier, 2009). The VIF values for our formative 
constructs were as follows: 1.05–2.34 (BUYSATIS), 1.07–1.49 
(PERFSPEC), 1.04–2.26 (BEHSPEC), 1.08–1.52 (PERFEVAL), 1.08–2.37 
(BEHEVAL), and 1.24–2.38 (SERVIMP). These VIFs are satisfactory, even 
for our relatively small sample size (Guide and Ketokivi, 2017). The 
bivariate correlations, which are reported in Appendix A, reveal that all 
measurement items are positively correlated with their respective construct. 
Therefore, we conclude that these indicators are important and valid facets 
of our constructs’ domains. 
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2.3.6 Common Method Bias 
Using single informants can enable the researcher to obtain pragmatic 
experience-based inputs from people who know what is going on within their 
firm (Montabon et al., 2018). However, the use of single informants to 
measure information for multiple variables based on perceptual measures can 
potentially be a source of systematic measurement error (Flynn et al., 2018). 
Common method bias (CMB) can be addressed most effectively during the 
research design phase (Montabon et al., 2018). We therefore took several 
measures at the survey design stage to minimize the effect of CMB. First, we 
ensured full anonymity for our respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Second, we targeted purchasing managers and asked them to answer 
questions about a specific contractual relationship in order to improve the 
credibility of the answers (Narayanan et al., 2011). We instructed informants 
to select a contractual relationship in which they had been involved recently. 
Third, questions relating to distinct constructs were asked on separate pages 
of the questionnaire to reduce the likelihood of item priming effects 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Fourth, we employed scale formats and anchors that 
were most appropriate for each question. Obtaining secondary data on 
outcome variables was not possible, mainly due to the perceptual nature of 
our dependent variable (buyer satisfaction). 
To detect whether these measures minimized the effect of CMB, we 
employed Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) post-hoc statistical strategy for 
detecting CMB. This technique checks for CMB by correcting bivariate 
correlations between the study’s variables by subtracting correlations 
between the marker variable, a theoretically unrelated variable and the study 
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variables. If the corrected correlations become insignificant when compared 
to the uncorrected correlations, CMB is detected (Richardson, Simmering, 
and Sturman, 2009). To detect CMB, we used ‘end-customer dependence on 
the supplier’ as a marker variable. The output of the correlational marker 
technique provided no evidence of CMB since none of the corrected 
correlations became insignificant. 
2.4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
2.4.1 Direct Effect Analysis 
To test our baseline hypothesis that outcome uncertainty is negatively related 
to buyer satisfaction, we performed hierarchical regression analyses. For the 
first model, buyer satisfaction was regressed on the control variables. We 
then included outcome uncertainty in the second model. We checked for 
multi-collinearity of independent and control variables by examining the VIF 
values. We found that the VIF scores ranged between 1.01 and 1.04. Since 
these scores indicate little or no inflation arising from collinearity of 
predictors, we conclude that multi-collinearity is not an issue (Guide and 
Ketokivi, 2015). We tested for heteroscedasticity using the recommended 
Breusch–Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). There was not an issue with 
heteroscedasticity (BP = 3.87, df = 4, p = 0.424). The regression results 
(Table 2.3) provide support for hypothesis 1, since outcome uncertainty is 
shown to have a negative effect on buyer satisfaction (b = -1.13, β = -.32, p 
= .002, 95% CI = -1.86 to -.51).   
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Table 2.3 
Regression results from the direct effect analysis 
Dependent variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Buyer satisfaction  b S.E.  b S.E. 
(Intercept)  18.593** .856  18.557** .815 
Control variables       
  BUYSIZE c1 -.146 .120 c1 -.150 .114 
  BUYDEP c2 -.208 .354 c2 -.221 .337 
  RELCON c3   .425 .539 c3 .531 .514 
  SERVIMP c4   .108 .109 c4 .141 .104 
Independent variable       
  OUTUNC    c -1.130** .355 
R2    .032   .133  
Adj. R2    -.012   .083  
R2 change    .032     .101
**  
F  .724   10.151  
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients 
reported 
 
2.4.2 Mediation Analysis 
To test whether shirking of responsibility mediates the negative relationship 
between outcome uncertainty and buyer satisfaction, we carried out 
mediation analysis. The regression results are presented in Table 2.4 (Model 
3); where the first column of regression coefficients refers to the relations 
with responsibility shirking as dependent variable (paths a in the mediation 
model) and the second column of regression coefficients refers to the 
relations with buyer satisfaction as dependent variable (paths b in the 
meditation model).  
In the next step, we followed the recommendations of Hayes (2013, 
2018) to use bootstrapping to detect mediation by computing the confidence 
interval of the indirect effect. While several approaches can be used to test 
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for mediation, bootstrapping is the preferred method due to its low sample 
size requirement and the fact that it does not rely on the assumption of 
asymptotic normality (Malhotra et al., 2014; Rungtusanatham, Miller, and 
Boyer, 2014). We therefore tested for mediation using Hayes’s (2013) 
PROCESS bootstrapping macro. We find evidence of mediation since the 
95% bootstrapping confidence interval for the indirect effect lies between -
.74 and -.07 (adjusted R2 = .181, p = .000) (to conserve space, the indices are 
not repeated in Table 2.4). While research often distinguishes between full 
and partial mediation, Rungtusanatham et al. (2014) argue that this is not 
appropriate since full mediation can never be truly tested. We therefore do 
not make this distinction.  
2.4.3 Moderation Analysis 
To test whether combining contracting approaches helps to prevent suppliers 
shirking their responsibility, we carry out conditional process analysis 
(Hayes, 2018). Conditional process analysis is an analytical strategy that 
seeks to quantify the boundary conditions of mechanisms. This is done by 
testing whether the effect of a mechanism (i.e., shirking of responsibility) is 
contingent on other factors. More specifically, moderated mediation occurs 
when the strength of a mediation process differs at specific levels of a 
moderator, which is also known as a conditional effect (Muller, Judd, and 
Yzerbyt, 2005).  
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Moreover, our hypotheses 3-4 propose that the indirect effect of shirking on 
buyer satisfaction is conditional not on a single factor or moderator, but a 
combination of moderators: the combination of behavior and performance 
specification, and the combination of behavior and performance evaluation. 
In other words, we are proposing moderated moderated mediation effects. 
Using the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2018), we establish whether 
the moderation of the indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer 
satisfaction by performance specification is conditional on behavior 
specification. Likewise, we also establish whether the moderation of the 
indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer satisfaction by performance 
evaluation is conditional on behavior evaluation. If the index of moderated 
mediation provides evidence of moderated moderated mediation, we probe 
the interaction to establish whether there is evidence of conditional 
moderated mediation.  This is done using the conditional moderated 
mediation index, which quantifies the linear relationship between a specific 
moderator and the indirect effect at a low, medium and high value of the 
second moderator. 
Model 4 (see Table 2.4) tests for moderated moderated mediation of 
performance and behavior specification. Again, the first column of 
regression coefficients refers to the relations with responsibility shirking as 
dependent variable (paths a in the mediation model) and the second column 
of regression coefficients refers to the relations with buyer satisfaction as 
dependent variable (paths b in the meditation model). The regression 
coefficient for the three-way interaction (a6) is not significant, but following 
Hayes (2018) it is more appropriate for small samples like ours to consider 
the moderated moderated mediation index. As the confidence interval of this 
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index includes zero (-.022, 95% CI = -.062 to .011), there is no evidence of 
moderated moderated mediation for the two types of specification (to 
conserve space, the indices are not repeated in Table 2.4). That is, our results 
do not provide support for Hypothesis 3a or for Hypothesis 3b.  
Model 5 tests for moderated moderated mediation of behavior and 
performance evaluation. As can be seen in Table 2.4, the explanatory power 
of this second moderated moderated mediation model increases substantially 
in comparison to the baseline mediation model (R2 increases from .101 to 
.238). Again, the regression coefficient for the three-way interaction (a6) is 
not significant, but following Hayes (2018) we primarily consider the 
moderated moderated mediation index. This index provides evidence of 
moderated moderated mediation (-.008, 95% CI = -.022 to -.001; to conserve 
space, indices not repeated in Table 2.4).  
Based on this result, we probe for evidence of conditional moderated 
mediation. We do this by subsequently considering the moderation by each 
of the two factors (behavior evaluation and performance evaluation) of the 
other factors’ moderating effect. We do this for completeness, even though 
our conceptual model, strictly speaking, has specified a ‘primary’ and a 
‘secondary’ moderator within H4 (and H3, for that matter). This step reveals 
two conditional effects. First, the conditional moderated mediation index of 
performance evaluation reveals that performance evaluation moderates the 
indirect effect when there is a low level of behavior evaluation. This first 
conditional moderated mediation effect is illustrated in Figure 2.2. While 
performance evaluation does not moderate the indirect effect when a medium 
(.031, 95% CI = .000 to .083) or high level (.004, 95% CI = -.042 to .050) of 
behavior evaluation is used, performance evaluation weakens the negative 
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indirect effect when a low level (.059, 95% CI = .013 to .138) of behavior 
evaluation is used. Consequently, the moderating effect of performance 
evaluation is conditional on there being a low level of behavior evaluation. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Visualization of conditional moderated mediation. 
Second, the conditional moderated mediation index of behavior 
evaluation reveals that behavior evaluation moderates the indirect effect, if a 
high level of performance evaluation is used. This second conditional 
moderated mediation effect is illustrated in Figure 2.3. While behavior 
evaluation does not moderate the indirect effect when a low (.007, 95% CI = 
-.083 to .112) or medium level (-.064, 95% CI = -.158 to .015) of 
performance evaluation is used, behavior evaluation strengthens the negative 
indirect effect when a high level (-.133, 95% CI = -.314 to -.025) of 
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
Low PERFEVAL Medium PERFEVAL High PERFEVAL
In
di
re
ct
 e
ffe
ct
 O
UT
C
UN
C
 o
n 
BU
YS
A
TI
S 
th
ro
ug
h 
R
ES
PS
H
IR
Astitel
High BEHEVAL: slope = .004, n.s.
Chapter 2 
 
53 
 
performance evaluation is used. Consequently, the moderating effect of 
behavior evaluation is conditional on using a high level of performance 
evaluation. 
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Visualization of conditional moderated mediation. 
 
Based on these results we conclude that using performance evaluation 
in combination with behavior evaluation can both weaken and strengthen the 
indirect effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer satisfaction through shirking 
of responsibility. Figure 2.2 reveals that for a given low level of behavioral 
evaluation, increasing the amount of performance evaluation will weaken the 
(indirect) negative effect of outcome uncertainty on buyer satisfaction, 
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Hypothesis 4b. The moderated moderated mediation effects are not 
significant in the other situations (gray lines in Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
2.5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
PBC is used in service triads for the purpose of motivating suppliers in order 
to deliver superior performance (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015; Wynstra et 
al. 2015). Specifically, it is achieved by implementing a payment model that 
shifts responsibility to suppliers (Sumo et al., 2016). Since linking pay to 
performance can expose suppliers to considerable financial risk, this method 
of contracting has long been deemed ineffective in achieving satisfactory 
performance outcomes, when performance outcomes are not (entirely) under 
the control of suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). We tested 
this notion in relation to service triads, where there is outcome uncertainty 
due to both buyers and suppliers being involved in providing the service 
(Bastl, Johnson and Finne, 2019). While our study confirms that PBC is less 
effective to induce suppliers to deliver satisfactory performance outcomes 
when performance outcomes are uncertain (H1 is supported), we find that the 
supplier’s propensity to engage in shirking behavior can be mitigated by 
using particular combinations of PBC and BBC. Our findings hold several 
implications for theory.  
First, this study increases our understanding of the behavioral 
mechanism by which outcome uncertainty decreases the effectiveness of 
PBC in the context of service triads. Our results reveal that outcome 
uncertainty leads suppliers to shirk their responsibilities, as it increases the 
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financial risk that they are exposed to and thus leads to poorer performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Ross, 1973; Wang and Yang, 2013).  
Second, we find that the specific ways in which PBC and BBC are 
combined determines how outcome uncertainty affects supplier behavior. In 
contrast to prior contracting literature (e.g., Argyres and Mayer, 2007), our 
study focuses on the effectiveness of contractual controls during contract 
design and the subsequent contract management phase. This enables us to 
explicate what should be specified during the contract design phase and what 
should be monitored and evaluated during the contract management phase 
(Carson, 2007). While we find no evidence that combining performance and 
behavior specification mitigates the shirking inducing effect of outcome 
uncertainty, our results reveal that combining performance and behavior 
evaluation can have such a mitigating effect. This means that monitoring and 
evaluation activities are an important mechanism by which buyers can 
mitigate supplier shirking in service triads (Van der Valk and Iwaarden, 
2011). Moreover, our results reveal that this ‘mitigation effectiveness’ of 
monitoring and evaluation activities depends on how the different forms of 
contractual controls are precisely combined during the contract management 
phase.  
For a given low level of behavioral evaluation, increasing the amount 
of performance evaluation will weaken the (indirect) negative effect of 
outcome uncertainty on buyer satisfaction. This corroborates earlier findings 
on the favorable effects of output monitoring on customer-supplier relations 
and supplier performance (Heide et al., 2007; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). At the 
same time, retaining a minimum for of behavioral evaluation seems useful, 
in line with Hirst (1981, 1983). Effective monitoring and evaluation should 
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not only signal whether outcomes have been achieved, but be accompanied 
by discussion of how this can be improved in the future (Uenk and Telgen, 
2018).  
For a given high level of performance evaluation, increasing the 
amount of behavioral evaluation will strengthen the (indirect) negative effect 
of outcome uncertainty on buyer satisfaction. In situations where extensive 
performance evaluation is used, applying also extensive evaluation of 
behavior is counterproductive since this restricts supplier autonomy (Sumo 
et al., 2016; Whipple and Roh, 2010). With extensive behavioral evaluation, 
adherence to buyer-specified inputs, activities or processes is typically 
evaluated, restricting the supplier’s freedom to employ processes that it 
deems to be most appropriate. As the supplier’s autonomy is reduced, its 
ability to manage its exposure to risk is diminished. Consequently, in service 
triads extensive behavior evaluation leads suppliers to increasingly shirk 
their responsibility, as this form of evaluation overrides the positive effect of 
performance evaluation – even when this evaluation is extensive (Frey, 
1993). Our research findings are summarized in Figure 2.4.   
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Research results (i = moderated moderated mediation index) 
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2.5.2 Managerial Contributions 
This study provides purchasing managers with new insights into how to use 
PBC effectively in uncertain contexts such as service triads. Our findings 
have two main implications for purchasing managers.  
First, to reduce responsibility shirking by suppliers (and, thereby, 
limit the negative effects on buyer satisfaction), buying firms do well to place 
particular emphasis on the contract management phase. Our findings 
demonstrate that it is through the application of monitoring and evaluation 
activities, rather than through contractual specifications, that shirking – in the 
context of a supplier facing uncertain performance outcomes – can be 
contained. In line with these implications we encourage purchasing managers 
to focus on the activities carried out after the contract has been drawn up and 
agreed. While purchasing departments typically invest considerable 
resources in designing and negotiating contracts, our results reveal that the 
way a contract is managed is the most important in determining whether the 
performance outcomes are achieved. This is of particular relevance in service 
triads, since the uncertain nature of operations can require adaptations to the 
contractual control mechanisms employed once the contract design has been 
finalized.  
Second, buying organizations need to realize that the benefits of PBC, 
and in particular performance evaluation, are contingent on the level of 
behavioral evaluation. Investing in performance evaluation, while retaining 
high levels of behavioral evaluation (i.e. still monitoring whether the supplier 
followed the detailed work instructions), will have no noticeable effects on 
improving buyer satisfaction, to the extent that it does not reduce supplier 
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shirking. In situations, where extensive performance evaluation is used, 
adding more behavioral evaluation will even make matters worse. In other 
words, the best results are achieved by not only increasing monitoring of 
performance but at the same time reducing process or behavior monitoring. 
Particularly the latter may be difficult to achieve, especially for organizations 
that have previously conducted the supplier’s activities in-house or that 
consider themselves experts based on other grounds.  
2.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has several limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data 
used in this study prevents us from making strong causal claims. We 
therefore encourage replication of this study using longitudinal data. Second, 
the study relies on data gathered from single informants. While our results 
indicate that there are no clear indications of common method bias, we 
encourage future studies based on data triangulation. More generally, triad 
research would benefit from polyadic rather than monadic analysis, making 
data collection at (preferably) all three actors in the triad imperative. Third, 
this study uses perceptual measures of buyer satisfaction. While it is 
generally preferable to use objective data to measure this type of construct, 
most aspects of buyer satisfaction are not measured by organizations 
themselves. As an alternative, we could have relied on performance or 
effectiveness measures such as cost or quality, but these more specific 
measures are not equally relevant for the different types of services included 
in our sample. In addition, Sihag and Rijsdijk (2018) find that the results of 
studies on control mechanisms that use self-reported performance data versus 
those that use archival data do not differ significantly. Fourth, the sample has 
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limitations in terms of its scope and size; it is limited to service triads in the 
Netherlands. We would like to encourage scholars to conduct additional 
studies to replicate our findings concerning the effective use of PBC in 
service triads, and to extend our findings we would also urge scholars to 
replicate them in other contexts.  
Based on this study we suggest two main directions for future 
research. First, future studies could explore how a broader set of service 
characteristics may affect the complementary nature of PBC and BBC. 
Reflecting on the insignificant effects of performance and behavior 
evaluation leads us to believe that service complexity, for example, could 
lead to considerable variation in how effective performance and behavior 
specification might be across different types of services (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 
2018). While buyers that are contracting complex services such as social care 
rely mainly on behavior specification (Uenk and Telgen, 2018), such 
contractual controls are not as common when less complex services are being 
contracted. Additional research is therefore required to determine which 
configurations of performance and behavior specification are most effective 
when contracting specific types of services.  
Second, future research could investigate contracting in other types 
of service triads. The rise of the internet has led to a rise in different kinds of 
triadic arrangements other than conventional buyer–supplier–customer 
triads. Contemporary manifestations of triads are distinctly different from 
buyer-supplier-customer service triads since they do not involve governance 
of buyer-supplier relationships. Rather, they involve one organization acting 
as a supplier to two or more individuals, which then exchanges services (e.g., 
Airbnb and Uber). At this point it is unclear whether such different 
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characteristics affect the configuration in which contractual controls can help 
to mitigate shirking. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Outcome attributability in performance-based contracting: Roles and 
activities of the buying organization3 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Performance-based contracting deployed to purchase services has gained 
increasing attention in practice recently, but its implementation has seen 
mixed results (Ng and Nudurupati, 2010; Ssengooba, McPake, and Palmer, 
2012). Performance-based contracts have therefore also received renewed 
interest in academic literature (e.g., Heinrich and Choi, 2007; Hypko, 
Tilebein, and Gleich, 2010; Kleemann and Essig, 2013; Selviaridis and 
Wynstra, 2015). 
Previous research has explained performance differences between 
alternative contract forms primarily in relation to the characteristics of the 
task being contracted and the nature of the partners. Agency theory and 
theories on organizational control posit that performance-based contracts 
(outcome controls) are less effective when the supplier is risk averse, the 
measurability of outcome is low, and the uncertainty of the outcome is high 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Ouchi, 1979). In the case of performance-based 
contracting, outcomes are typically defined in terms of product (equipment) 
availability or reliability (Guajardo et al., 2012), product utilization (Hypko 
                                                 
3 This chapter has been published as Nullmeier, F. M. E., Wynstra, F., & van Raaij, E. M. 
(2016). Outcome attributability in performance-based contracting: Roles and activities of 
the buying organization. Industrial Marketing Management, 59, 25-36.  
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et al., 2010), or even customer satisfaction (Gruneberg, Hughes, and Ancell, 
2007).  
Outcome uncertainty – the extent to which variations in these kinds 
of outcomes cannot be controlled by the inputs and efforts of the supplier – 
is a central characteristic in defining the effectiveness of a performance-
based contract (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). While thorough empirical 
evidence of the effectiveness of performance-based contracting is still scarce 
(Guajardo et al., 2012), it appears that successful cases of performance-based 
contracting in the defense sector, for instance, mainly relate to assets that are 
operated in relatively predictable and stable conditions such as patrol vessels 
(Spacewar.com, 2013) and trainer aircraft (Dorn and Ekström, 2014). When 
performance-based contracts draw critique from suppliers, it is often because 
of their inability to fully control the performance based on which they are 
rewarded and because, for various reasons, the suppliers are not able to obtain 
a sufficiently high risk-premium (Gruneberg et al., 2007; Wynstra, 2015).  
Outcome uncertainty has been studied in relation to selection of 
effective contracts, but mainly in terms of external influences and not so 
much in relation to the influence that buying organizations have on supplier 
performance. In service production, however, one key aspect is the provision 
of inputs by the customer, often being the buying organization (Sampson and 
Froehle, 2006). When buyer inputs are substantial, variations in the quality 
and (timely) availability of such inputs may have a severe impact on the 
uncertainty of the performance outcomes of the service.  
What previous research has not studied in-depth either, given its 
predominant focus on the selection and design of contracts, is how the actual 
execution or management of the performance-based contract can attenuate 
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some of the negative effects that outcome uncertainty would have on the level 
of supplier inputs and effort and thereby performance outcomes. Anecdotal 
evidence, at least, suggests that how the contract is actually being managed—
for instance, in terms of the way penalties are enforced—has a strong impact 
on the actual outcomes (Houtekamer, 2015).  
To address these two gaps, this paper seeks to make two 
contributions. First, it investigates how the outcome uncertainty of a service 
production process relates to the roles of the buying organization in service 
design and production, particularly in terms of providing inputs for the 
service exchange (Sampson and Spring, 2012). We provide a synthesis of 
literatures on contracting on the one hand (agency theory and theories on 
organizational control) and service operations management on the other, to 
better understand those antecedents of outcome uncertainty that are internal 
to the buyer-supplier relationship.  
The paper also identifies specific activities in managing 
(performance-based) contracts, and how and to what extent such activities 
can enhance the effectiveness of a performance-based contract, in a context 
(high outcome uncertainty) where traditionally such a contract (outcome 
control) has been argued to not be effective. By identifying the activities for 
managing performance-based contracts, we aim to complement the literature 
that has so far focused on design and selection of these contracts.  
On the basis of literature, we develop theoretical predictions. In order 
to elaborate these theoretical predictions into a conceptual model (Ketokivi 
and Choi, 2014), we study contract management practices through a multiple 
case study. The two cases involve cleaning services contracted by a train 
operator and a university hospital. In the remainder of this paper, we first 
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review prior literature to develop theoretical predictions. Subsequently, we 
discuss research design, the cases and case analysis. The final two sections 
discuss our findings and our conclusions.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 Uncertainty and Attributability of Performance Outcomes 
Various theoretical frameworks are relevant to the study of performance-
based contracting (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). Out of these, agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and theories on organizational control 
(Ouchi, 1979) have specifically investigated the situational characteristics 
that determine the optimal form of contract or control – behavior versus 
outcome. Eisenhardt (1989a) developed a synthesis of these theories, and 
proposed that an outcome-based contract is more effective in situations of 
high outcome measurability, high goal incongruence, and buyer risk-
averseness. A behavior-based contract is more effective when there is high 
task programmability, high outcome uncertainty, high information 
availability, supplier risk-averseness, and a long-term relationship. 
Outcome uncertainty has become a central consideration in research 
on the effectiveness of performance-based contracts (outcome contracts), 
particularly because of its close association with the propensity of suppliers 
to accept risk (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015): “The issue of risk arises 
because outcomes are only partly a function of behaviors. [...] as uncertainty 
increases, it becomes increasingly expensive to shift risk despite the 
motivational benefits of outcome-based contracts” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 
61). Outcome uncertainty in this context is exclusively defined in relation to 
external factors: “Government policies, economic climate, competitor 
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actions, technological changes, and so on, may cause uncontrollable 
variations in outcomes” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 61; see also Celly and Frazier, 
1996). 
However, also the behavior of the customer (the principal in the 
principal-agent relationship) may be a source of uncertainty. Particularly 
when the customer-supplier exchange involves a service, the customer can 
have a strong impact on the effectiveness of the efforts of the supplier, as the 
customer contributes inputs to the service production process. Any 
(unplanned) variations in the quality and availability of such inputs may 
create additional uncertainty for the supplier. Sampson and Froehle (2006) 
have distinguished three types of these inputs: “the customer's self, its 
belongings or other tangible objects, and information” (p. 332). Unified 
Service Theory (UST) suggests that this presence of customer inputs—and 
its consequences—is the unique factor distinguishing service processes from 
non-service processes (Sampson, 2000; Sampson and Froehle, 2006). Still, 
across different service production processes, the relative importance of each 
type of inputs (human assets, physical objects, and information), and the 
extent to which a service production depends on these inputs, may vary. The 
more important customer inputs are for a service production process, the 
more factors affect service outcomes, and hence the larger the outcome 
uncertainty. 
In a recent study of logistics services, for instance, Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2014) find that indeed one of the main antecedents of outcome 
uncertainty is the service provider's control over input and behavior of 
customers. Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) refer to outcome uncertainty as 
(the inverse of) performance attributability. The more limited the impact of 
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other factors, besides the efforts of the supplier, on the performance outcome 
of the service production process, the higher the attributability of the 
performance outcome. In line with the propositions from agency theory and 
theories on organizational control, Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) develop 
the proposition that low attributability of performance outcomes makes 
service providers less willing to accept financial risks as embedded in 
performance-based contracts. Low performance attributability is also argued 
to lead to increased emphasis on relational governance based on information 
sharing, collaboration and trust, which in turn make providers more willing 
to accept the risks of performance-based contracts. 
We build on this literature in two ways. First, we elaborate on the 
impact of customer inputs and roles as antecedents of performance 
attributability or outcome uncertainty. Second, we explicate the impact of 
specific activities related to contract management in moderating the impact 
of customer roles on outcome uncertainty – and the impact of outcome 
uncertainty on the level of supplier inputs and effort, which in turn affects 
performance outcomes. 
3.2.2 Roles of the Customer 
In the context of service production, outcome uncertainty is strongly 
influenced by the inputs that the customer needs to provide for service 
production. The amount and type of customer inputs relates to the task or role 
distribution between the customer and the supplier in the service 
development and production process. Service operations management 
literature has distinguished seven supply chain roles that customers assume 
in service supply chains, and which are directly related to the inputs 
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customers provide for the service development and production process: 
design engineer, production manager, labor, component supplier, inventory, 
product, and quality assurance (Sampson and Spring, 2012).  
Customers acting as ‘design engineer’ design services and service 
production processes. ‘Production managers’ plan and oversee the 
conversion of inputs into outputs by directing the service delivery. The 
‘labor’ role applies to situations in which customer and supplier engage in 
co-production and the customer assists, operationally, in the actual 
production of services (Grönroos, 2008). Customers in the role of 
‘component supplier’ provide essential process components without which 
the service cannot be produced (e.g., offices as inputs for cleaning services). 
Customers are ‘inventory’ when they are waiting for themselves, their 
belongings or their information to be processed as part of a service exchange 
(Sampson and Spring, 2012).  
The ‘product’ role applies when service providers act on the customer 
or the customer's organization. For example, when a consultant provides 
restructuring services, the restructured organizations is the product. Finally, 
when customers assume an active ‘quality assurance’ role, they provide ex 
ante specifications, and measure and evaluate quality ex post (Chervonnaya, 
2003).  
Of these seven customer roles, the labor, component supplier, 
inventory, and product roles mainly involve the input provision of human 
assets and physical objects. The design engineer, production manager, and 
quality assurance roles mainly involve the input provision of information. 
The more substantial these customer roles are in a given service exchange, 
the more important the associated customer inputs are for the performance 
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outcomes of the service, and thus the higher the outcome uncertainty for the 
supplier: the relation between its own inputs and efforts and final outcomes 
becomes weaker.  
3.2.3 Contract Management Activities 
In most theories on contracting, safeguarding is the most prominent function: 
contract design to minimize opportunism and to protect investments. This 
can be done through assigning decision and termination rights, and defining 
processes for dispute resolution (Schepker et al., 2014). Contracts can also 
serve to coordinate and align actions of the contract partners, particularly 
when these actions or tasks are highly uncertain and complex (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Ouchi, 1979; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). By outlining 
responsibilities of suppliers and customers, contracts also serve as a blueprint 
for exchange, aligning the actions of both parties (Macaulay, 1963; Vanneste 
and Puranam, 2010). 
Besides enabling safeguarding and coordination, contracts can 
support cooperation. Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam (2005), for instance, 
argues that cohesive effort between buyer and supplier “... not only requires 
the alignment of interests (cooperation), but also the alignment of actions 
(coordination)” (p. 419). Cooperation clearly relates to the function of 
contracts to align incentives. Agency Theory views contracts mainly as a 
vehicle to align incentives and to achieve risk sharing between parties 
involved, particularly when there is information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Jensen, 1983). 
These three functions of contracts help identify the activities the 
buyer needs to execute in contract management: monitoring, enforcing, 
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coordination, and cooperation. Firstly, contract management encompasses 
activities related to contract monitoring (Reeves and Woodward, 1970). 
Monitoring involves gathering of supplier performance information, linked 
to provision of feedback (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996). Typical 
approaches to supplier performance monitoring include supplier audits, 
customer satisfaction surveys, and monitoring of complaints (Brown and 
Potoski, 2003). Formal contract monitoring can be defined as “establishing 
the extent to which contractual compliance has taken place” (Heide, 1994, p. 
77). Such compliance monitoring is different from monitoring performance 
for benchmarking or improvement, as the first can more easily lead to 
enforcement actions. 
Contract enforcing is the response (by the buyer) to a violation of a 
contractual obligation (or, positively, compliance with an obligation) by the 
supplier. A violation need not be the manifestation of opportunism; it can 
also arise because the supplier is unable to meet the obligation or is unaware 
of it (Antia and Frazier, 2001; Kauppi and Van Raaij, 2015). Monitoring and 
enforcing activities are closely related. Taken together, they fulfill the 
safeguarding and cooperation functions of the contract. According to Antia 
and Frazier (2001), “The integrity of firms' explicit contracts and the 
effectiveness of their coordination efforts depend to a large extent on sound 
enforcement practices...[yet] few studies in the marketing literature have 
addressed this important issue” (p. 67). This quote also leads us to the 
coordination activities in contract management, which closely relate to 
monitoring and enforcement.  
Next to monitoring and enforcing, contract management includes 
coordinating activities related to coordination of actions of both parties 
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(Soeters and Griffiths, 2003). These activities include the alignment and 
adaptation of activities in the service production process, based on 
contractual provisions or following monitoring and enforcement. Even 
though performance-based contracts in their pure form do not specify the 
operational actions of suppliers, many in practice still include process 
prescriptions (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015).  
Cooperating activities are activities that seek to align (or re-align) 
interests, objectives, and motivations of contract partners, or that facilitate 
such alignment. Contract monitoring and enforcement relate to the 
cooperation function of contracts, but there are also other mechanisms that 
contribute to cooperation, such as common ownership of assets. Because 
services entail co-production by supplier and customer, the latter can assist 
the supplier through a joint investment in the service delivery process (Yang, 
Hsieh, and Li, 2009). Such joint investment is of specific importance in 
dynamic markets in which customer demand changes require firms to adapt 
quickly (Selviaridis, Agndal, and Axelsson, 2011). Cooperation may also be 
facilitated through informal activities such as creating mutual identification 
and embeddedness (Gulati et al., 2005) through collaborating in teams and 
sharing of information (Randall, Pohlen, and Hanna, 2010; Guo and Ng, 
2011; Randall, Nowicki, and Hawkins, 2011).  
3.2.4 Effects on Performance 
Synthesizing literature on service operations management and contracting, 
we have identified the extent to which a service customer plays a role in 
providing inputs in terms of human assets, physical objects, and information 
as antecedent to outcome uncertainty: variation in outcomes that cannot be 
Chapter 3 
 
71 
 
controlled by the supplier. The higher the uncertainty in outcomes – typically 
measured as availability or utilization of serviced assets or customer 
satisfaction – the less effective a performance-based contract. Thus, when a 
performance-based contract is in place, outcome uncertainty has a negative 
effect on performance, as there is misfit between the contract and the 
situational contingencies (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Such a misfit between contract 
and context may lead to the supplier post-contractually skimping on quality 
and reducing its inputs and efforts in the service exchange. 
Contract management by the customer – activities related to 
monitoring, enforcing, coordination, and cooperation – can attenuate some 
of the effects of customer roles and inputs on outcome uncertainty and 
performance. For instance, a careful coordination of customer inputs with the 
supplier's service production processes can help reduce the impact of 
customer roles on outcome uncertainty (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). In 
order to elaborate these basic theoretical predictions into a conceptual model, 
we use two case studies of performance-based contracting for cleaning 
services. 
 
3.3 METHODS 
Theory building in industrial marketing research is characterized by the use 
of qualitative case studies (Dubois and Araujo, 2004; Beverland and 
Lindgreen, 2010). Three modes of conducting case research can be 
distinguished: theory generation, theory elaboration, and theory testing 
(Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). Theory elaboration does not seek to generate new 
theory or test existing theory but can be used to introduce new concept(s), 
examine boundary conditions, or investigate relationships between concepts 
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– which is what this paper does. In this theory elaboration study, empirical 
data have been collected through the use of the multiple case study approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Ellram, 1996; Yin, 2009). 
3.3.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
Empirical data have been collected at two (semi-)public organizations in 
Western-Europe, which employ performance-based contracts to purchase 
cleaning services. These organizations have been selected in two steps. First, 
we identified the target population of our study as cases of performance-
based contracting for services. Convenience sampling was subsequently 
employed to find suitable cases in which different challenges associated with 
attributability were faced. The first case study, carried out at a train operator, 
is characterized by extensive challenges associated with attributability of 
performance. This is caused by the fact that the objects to be cleaned (the 
trains) are highly mobile—and not always predictably so. Extensive 
involvement of the buying organization is required to provide the supplier 
access to the objects to be cleaned. The second case study concerns a 
university hospital. This case is characterized by less pronounced challenges 
associated with attributability of performance.  
Data for both case studies has been collected by the lead author 
through interviews with key personnel involved in contract management and 
through analysis of buyer and supplier documents. Semi-structured 
interviews have been used since some structuring of interviews improves 
accuracy as well as ease of data processing, but flexibility and latitude in 
interview topics is also needed (Bryman and Bell, 2007). This flexibility is 
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important in theory elaboration to capture insights that may be employed to 
introduce new concepts.  
The interviews were held with employees in different positions of the 
buying and supplying organization to enable source triangulation (Yin, 
2009). All interviews were held by the same researcher to ensure a consistent 
approach to data collection. An overview of the employees interviewed can 
be found in Table 3.1. Buyer and supplier documents (e.g., tender documents, 
the contract, and newsletters) were studied to enable further data 
triangulation.  
 
Table 3.1 
Overview of interviewees 
 Case 1: train operator Case 2: university hospital 
Interviewees at 
buying organization 
• Director of 
purchasing • Director of purchasing 
 • Senior buyer • Senior buyer 
 
• Senior contract 
manager 
• Director of facility 
services 
 
• Contract manager • Cluster manager of facility services 
 
• Senior auditor • Regional manager of facility services 
 • Transition manager 
 
 • Controller 
 
 
• Manager external  
cleaning 
Interviewees at 
supplier • Transition manager • Director of joint venture 
  • Joint venture manager 
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3.3.2 Data Analysis 
Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and subsequently 
summarized. This process ensured a high degree of reliability and traceability 
of the data (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). The lead author coded the 
concepts and relationships between the concepts by employing a 
combination of open and closed coding. More specifically, sensitizing 
concepts were used to enable the coder to apply a structured coding approach 
yet leave room for the identification of additional constructs (Blumer, 1954; 
Van den Hoonaard, 1996). The concepts and sub-concepts shown in the 
coding scheme in Appendix B were derived from existing literature and used 
as sensitizing concepts. The application of sensitizing concepts was of 
importance since the identified concepts have not been previously studied in 
the context of performance-based contracting. Additional concepts were 
inductively derived. 
To elaborate on existing theory, we moved iteratively between theory 
and practice (Orton, 1997; Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This enabled us to 
include disciplined imagination in our theory elaboration approach (Weick, 
1989) and increased the likelihood of formulating accurate and reliable 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Appendix C lists the actions taken to validate the 
case study results.  
3.4 CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSES 
3.4.1 Context Case 1: National Train Operator 
The first case study concerns a performance-based contract used by a 
Western-European train operator to source interior cleaning of passenger 
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trains. With approximately 600 employees, the cleaning services provider 
cleans a total stock of about 2800 carriages and locomotives. The five-year 
performance-based contract was implemented in 2012 with pay linked to 
cleaning performance. The train operator aims to reduce costs while 
increasing performance, and stimulating innovation. At the time of 
implementation, the organization had limited to no experience with 
performance-based contracting.  
Two types of cleaning operations can be distinguished in this case: 
cleaning operations at specific cleaning locations and cleaning operations at 
designated train stations. Most cleaning activities are carried out at cleaning 
locations during nighttime, when rolling stock is not in use. Cleaning at 
designated train stations is carried out during stops and focuses on 
contamination that is easy to clean (e.g., trash bins and newspapers).  
The written contract is characterized by a combination of outcome 
and behavior clauses. These clauses are based on requirements set by the 
train operator during the tender as well as the cleaning concept proposed by 
the supplier. The main aims of the contract are to create a partnership and to 
shift responsibility for the outcome to the supplier.  
The supplier is evaluated based on three Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs): quality (cleanliness of trains), safety (processes and tools/materials 
used), and personnel (education provided and employee satisfaction). 
Bonuses and fines are tied to performance levels to incentivize the supplier 
to innovate, increase efficiency, and ultimately improve cleaning quality. 
The performance-based contract is managed by the buyer's department 
specialized in cleaning processes. A detailed specification of the bonuses and 
fines contained in the contract can be found in Appendix D.  
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3.4.2 Analysis Case 1: National Train Operator 
Once the contract had been signed, the train operator (customer, which in our 
case is the buying organization) and supplier agreed on a division of 
operational tasks. The division of these tasks is identified next, to assess 
possible challenges concerning the attributability of the supplier's 
performance. 
Supply chain roles and attributability of performance 
Moving from a behavior or process-based contract to a performance-based 
contract should have caused a substantial change in roles assigned to the train 
operator. While previously a very active presence in directing the supplier 
was required, the supplier should now be given more freedom. “The supplier 
cleans trains all the time, so we assume that they are more knowledgeable 
about cleaning than we are. They need to come up with a way to clean the 
trains” (Buyer, Controller). A switch needs to be made from ‘design 
engineer’ to ‘quality assurance’. Moreover, the design of service production 
processes has to be left to the supplier so that it can utilize its ‘expert’ 
knowledge to improve existing processes. “We [as contract managers] need 
to have an informing and facilitating role” (Buyer, Contract manager).  
In practice the train operator has, however, partly held on to the 
design engineer role as safety standards have been specified in the contract. 
Hereby, the supplier's freedom to design cleaning processes is limited. 
Freedom is limited further by the fact that the component and production 
manager roles have been assigned to the train operator. The component 
supplier role is especially predominant in this case as the trains need to be 
delivered to specific cleaning locations. The carriages and locomotives are 
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essential process components, without which cleaning processes cannot be 
carried out. “If you clean office buildings you know that the buildings will 
be in a specific location. Delivery of trains [to the cleaning locations], 
however, is associated with significant fluctuations. This can have a 
substantial impact on what you are able to clean” (Supplier, Transition 
manager). Delivery times of the trains thereby impact the production process. 
“If we deliver trains too late the supplier will have to deal with overcapacity 
[of cleaning personnel]” (Buyer, Transition manager). The train operator thus 
also assumes a ‘production manager’ role, as it determines the number of 
trains that are present at a specific time and place. As trains are idle at 
cleaning locations before and after they are cleaned, they are in ‘inventory’. 
The assignment of these roles to the buyer limits the supplier's freedom and 
thereby also the attributability of performance to the supplier's effort. Once 
cleaning activities have been carried out, quality needs to be assessed. This 
requires the train operator to assume the ‘quality assurance’ role. The 
‘product’ role is not present in this case as the service provider does not act 
on the customer or the customer's organization.  
The assignment of the design engineer, component supplier, and 
production manager roles to the buyer decreases outcome attributability to 
the supplier's inputs and effort. This is specifically challenging as actual 
supplier performance did not meet or exceed predefined targets. Moreover, 
the fact that the outcome is not entirely attributable to the supplier's inputs 
and effort has resulted in a strained buyer-supplier relationship as the supplier 
does not feel responsible for the inadequate performance.  
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Contract management activities 
On a day-to-day basis the train operator engages in monitoring and 
coordinating activities that are of an operational nature. Enforcing and 
cooperating activities take place on a less regular basis as these are of a more 
strategic nature.  
Monitoring 
To monitor the supplier's performance, the train operator collects data related 
to three dimensions: safety, personnel, and quality. To monitor whether 
safety standards are met, the train operator's quality auditors carry out regular 
audits. Data is collected on the processes employed, use of tools and 
materials, use of protective clothing, and accessing of trains. Adherence to 
personnel standards (i.e. education) is monitored by administering employee 
surveys. Assessment of outcome quality (i.e. cleanliness of the trains) 
involves the most extensive monitoring activities, using three data sources: 
passenger satisfaction surveys, passenger as well as train conductor 
complaints, and quality audits. Reliability of customer surveys and 
complaints is limited due to a small sample size. More specifically, these data 
sources provide a general overview of customer satisfaction but cannot be 
linked to a specific cleaning location. More detailed data are required to 
provide the supplier with adequate feedback. Therefore, the train operator 
relies mainly on quality audits to monitor the supplier's performance. This 
type of data enables the buyer to provide detailed feedback on the supplier's 
performance at a specific location and time.  
The quality audits are carried out by seven quality auditors using a 
quality measurement system designed specifically for this contract. The 
auditors carry out 62 audits per month, which equals about two audits per 
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cleaning location per month. To audit cleaning quality, auditors walk through 
the trains and register the number and type of remaining contaminations in 
the quality management system. These data are analyzed and subsequently 
used to provide feedback to the supplier. By engaging in such monitoring 
activities, the train operator aims to more readily distinguish whether the 
supplier's effort causes the performance outcome.  
Enforcing 
Once the supplier's performance on the specified KPIs has been determined, 
the train operator has to decide whether or not to enforce the contract. The 
contract is enforced by paying bonuses and/or levying fines. Bonuses are to 
be paid to the cleaning personnel, while fines are to be paid by the supplier.  
During the first year the performance outcomes did not meet the 
specified targets. Nonetheless, the train operator decided to refrain from 
levying fines. This decision was motivated by the insight that levying fines 
this early in the relationship would negatively affect the relationship and 
future performance.  
Coordinating 
Due to the nature of this service, extensive coordination between buyer and 
supplier operations is required. “The efficiency that can be realized by the 
supplier is determined by our coordination efforts” (Buyer, Director of 
purchasing). Three main operations need to be coordinated by the buying 
organization: use of trains, maintenance, and cleaning. As the use of trains 
and maintenance activities take precedence over cleaning activities, 
coordination is essential. “We [the cleaning operations team] really have to 
fight for a position in the schedule” (Buyer, Manager of external cleaning). 
Internal coordination supports information flows between the train 
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scheduling department and contract managers, while external coordination 
supports information flows between buyer and supplier. Coordination 
enables contract managers to deliver accurate forecasts on the number of 
trains to be cleaned at a specific location. This in turn enables the supplier to 
adjust its cleaning capacity accordingly.  
Accurate forecasting is typically hampered by two factors: 
disruptions in the train schedule and special events (e.g., national holidays, 
concerts, and promotions). Disruptions lead to delays and cause the actual 
number of trains in specific locations to deviate from forecasts. Events can 
increase the number of trains in use and cause more extensive contamination. 
Currently a diverse set of events is not coordinated within the buying 
organization. One example is a promotional event at train stations during 
which free product samples were handed out. Such events cause additional 
contamination since packaging ends up in trains (e.g., empty soda cans). By 
coordinating such promotional activities within the buying organization, 
contract managers gain access to more reliable information. This can 
subsequently be used to enable the supplier to adjust cleaning capacity in a 
timely manner. “Acting as an intermediary is what I believe to be most 
important” (Buyer, Contract manager). Engaging in coordination activities 
improves the information flows towards the supplier. This in turn enables the 
supplier to improve accuracy of cleaning capacity scheduling, which 
increases attributability of performance outcomes to the supplier's effort.  
Cooperating  
To facilitate cooperation through improved transparency and alignment of 
goals, strategic meetings between the buyer and supplier are organized once 
a week. “These meetings currently occur more often to alleviate the issues 
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that have arisen” (Buyer, Transition manager). The number of strategic 
meetings will be reduced to two a year once the most pressing strategic 
challenges have been addressed. Both organizations should have similar 
goals and act as a single organization: “To effectively coordinate [our 
operations] we need to act as one organization with a single goal. The main 
goal should be to deliver the agreed upon quality, which is a clean train for 
the customers. Money will then be a side issue” (Buyer, Senior buyer). 
“Cooperating is crucial. If we are not able to get the cooperation up and 
running, the two organizations will continue to operate as independent 
entities and issues will not be addressed” (Buyer, Transition manager). 
Engaging in cooperating activities thus aligns interests and thereby positively 
affects the relationship between buyer and supplier.  
3.4.3 Context Case 2: University Hospital 
The second case study concerns a performance-based contract for cleaning 
services used by a university hospital in the context of a joint venture. The 
hospital outsources only part of the cleaning activities: the hospital's cleaning 
staff cleans operation-critical spaces (e.g., operating theatres), while the 
cleaning services supplier's staff cleans less critical spaces (e.g., offices and 
restrooms). Both organizations combined employ 400 employees. In this 
case study the focus is solely on the outsourced cleaning activities. The 
supplier's cleaning staff of about 200 employees, which is employed by the 
joint venture, cleans a space of 175,000 m2. 
At the university hospital the majority of cleaning services are 
delivered during the evening. Cleaning operations do not interfere with the 
hospital's operations, as rooms to be cleaned are not in use during the night. 
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During the daytime some cleaning staff are on hand to respond to complaints 
and to clean restrooms.  
The contract contains a large number of KPIs based on behavior and 
outcome specifications. These are used by the buyer's facility services (FS) 
department to evaluate the supplier's performance. Two main types of KPIs 
can be distinguished. Quality related KPIs evaluate the cleaning quality 
delivered by the supplier. KPIs related to the performance of the managing 
partner evaluate all activities carried out by the supplier to keep the joint 
venture running successfully (e.g., management of absenteeism). Based on 
the supplier's performance, bonuses will be paid, or fines will be levied. An 
overview of the bonuses and fines contained in the contract can be found in 
Appendix D.  
3.4.4 Analysis Case 2: University Hospital 
The joint venture (supplier) and FS department (buyer) have agreed on a 
specific task division to build towards a successful partnership. The supply 
chain role assignment associated with this task division will be identified 
next to establish whether challenges related to attributability of the 
performance to supplier's effort exist. 
Supply chain roles and attributability of performance 
As mentioned, the university hospital has set up a joint venture. “We have 
done this since we believed that the supplier's expertise could be combined 
with our own by acting as partners” (Buyer, Director of FS). 
As the design engineer role has been assigned to the buying 
organization, it has defined cleaning protocols. These protocols are adopted 
by the supplier and adapted if needed. The design engineer role has 
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increasingly become more important as hospitals have had to deal with a 
growing number of infectious diseases (e.g., MRSA and Ebola). The creation 
of such protocols limits the supplier's possibilities to customize its services 
and causes a mismatch between customer demands and the work being 
carried out. “What happens here is that we clean everywhere in the same way. 
Some departments tell us that they would like us to clean only once per week, 
while other departments would like us to clean two, three or five times a 
week” (Supplier, Joint venture manager). Next to this, the creation of 
protocols limits creativity. “We of course [define protocols] to ensure patient 
safety but at the same time you take away all creativity and enthusiasm. And 
enthusiasm [from the cleaning personnel] is what in the end leads to 
productivity” (Supplier, Director of joint venture). The assignment of the 
design engineer role to the buyer hereby limits the attributability of 
performance to the supplier's efforts. 
The ‘production manager’ role has been assigned to the buyer as well 
as the supplier. The buyer has created an overview of all rooms that need to 
be cleaned, which contains cleaning protocols to be used and the amount of 
time required to clean a room. The supplier subsequently plans and executes 
the production of the cleaning service. There is a caveat though: when 
supplier performance falls short and the buyer's contract manager is 
responsible for the outcome, the buyer's personnel becomes more directive 
and less collaborative. “In the end I am the one responsible for the outcome. 
This makes that you feel the urge to start directing [the operations], almost 
prescribing [the suppliers’ personnel what to do]” (Buyer, Cluster manager 
of FS). This raises challenges related to attributability. The supplier's 
freedom to schedule service production is limited by the fact that the buyer 
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determines the time to be spent per room. More importantly, contract 
managers have adverse incentives that lead them to revert back to directing 
the cleaning personnel.  
The ‘component supplier’ role has been assigned to the buyer as it 
provides buildings to be cleaned as essential process components. Related, 
the buyer performs the ‘inventory’ role as it provides a supply of rooms to be 
cleaned; mainly overnight, so there is no direct impact on the buyer's primary 
process. Once the service has been delivered, the buyer has to assess the 
quality. Therefore, the ‘quality assurance’ role has been assigned to the 
buyer. The ‘product’ role has not been assigned to the buyer.  
As in the first case, the assignment of specific roles to the buyer 
decreases the outcome attributability to the supplier's inputs and effort. The 
negative effects become apparent at the individual level as cleaning 
personnel become frustrated by the fact that their performance evaluations 
do not match their effort. “This has a negative effect on our personnel's 
motivation” (Supplier, Joint venture manager). 
Contract management activities 
Also, in this case monitoring and coordinating are activities of an operational 
nature while enforcing and cooperating activities are of a more strategic 
nature. This is reflected in the frequency with which the university hospital 
engages in these activities. The hospital engages in operational activities on 
a daily basis while it engages in strategic activities on a monthly or even 
quarterly basis. 
Monitoring 
To assess performance based on the earlier discussed KPIs (quality and 
performance of the managing partner), the buying organization carries out 
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audits, administers customer satisfaction surveys, and monitors compliance 
with protocols. In contrast to the train operator, the university hospital 
utilizes all data sources to monitor the supplier's performance. Quality audits 
are carried out based on a nation-wide standardized auditing methodology 
for cleaning services. “Within the cleaning sector this is a nation-wide 
accepted methodology, which enables you to objectively measure quality” 
(Buyer, Regional manager of FS). While the auditors are employed by the 
hospital, they have no formal ties to the personnel that manages the contract. 
Customer satisfaction surveys are administered to assess whether employees 
and patients experience the hospital as clean. The reliability of this data 
collection method is, however, challenged by the supplier. “Employees could 
say: nice office but there is a hole in the wall ... and some other shortcomings. 
Not a neat office, 6 [out of 10, 10 being the highest]. But are the cleaning 
personnel responsible for damaged walls? No.” (Supplier, Joint venture 
manager). Yet, such additional data are valuable as auditors' measurement of 
cleanliness does not always match the perception of the ‘customers’. Finally, 
compliance with protocols is monitored to assess whether the joint venture 
has submitted all required reports. 
By employing data from these three sources the university hospital is 
able to assess the supplier's performance based on multiple perspectives. In 
this way it can distinguish whether low levels of performance are caused by 
a lack of supplier inputs or effort. By engaging in these monitoring activities, 
attributability of performance can therefore be increased. 
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Enforcing 
To stimulate performance, bonuses and fines were introduced. As in the first 
case, bonuses need to be paid out to the cleaning personnel individually, 
while fines are to be paid by the supplier.  
Also, in this case, the buyer has decided not to enforce bonuses and 
fines during the first year, in response to the issues related to attributability 
and KPIs. “We said: Let's use the first year to build [the relationship] and let 
us not punish the supplier. That would be to nobody's benefit” (Buyer, 
Director of FS).  
Coordinating 
At the university hospital different aspects need to be coordinated when 
compared to the train operator. Yet, engaging in coordinating activities is just 
as crucial. “I think that the joint venture has underestimated the extent of 
coordination needed to keep all operational processes running. It is all about 
coordinating” (Buyer, Cluster manager of FS).  
At the university hospital the contract managers have to act as a 
coordinating party between internal customers and the supplier. More 
specifically, contract management needs to communicate to the supplier 
changes in the rooms and areas that need to be cleaned. Such changes arise 
due to the repurposing of a room. However, this does not always happen in a 
timely manner. “At most businesses/organizations, you would get an 
overview of the rooms and areas about a month or month and a half before 
the changes are made. But here, I often get the overview with changes two 
months after the changes have been made. ... Better coordination would play 
a very important role in this” (Supplier, Joint venture manager). A lack of 
coordination thus decreases the attributability of performance as the supplier 
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does not always know which specific rooms or areas need to be cleaned. “All 
of a sudden we will get a complaint that we did not clean something while it 
has not even been entered into the system” (Supplier, Joint venture manager). 
Customer requirements and complaints need to be coordinated with 
and communicated to the supplier. The buying organization attempts to fulfill 
customer demands through the design of cleaning protocols. In practice these 
cleaning protocols do not always match customer requirements and 
flexibility in the protocols is limited. Customers can make requests to get 
specific spaces cleaned that are not part of the cleaning schedule. The 
supplier's operational managers will then check whether this request can be 
honored within the allotted cleaning time. If cleaning capacity is exceeded 
the customer will have to pay for the additional cleaning operations. 
Coordinating (changing) customer demands with the supplier is thus 
of importance to ensure that the supplier is able to meet customer demands. 
This is of specific importance in this case as the university hospital assumes 
the design engineer role by formulating cleaning protocols. By failing to 
engage in coordinating activities to keep the cleaning protocols aligned with 
customer requirements, the attributability of performance to the supplier's 
effort would be further decreased. 
Cooperating 
To increase transparency and align goals, the buyer and supplier organize 
strategic and tactical meetings. “Twice a year a shareholder meeting is held. 
... In addition to this there are ... tactical meetings during which we discuss 
the main aspects of the contract” (Regional manager of FS). Alignment of 
goals through cooperating is of specific importance when a non-profit 
organization partners with a for-profit business. “Even though we have set 
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up a joint venture, we do notice that there is a business behind it that 
essentially has a single goal: making as much money as possible by doing as 
little as possible. So, we have opposite goals” (Buyer, Regional manager of 
FS). The hospital on the other hand has different goals. “My goal is to get as 
much cleanliness for the money that we spend” (Buyer, Regional manager of 
FS). This exact issue has in fact been one of the main motivations to 
implement a performance-based contract. Engaging in cooperating activities 
to build a partnership, even in the context of a joint venture, appears to be of 
importance to positively affect performance outcomes. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
In this section, the two case analyses are compared, and findings are 
embedded in extant literature to formulate propositions as well as a 
conceptual model. 
3.5.1 External Factors 
As has been discussed in the literature section, previous research has focused 
on the effects of external factors on outcome uncertainty. While we have not 
focused on external factors in our study, these previous findings will be 
included in our conceptual model as a baseline proposition. 
External factors (e.g., government policies, economic climate, 
competitor actions, technological changes) increase outcome uncertainty 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; see also Celly and Frazier, 1996) and thereby negatively 
affect outcome attributability of performance to supplier effort. While our 
research did not focus on such external factors, both cases show how external 
factors impact attributability. In the case of cleaning services, the weather is 
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a context specific external factor that has a substantial impact on the 
relationship between supplier inputs as well as effort and performance. 
 
Proposition 1. The greater the extent to which factors beyond the 
control of buyer or supplier affect service outcomes, the lower the 
outcome attributability of performance to supplier inputs and effort. 
 
3.5.2 Supply Chain Roles and Outcome Attributability 
In both cases, the buying organizations have switched from a behavior- to a 
performance-based contract to shift responsibility to the cleaning services 
supplier by linking pay to performance. In both cases, the relationship 
between buyer and supplier was set up as a partnership. While one might 
expect that the implementation of a performance-based contract would limit 
the extent to which supply chain roles are assigned to the buying 
organization, this is not the case at either organization. The design engineer, 
production manager, component supplier, inventory, and quality assurance 
roles have been assigned to both buying organizations to varying degrees. A 
summary of the main findings can be found in Table 3.2. 
While the train operator has decreased its involvement in designing 
cleaning processes, the university hospital has not. Both buying 
organizations have assumed the design engineer role to minimize risk 
exposure. The train operator has designed safety standards and prescribes 
periodic cleaning activities to be carried out by the supplier, as this reduces 
the exposure to risk associated with accidents and warranty claims 
respectively.  
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Table 3.2 
Supply chain roles findings (TO = train operator; UH = university hospital) 
 
 
The design of the regular cleaning process is left to the supplier. In contrast, 
the university hospital has designed cleaning protocols for all cleaning 
activities carried out by the supplier, to decrease the exposure to an 
increasing number of infectious diseases. 
In practice, many performance-based contracts contain combinations 
of behavior, process, and outcome specifications (Martin, 2007; Selviaridis 
and Wynstra, 2015; Sols and Johannesen, 2013). As such, the process 
specifications provided by the two buying organizations from our case 
studies are no exception. It is at the same time clear, however, that a detailed 
execution and broad scope of the design engineer role will grant the supplier 
less autonomy, and possibly will decrease its motivation to pursue 
improvements (Sumo et al., 2016; Wynstra, 2015). This is particularly the 
case at the university hospital. 
While the train operator and the university hospital do not direct the 
service production in detail, they do impact the planning of production and 
thereby take an active role as production manager. The train operator 
Design 
engineer
Production
manager
Component 
supplier Inventory
Quality
assurance
Extent of role 
assignment to 
buyer
TO:   
moderate
TO:   
extensive
TO:   
extensive
TO:   
moderate
TO:   
moderate
UH:   
extensive
UH:   
moderate
UH:       
limited UH:     limited
UH:   
moderate
Type of input Information Information Physical objects
Physical 
objects Information
Affects
attributability Yes Yes Yes No No
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determines the time at which a train can be cleaned by its train delivery 
schedule. The hospital on the other hand affects the planning of service 
production by deciding and communicating which rooms/ areas need to be 
cleaned, and when. Our case studies illustrate in this respect that “the quality 
of many business services depends not only upon the performance of the 
supplier but also on how well the customer performs in interaction with the 
supplier” (O'Farrell and Moffat, 1991, p.206; emphasis in original). 
The assignment of the component supplier role to the buying 
organizations is crucial in both cases as the supplier needs access to an 
essential process component (trains or buildings). The train operator needs 
to deliver the trains to specific cleaning locations to provide the supplier 
access to the trains. The supplier is thus very dependent on this buyer input 
in being able to carry out its cleaning processes. The university hospital on 
the other hand only needs to grant the supplier access to the objects 
(buildings, rooms) to be cleaned. The buyer inputs associated with the 
component supplier role thus vary based on the service context. In contexts 
in which the supplier is dependent on the buyer to deliver objects to be 
cleaned, this dependence can negatively affect supplier performance and 
hence supplier payment: performance is then no longer fully attributable to 
the supplier (Else et al., 1992; Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). 
In the case of train cleaning, the inventory role is also performed by 
the buying organization, closely intertwined with its role of component 
supplier. Basically, an inventory of trains or rooms to be cleaned can help the 
supplier to improve capacity utilization (Sampson and Spring, 2012), and 
that is one of the reasons why most cleaning is done overnight, when trains 
and rooms are not (all) in service and the customer (and its clients, i.e. 
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passengers, patients) do not have to be waiting for the service, if all goes 
well. 
Both buying organizations have assumed the quality assurance role 
to ensure that the supplier meets quality targets. The assignment of the 
inventory and quality assurance roles to the buying organization does not 
affect the outcome attributability of performance to supplier effort. These 
findings are captured in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The greater the extent to which the buyer assumes the 
design engineer, production manager, and component supplier roles, 
the lower the outcome attributability of performance to supplier inputs 
and effort. 
 
Both cases illustrate that a limited level of outcome attributability of 
performance to supplier inputs and effort results in frustrated suppliers and a 
strained relationship. Social psychologists have long recognized the 
importance of causal attribution in determining behavior (Duval, Duval, and 
Mayer, 2014). According to Kelley (1973) “causal attribution identifies the 
causes of certain effects and forms the basis for decisions about how to act 
in order to bring about the continuance or discontinuance of those effects” 
(p. 127). In cases of service outsourcing, suppliers, and more specifically 
their employees, will thus alter their behavior based on the perception of 
outcome attributability to their inputs and effort. If outcome attributability is 
limited, the supplier and its cleaning personnel will not be motivated to 
deliver the required inputs and put in the required effort to meet or exceed 
the agreed upon level of performance outcomes. 
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Proposition 3. The lower the outcome attributability of performance 
to supplier inputs and effort, the lower the level of supplier inputs and 
effort. 
 
3.5.3 Contract Management Activities 
Both buying organizations engage in three of the four contract management 
activities that emerge from the literature review: monitoring, coordinating, 
and cooperating. A summary of the main findings can be found in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 
Contract management activities findings 
 Monitoring Coordinating Enforcing Cooperating 
Engagement in 
activity 
TO: moderate TO: extensive TO; no TO: moderate 
UH: moderate UH: moderate UH: no UH: moderate 
Nature of 
activity Operational Operational Strategic Strategic 
 
Both organizations had to switch to monitoring outcome quality 
instead of behavior. While the university hospital had previously monitored 
outcome quality to a limited extent, the train operator had only monitored 
behavior. To increase attributability of performance to supplier effort and 
thereby minimize discussion concerning whether compensation is adequate, 
both organizations monitor outcome through the use of standardized quality 
audits. Yet, measurement systems remain a simple model of a complex 
business reality (Franceschini, Galetto, and Maisano, 2007). Therefore, both 
organizations complement quality audits with customer satisfaction surveys 
and complaints registrations. These monitoring activities, including the 
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feedback discussions with the supplier, enable the buyer to separate 
attributable outcomes from non-attributable outcomes, even in situations in 
which the extent to which the buyer has assumed specific supply chain roles 
is extensive. Hence, monitoring moderates the negative effect of supply 
chain roles having been assigned to the buyer on attributability. 
By engaging in coordination activities both buyers provide the 
supplier with information concerning the number of objects to be cleaned at 
a certain time and place. This type of information is of particular importance 
in the first case due the nature of the case context. As disruptions can cause 
a change in the number of trains to be cleaned at specific locations and times, 
continuous information exchange is essential. At the university hospital 
changes in the number of rooms are less prevalent. Information exchange 
between buyer and supplier does therefore take place less often and in a more 
standardized manner. These differences in coordination modes can be 
explained by the uncertainty and interdependence of the task (Thompson, 
1967; Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig, 1976). At the train operator the 
degree of work flow interdependence is quite extensive as service delivery is 
of a reciprocal nature. Therefore, a coordination mode that is less 
programmed and relies on feedback and mutual adjustment is suitable. At the 
university hospital there is less task uncertainty and interdependence as 
service delivery is of a sequential nature. Consequently, a more programmed 
approach to coordination is suitable, based on pre-established plans, 
schedules, forecasts, formalized rules, policies and procedures, and 
standardized information and communication systems. 
Both organizations need not only engage in external coordination 
(between buyer and supplier) but also in internal coordination. Coordination 
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between the contract management and train scheduling departments enables 
the train operator to provide the supplier with accurate forecasts on the 
number of trains to be cleaned. In the second case, coordination between the 
contract management department and the customers enables the hospital to 
provide accurate information on customer demands. Internal coordination is 
in both cases thus imperative to external coordination. Both types of 
coordination together, if done well, enable the supplier to perform better with 
appropriate effort, and therefore mitigate the impact of the design engineer, 
production manager, and component supplier roles having been assigned to 
the buyer on attributability. 
 
Proposition 4. A buyer's effective engagement in monitoring and 
coordinating activities moderates the relationship between the extent 
to which the buyer assumes the design engineer, production manager, 
and component supplier roles and outcome attributability of 
performance to supplier inputs and effort, such that this negative 
relationship is attenuated. 
 
The train operator as well as the hospital aim to enforce the contract 
by paying bonuses or levying fines based on multiple KPIs. As several 
challenges have arisen both organizations have chosen to not enforce the 
contract initially but rather discuss and interpret challenges together with the 
supplier. Hereby the contract and performance measurement are used in a 
more open and relational matter rather than instruments for static control 
(Enquist, Camén, and Johnson, 2011). 
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Cooperating is a prerequisite for coordinating (Beer, Eisenstat and 
Spector, 1990). To stimulate cooperation, both organizations organize 
strategic meetings to increase transparency and align goals. Ang, Groosman, 
and Scholten (2005) in fact identify transparent cooperation as a determinant 
of performance-based project success. Cooperating is linked to enforcing, as 
the enforcement of performance targets can lead to subsequent adjustments 
in the information exchange. Goal alignment is facilitated by engaging in 
enforcing activities. As both organizations have chosen not to enforce the 
contract during the first year, goal alignment is not in place. This results in 
challenges and frustrations as the supplier continues to focus on cost whereas 
the buyer continues to focus on quality. Cooperation appears to be an 
antecedent that affects the buyer-supplier relationship and thereby the 
willingness to engage in coordination activities. From our data it does not 
become clear, however, how this affects the relationships in our conceptual 
model. Therefore, a proposition cannot be formulated based on the available 
evidence. 
Neither organization has engaged in enforcing activities during the 
first year of contract execution. As we have not been to collect data on the 
engagement in enforcing activities, a proposition cannot be formulated. It is 
clear, however, that enforcing activities play an important role in structuring 
the relationship and might thereby act as an antecedent. 
3.5.4 Conceptual Model 
The discussed findings illustrate that challenges that occur during contract 
execution in situations of low outcome attributability in the service exchange 
requires buying organizations to engage in distinct contract management 
Chapter 3 
 
97 
 
activities. The relationships between the discussed concepts are visualized in 
Figure 3.1. Given the absence of the labor and product roles in the two cases, 
our elaborated conceptual model relates to the design engineer, production 
manager, and component supplier supply chain roles. The inventory and 
quality assurance roles were found not to affect attributability and are 
therefore not included in the model. The cooperating activity appears to be 
an antecedent and can at this point not be put into the model. Also, as we 
have not been able to collect clear evidence on the engagement in enforcing 
activity, it is not included in the model. The conceptual model proposes that 
performance-based contracts can also be effectively implemented in 
situations where performance depends heavily on the buyer inputs associated 
with specific supply chain roles. Contract management activities help to 
increase attributability in such situations and help to keep suppliers 
committed as well as engaged even when attributability is relatively low. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Conceptual model 
Extent to which external
factors affect performance
Extent to which buyer
assumes design engineer, 
production manager, and
component supplier roles
Outcome Attributability
of performance to
supplier inputs and effort
Level of supplier
• Inputs
• Effort
Buyers engagement in
• Monitoring activities
• Coordinating activities
P1 = -
P2 = -
P3 = +
P4 = -
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3.6 Conclusions 
3.6.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Performance-based contracting aims to manage suppliers based on outcome 
(not process), put them in their expert role, and shift responsibility to the 
supplier by providing it with more freedom to decide how to deliver the 
desired performance. While this may suggest that a laissez-faire style of 
contract management suffices, our study shows that customers assume more 
roles than simply monitoring suppliers' performances and rewarding 
accordingly. As part of the service exchange, customers design service 
production processes or affect the design thereof, (help to) plan service 
production, provide access to crucial components (and create an inventory of 
such components where needed), and assure that the agreed upon 
performance is delivered. The customer inputs associated with these roles co-
determine the supplier's performance, and in this way, they decrease the 
attributability of the service outcomes to just the efforts of the supplier. 
While outcome uncertainty (i.e. decreased attributability) has been 
studied in relation to the effectiveness of performance-based contracting, it 
has been mainly defined in terms of sources in the external environment. By 
integrating service operations management theory, our model identifies 
specific sources—particular roles of the customer in service design and 
delivery—of customer-induced outcome uncertainty. 
For a performance-based contract to work effectively in such 
situations of increased outcome uncertainty, active engagement of the 
customer in contract management is required. 
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Contract management activities related to monitoring and 
coordinating help to ensure that the customer understands which 
performance outcomes are attributable to the supplier, and that the supplier 
is not hindered in achieving performance outcomes due to untimely or 
inadequate customer inputs. 
In sum, this study systematically links supplier engagement, in terms 
of inputs and efforts, to outcome attributability, and outcome attributability 
to situational factors as well as buyer behaviors. This study proposes how 
contract management contributes to the success of performance-based 
contracts, through the mediating concept of outcome attributability. Outcome 
attributability is posited as a pivotal concept in explaining the success of 
performance-based contracting. The proposed framework represents 
actionable theory, as it stipulates how buyer roles on the one hand decrease 
attributability of performance outcomes to suppliers, but also how contract 
management activities of the buyer help to attenuate such negative effects. 
3.6.2 Managerial Contributions 
This study provides managers of buying organizations with some initial 
insights concerning the management of a performance-based contract. More 
specifically, it provides managers with insights into how and why contract 
management activities help to keep suppliers engaged when a performance-
based contract is used in a service exchange. It may seem that performance-
based contracts require an arm's length relationship with the supplier. Our 
study shows that on the one hand, contract managers need to learn to ‘let go’ 
and give the supplier room to take its expert role. On the other hand, contract 
managers need to remain engaged and in touch, in order to facilitate the 
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supplier. The supplier depends in various ways on the buying organization in 
order to perform. Adequate training of the contract management staff is 
needed to facilitate a smooth transitioning into their new roles. In our two 
case studies we saw that the contract management responsibility does not rest 
just with the purchasing department, but wholly or partly with operational 
departments, such as facility management. 
From this study, managers can also gain insights concerning the link 
between contract design and contract management. Managers should be 
aware that shortcomings in the written contract could cause challenges while 
managing the contract. In the two studied organizations personnel not 
involved in contract management have designed the contracts. It appears that 
involving personnel with contract management experience in the design of 
the contract could have minimized the shortcomings in the written contract 
(e.g., inclusion of realistic performance targets). This in turn would reduce 
the number of challenges faced in managing a performance-based contract. 
3.6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
There are four main limitations to this research. First, our specific sample of 
cases means that the results, i.e. the conceptual model developed, may not 
fully generalize to other contexts, regarding three dimensions. First, our 
studies focus solely on cleaning services and service characteristics specific 
to cleaning services might limit the generalizability to other service types. 
Our cases were selected to display variety in customer roles, and keeping the 
service type constant may rule out some alternative explanations for 
differences in performance attributability. It is likely that with other types of 
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services, the customer needs to fulfill supply chain roles in other ways and to 
differing extents. 
Secondly, the case studies were carried out in one country. This 
country is generally characterized by a culture based on deliberation and 
reaching consensus, which could be conducive to the creation of partnerships 
with suppliers. In countries with more hierarchical cultures and greater power 
distance, partnerships may be more difficult to create. This could cause the 
buyer to assume a different set of roles and activities and engage in less 
coordination and cooperation with the supplier. 
Thirdly, both cases concern organizations with a rather strong public 
management background. The university hospital is a public entity and the 
train operator is a former public organization. What is particularly salient, in 
our view, is that both organizations operate under a strong eye of the public. 
Nevertheless, we expect to see similar levels of importance in other service 
organizations with intensively used spaces such as banks, retail outlets, and 
universities. 
The fourth limitation refers to the data collection. We predominantly 
interviewed personnel at the buyer side, and the limited number of interviews 
with supplier's employees could be seen as a limitation. As we study contract 
management practices of the buying organization, the focus on the buyer's 
perspective is however warranted. 
Based on our research we can suggest two main directions for further 
research. First, the conceptual model developed in this paper needs to be 
elaborated further and tested, for other types of services and in other sectors 
and cultures. In doing so, one activity to investigate more closely is contract 
enforcement. 
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Second, some interviewees indicated that performance-based 
contracting requires contract management personnel to develop other skills 
than are required for behavior-based contracting. Future research could study 
which skills are required at the individual level to be able to manage a 
performance-based contract successfully.
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CHAPTER 4  
Uncovering Behavioral Effects of Causal Attributions and 
Attributional Biases in Performance-based Contracting 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Well known for its early use by the US army to incentivize suppliers to 
deliver innovative maintenance services, performance-based contracting 
(PBC) is now widely used across public and private sector to improve 
supplier performance (Hypko, Tilebein, and Gleich, 2010). While the 
incentive mechanisms underlying PBC have been shown to significantly 
improve supplier performance (Guajardo et al., 2012), unsuccessful 
implementations continue to be documented in the academic literature (e.g., 
Banker et al., 1996; Ng and Nudurupati, 2010; Ssengooba, McPake, and 
Palmer, 2012). Determinants of PBC effectiveness have therefore received 
renewed attention from practitioners and academics (Nullmeier, Wynstra, 
and Van Raaij, 2016; Steinbach, Wallenburg, and Selviaridis, 2018).   
Recognizing that PBC is predicated on agency assumptions (Fong 
and Tosi, 2007; Jensen, 1989), contracting scholars have relied on agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to provide supply chain managers with 
guidance on how to use PBC effectively (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). 
Agency theory is relevant to inter-organizational contractual relationships 
since it is concerned with problems that can arise when buyers contract 
suppliers to make decisions on their behalf (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These 
agency problems manifest themselves as suppliers engaging in opportunistic 
behavior as they have different goals from buyers (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
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Previous studies have advocated the use of contractual incentives underlying 
PBC to foster goal alignment between a supplier and a buyer (Kim, Cohen, 
and Netessine, 2007). However, these contractual incentives are said to be 
less effective when suppliers are risk-averse, contractual outcomes are 
difficult to measure, and when outcome uncertainty arises as contractual 
outcomes are not (entirely) controllable by suppliers (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). 
Outcome uncertainty has become a central topic in the contracting literature 
due to its close association with the supplier’s propensity to accept the risks 
that are inherent to PBC (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). To increase our 
understanding of the manner in which outcome uncertainty decreases the 
effectiveness of PBC, recent studies have looked at how environmental 
factors (e.g., regulations and economic climate) and non-collaborative buyer 
actions can cause the achievement of outcomes to be uncertain (Ng, Maull, 
and Yip, 2009; Nullmeier et al., 2016; Steinback et al., 2018). Being 
grounded in agency theory, contracting literature suggests that uncertainty 
introduced by these factors create disutility of effort, which drives suppliers 
to act opportunistically (Nullmeier et al., 2016). Consequently, PBC is 
suggested to be less effective in contracting outcomes that are determined, at 
least in part, by environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer actions.    
These insights are, however, based on the assumption that managers 
are rational decision makers who are unaffected by emotions and cognitive 
biases (Bendoly, Donohue, and Schultz, 2006; Katsikopoulos and 
Gigerenzer, 2013). Scholars have criticized findings grounded in the 
assumption of bounded rationality, as such findings ignore the motivational 
implications of emotions and cognitive biases (Loch and Wu, 2007; Long 
and Sitkin, 2018). If previous studies have indeed ignored the role that 
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emotions and cognitive biases play in contractual relationships, it could have 
led to inadequate conclusions concerning the effectiveness of PBC in specific 
contractual settings. Having faced similar criticism, supply chain scholars 
have drawn on attribution theory (Weiner, 1986) to study how emotions and 
cognitive biases affect supplier behavior (e.g., Gino and Pisano, 2008; Mir, 
Aloysius, and Eckerd, 2017; Ro, Su, and Chen, 2016). Building on these 
insights, we use attribution theory to study how supplier behavior is affected 
by the attributional processes used by managers when assigning 
responsibility for contractual outcomes (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). To gain a 
better understanding of how managers assign responsibility when 
environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer actions affect contractual 
outcomes, we first conduct an exploratory case study. We then complement 
this case study with an experiment to test our theoretical predictions 
concerning the psychological effects of PBC.         
With this study we seek to make two conceptual contributions and 
one methodological contribution to the behavioral supply management and 
contracting literature. First, we study how emotions experienced by 
suppliers’ managers affect the ability of PBC to govern supplier behavior. 
Previous studies have assumed that organizational responses to contractual 
incentives are driven by (bounded) rationality and have therefore not 
considered the role of emotions experienced by individuals. We break with 
this convention to uncover whether emotions affect how suppliers respond to 
contractual incentives. Second, we study the extent to which PBC 
effectiveness in motivation suppliers is constrained by attributional biases. 
While it is assumed in contracting literature that suppliers will all respond to 
contractual incentives in the same way, we study how attributional biases can 
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in fact cause them to respond differently. Third, we extend the attribution 
styles concept beyond the intra-organizational context by testing its 
relevance in the inter-organizational context. Moreover, we test whether the 
concept covers biases on all causal dimensions that affect achievement 
motivation in inter-organizational settings.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we 
discuss the theoretical insights attribution theory that inform this study. 
Because attribution theory has not been used to study PBC, section 3 reports 
on the results of an exploratory case study undertaken to provide preliminary 
insights on how emotions can affect PBC effectiveness. In section 4 we 
formulate our research hypotheses based on the insights gained from the 
exploratory case study and extant literature. In section 5 we report on the 
results of a scenario-based experiment used to test our hypotheses. Finally, 
in section 6 we highlight the implications of our study for theory and practice, 
and discuss its limitations and directions for future research. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Psychological Effects of Performance-based Contracts 
Although contracting literature provides us with a detailed understanding of 
the manner in which PBC can be used to mitigate opportunistic behavior (see 
Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015 for a review), we know little about the 
psychological mechanisms that drive behavior in response to PBC. Seeking 
to further our understanding of psychological effects of contracts, Weber and 
Mayer (2011) studied how contract framing influences emotions and 
behaviors. These scholars argue that promotion framed contracts, which are 
based on gain framing, induce low-intensity feelings of sadness since failing 
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to reach a maximum target is seen as falling short of an ideal, not as a failure. 
On the other hand, prevention framed contracts, which are based on loss 
framing, are said to induce high-intensity agitation since one fell short of 
achieving a minimum target. Both types of contract framing are thus said to 
induce negative emotions when managers are confronted with failures 
(Weber, Mayer, and Macher, 2011).  
A recent study finds that performance-based contracts can be framed 
using promotion, prevention and hybrid frames (Selviaridis and Van der 
Valk, 2018). Following Weber and Mayer’s (2011) reasoning, PBC should 
thus induce low- to high-intensity negative emotions, when managers are 
confronted with failures to achieve contractual outcomes. What has, 
however, been neglected by Weber and colleagues are the psychological 
effects of factors that cause such failures to arise. Based on attribution theory, 
Weiner (1986) argues that causes of failures rather than the failure itself 
determine whether positive or negative emotions are experienced by 
managers.  
4.2.2 Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory (Weiner, 1986) explains the cognitive processes through 
which managers assign responsibility for their success or failure to achieve 
outcomes (Fisher and Taylor, 1991). The premise being that managers have 
an innate desire to understand the causes of important outcomes and that their 
attributions influence their expectancies, emotions and future behavior 
(Heider, 1958; Martinko, Harvey, and Douglas, 2007a). Wong and Weiner 
(1981) suggest that managers spontaneously engage in attributional activities 
referred to as causal search to assign responsibility for outcomes. Causal 
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search is said to be a three-step cognitive process leading to causal 
attributions (see Figure 4.1): First, managers determine the source of a cause 
(internal vs. external), which has been termed the locus of causality. Second, 
managers assess whether the cause is of a persistent or temporary nature, 
which has been termed stability (stable vs. unstable). Third, managers 
determine whether the cause is under the volition of an individual, which has 
been termed controllability (controllable vs. uncontrollable). Recent studies 
have further specified the controllability dimension by distinguishing 
between self-controllability and other-controllability (Gurevich, Klinger, 
and Weiner, 2012; Weiner, 2018). Self-controllability refers to the degree to 
which managers perceive the cause to be something which they themselves 
can control (controllable vs. uncontrollable by self). Other-controllability 
assesses the degree to which managers perceive the cause to be under the 
volition of others within or outside of their organization (controllable vs. 
uncontrollable by other).  
In the context of buyer–supplier contractual relationships, locus of 
causality refers to whether suppliers’ managers perceive an outcome to be 
caused by their own actions (internal) or by the actions of employees of 
another organization (external) (Mir et al., 2016). Stability refers to whether 
suppliers’ managers perceive a cause to affect contractual outcomes across 
periods (stable) or only in the previous period (unstable). Self-controllability 
refers to whether suppliers’ managers perceive a cause to be under the control 
of the suppliers’ employees (controllable by self) or not under the control of 
the suppliers’ employees (uncontrollable by self). Other-controllability refers 
to whether suppliers’ managers perceive a cause to be under the control of 
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buyers’ employees (controllable by other) or not under the control of buyers’ 
employees (uncontrollable by other).  
The causal search process is of interest to this study since 
combinations of causal dimensions are said to trigger specific emotions, 
which in turn affect achievement motivation of suppliers’ managers (see 
Figure 4.1.) (Weiner, 2018). Table 4.1 provides an overview of all causal 
dimension – emotion links that have been empirically tested. The emotions 
that are experienced by suppliers’ managers determine to which extent they 
will be motivated to achieve contractual outcomes in the subsequent period. 
 
Table 4.1 Causal Dimensions – Emotion Links 
Outcome Essential causal dimensions Emotion 
Success Locus: internal Pride 
Success Locus: external, Other-controllability: controllable Gratitude 
Failure Stability: stable Hopeless 
Failure Stability: unstable Hope 
Failure Locus: internal, Self-controllability: controllable Guilt and regret 
Failure Locus: external, Other-controllability: controllable Anger 
Failure Other-controllability: uncontrollable Sympathy 
 
4.2.3 Attributional Biases 
Although attribution theory provides us with a clear framework to determine 
psychological effects of factors that cause performance shortfalls, it is 
important to recognize that the causal search process is said to be influenced 
by attribution styles of managers (Abrahamson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 
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1978; Kent and Martinko, 1995a; Russell, 1991). Attribution styles are trait-
like characteristics that lead to specific tendencies, which result in the making 
of similar attributions across different types of outcomes (Martinko et al., 
2007b). Attribution styles have been found to be useful in predicting both 
attributions and behavior since attribution styles affect attributions, which in 
turn affect behavior (see Martinko, Douglas, and Harvey, 2006 for a review).  
Extant literature has made a distinction between intrapersonal and 
social attribution styles (Martinko, Sikora, and Harvey, 2012). Intrapersonal 
attribution styles are concerned with managers’ causal attributions for their 
own outcomes, whereas social attribution styles describe how managers 
attribute the causes of other people’s outcomes. In this study we focus on 
intrapersonal attribution styles as our study is concerned with suppliers’ 
managers’ causal attributions for contractual outcomes to be delivered by the 
supplier. The most studied intrapersonal attribution styles are optimistic and 
pessimistic attribution styles (Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978; 
Douglas and Martinko, 2001). According to this dichotomy, managers with 
optimistic styles are biased toward making ‘internal, stable and controllable’ 
attributions for success and ‘external, unstable and uncontrollable’ 
attributions for failure. That is, managers with this self-serving attribution 
style attribute successes to themselves and failure to others (Harvey and 
Martinko, 2010). They therefore often feel good about themselves and their 
capacity for success. In contrast, managers with a pessimistic attribution style 
tend to make ‘external, unstable and uncontrollable’ attributions for success 
and ‘internal, stable and controllable’ attributions for failure. They often lack 
confidence in themselves and are pessimistic concerning their chances for 
success. Therefore, attribution styles affect the outcome of the causal search 
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process (see Figure 4.1). We posit that these individual differences between 
managers make suppliers respond in a different manner when confronted 
with the same negative outcomes.  
 
Fig. 4.1. Attributional processes 
 
4.3 EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY 
We conducted an exploratory case study to gain a better understanding of the 
role that causal attributions play in inter-organizational contractual 
relationships. Insights gained are subsequently used to formulate hypotheses 
to be tested in a scenario-based experiment.    
4.3.1 Case Description  
To gain a better understanding of the way in which suppliers’ managers 
assign responsibility for environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer 
actions, we studied how a train operator fared when using PBC over a six-
year period (2012–2017). By using PBC, the train operator sought to 
incentivize a cleaning services supplier to improve the quality of cleaning 
provided. Cleaning performance under a previous contract had been 
unsatisfactory and decreased passengers’ satisfaction with the overall service 
offering of the train operator. Therefore, a six-year performance-based 
contract was implemented, designed to improve cleanliness of the trains and 
passenger satisfaction.  
Past outcome
succes/failure
Causal attributions
Locus, stability, self-, 
other-controllability
Emotion Future outcome
Attribution style
Optimist/pessimist
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The performance-based contract contained both positive and negative 
incentives. Bonus payments were applied at the individual level to reward 
cleaning staff for achieving specified performance outcomes. Fines were 
applied at the organizational level to punish the cleaning services supplier for 
not achieving the specified performance outcomes. More specifically, a fine 
was deducted from the service fee paid to the supplier if performance 
outcomes were not achieved. Performance outcomes had been specified in 
relation to adhering to safety standards, providing adequate 
training/education to cleaning staff, and meeting cleanliness targets. While 
safety and education targets had been met consistently since 2012, 
cleanliness targets had not. We therefore focus on the performance outcomes 
concerning the cleaning performance of the supplier as experienced by 
passengers.   
4.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data were collected by the lead author through two rounds of interviews with 
key staff of the buyer and supplier. In the first round, in 2013, interviews 
were held with eight employees of the buyer who were involved in designing 
and managing the contract, one employee of the supplier who was involved 
in managing the contract, and four members of the cleaning staff. From this 
round of interviews, we identified environmental factors and non-
collaborative buyer actions that caused variations in outcomes that could not 
be controlled by the supplier. In the second round of interviews in 2018, 
interviews were held with five employees of the buyer who were involved in 
designing and managing the contract and two cleaning staff. During the 
second round of interviews we adopted a retrospective perspective to 
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establish whether the environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer 
actions we had identified had triggered emotions in employees of the supplier 
and affected supplier performance. Interviews were held with employees in 
different positions to enable source triangulation (Yin, 2009). Internal 
documentation (e.g., contract and newsletters), monthly passenger 
satisfaction data from January 2002 to February 2018, and news articles from 
external sources were collected to enable further triangulation of the data.  
Once the data collection had been completed, we analyzed the 
passenger data to identify any distinct phases where there were noticeable 
changes in satisfaction levels. We then analyzed qualitative data from our 
transcribed interviews, internal documents, and news articles to establish 
how causes of outcome uncertainty affected supplier performance. 
Reliability and traceability of qualitative data was ensured by using closed 
coding (McCutchean and Meredith, 1993; Yin, 2009).  
4.3.3 Case Analysis and Results 
Having implemented PBC in 2012, the train operator’s management team 
soon experienced disappointing results. “We implemented contractual 
incentives to motivate the supplier to improve [cleaning] performance but the 
[achieved] outcomes did not meet our expectations” (Train operator, director 
of supply chain operations, 2018). During our discussions with the train 
operator and its supplier in 2013, two main causes of the unsatisfactory 
contractual outcomes were highlighted: changing weather conditions 
(environmental factor) and inconsistent delivery of trains to cleaning 
locations (non-collaborative buyer action). Both factors required the cleaning 
services operator to adjust its cleaning capacity (i.e., the number of cleaning 
Chapter 4 
 
114 
 
personnel) in order to deal with fluctuating capacity demands. More 
specifically, poor weather conditions make trains grimier, which means that 
additional cleaning capacity is needed to remove sand, sludge, and similar 
contaminants during periods of poor weather. “Weather is an important 
factor. Especially during the winter, weather conditions affect cleanliness in 
a negative manner” (Train operator, manager of external cleaning, 2013). 
While weather conditions are fairly predictable because of the availability of 
weather forecasts, inconsistent delivery of trains to cleaning locations created 
a more significant challenge for the supplier. To enable the supplier to clean 
its trains, the train operator had to take the trains out of service and deliver 
them to one of several cleaning locations throughout the country. To facilitate 
capacity planning, the train operator and the supplier had agreed on a delivery 
schedule that detailed the number of trains to be delivered to a specific 
cleaning location. However, when there were unexpected disruptions due to 
breakdowns in the rail infrastructure, for example, the train operator seldom 
adhered to the agreed schedule. Consequently, the cleaning services supplier 
frequently had to deal with a mismatch of cleaning capacity at cleaning 
locations throughout the country. “If you clean office buildings you know 
that the buildings will be in a specific location. Delivery of trains [to the 
cleaning locations], however, is associated with significant fluctuations. This 
can have a substantial impact on what you are able to clean” (Supplier, 
Transition manager, 2013).  
When we look back over the six-year period of the contract, distinct 
developments in the identified factors and resulting trends in passenger 
satisfaction become apparent. These developments can be divided into three 
two-year phases, as shown in Figure 4.2.  
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Phase 1: Suspension of contractual incentives 
After a complex tender phase, a suitable supplier was selected, and 
considerable effort was invested in forming a buyer–supplier relationship 
based on partnership. However, both parties soon found that performance on 
the specified cleanliness targets was disappointing. As agreed in the contract, 
the train operator was in a position to levy a fine to punish the supplier for 
substandard performance. Having discussed the performance shortfalls at 
length, the train operator decided to suspend the contractual incentives during 
the first two years (2012–2013). 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Percentage of Passengers Satisfied with Cleanliness 
 
“Our goal was to build a partnership with the cleaning services 
supplier, so we decided not to fine them [during the first two years]” (Train 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
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operator, manager cleaning and maintenance, 2013). While it had become 
clear to both parties that the desired performance could only be achieved if 
coordination between them was improved, few operational improvements 
were made during the first two years. Consequently, passenger satisfaction 
increased only marginally during those two years. At the same time, 
changing weather conditions seemed to have no distinct negative effects on 
performance. “While weather is mentioned throughout the organization as an 
important factor, we find no evidence based on our passenger satisfaction 
data that it affects outcomes” (Train operator, head of passenger satisfaction 
department, 2013). 
Phase 2: Reinstatement of contractual incentives 
Having given the cleaning services supplier a considerable period of time in 
which to improve cleaning performance, the train operator reinstated the 
contractual incentives in 2014. During the following two years, the 
relationship between the train operator and the supplier worsened 
considerably. The supplier felt that it was being treated unfairly since it was 
made financially responsible for performance shortfalls caused by the train 
operator’s actions. That is, outcomes were affected by a cause that was under 
the buyer’s control: “This triggered [negative] emotions in both parties 
involved” (Train operator, director of supply chain operations, 2018). These 
negative emotions appear to have had a considerable effect on performance 
since passenger satisfaction levels decreased from 56 percent in 2013 to 51 
percent in 2014. On the other hand, the effects of changing weather 
conditions could be blamed on neither party and did therefore not appear to 
result in negative performance outcomes.  
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Phase 3: Reduction of non-collaborative buyer actions 
A newly appointed director of supply chain operations at the train operator 
recognized that the operator was partly to blame for the performance 
shortfalls and sought to remedy this. “We [the train operator] played an 
important role in this as we did not support them [the supplier] properly” 
(Train operator, director of supply chain operations, 2018). As a result of the 
change of leadership, operational changes were made to improve 
coordination with the supplier and on-time delivery of trains. Coordination 
with the supplier was improved by providing it with real-time data 
concerning day-to-day variations in the number of trains that had to be 
cleaned. To improve on-time delivery of trains, cleaning operations were 
given higher priority by the train operator managers. These collaborative 
buyer actions and resulting changes enabled the supplier to schedule its 
cleaning capacity more accurately and gave it more time to clean individual 
trains. Most importantly, the relationship between the train operator and the 
supplier was now based on the envisioned partnership, rather than on 
interactions in which both parties blamed each other. As can be seen in Figure 
4.2, these changes appear to have had a significant positive effect on 
passenger satisfaction. On the other hand, changing weather conditions 
appear to have had no discernable negative effect on passenger satisfaction.  
4.3.4 Preliminary Findings 
The developments in our case study suggest that emotions triggered by non-
collaborative buyer actions cause performance shortfalls to arise whereas 
emotions triggered by environmental factors do not. To gain a better 
understanding of the causal search process that lead to these different effects, 
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we classify these factors along the causal dimensions listed in Table 4.2. We 
conclude that it is the difference in causal placement on the other-
controllability dimension that results in different behavioral effects.   
 
Table 4.2  
Causal placement of causes of performance shortfalls 
Cause Locus Stability Self-controllability 
Other-
controllability 
Environmental 
factor External Unstable Uncontrollable 
Un-
controllable 
Non-
collaborative 
buyer actions 
External Unstable Uncontrollable Controllable 
 
However, the nature of our study limits our ability to draw 
conclusions concerning the causal relationships between the factors 
identified. As we were unable to control for the impact that other factors (e.g., 
strikes by cleaning personnel during the contract period) had on passenger 
satisfaction, these preliminary findings require further testing.  
4.4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.4.1 Emotions 
By combining the insights gained from our exploratory case study and the 
causal dimensions – emotion links presented in Table 4.1, we can now 
formulate hypotheses that are grounded in empirical and theoretical insights. 
The formulated testable hypotheses we analyze the causal search process in 
a structured manner to determine motivational effects of environmental 
factors and non-collaborative buyer actions. The causal search process that 
managers, which are confronted with a failure to achieve contractual 
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outcomes due to environmental factors, go through can be visualized in the 
following manner: 
 
Outcome (failure to achieve contractual outcomes)        Cause 
(environmental factor)         Essential causal dimension (stability: 
unstable)        Emotion (hope)         Motivational effect (positive)     
 
Given the realization that the effect of environmental factors on 
contractual outcomes will change over time, the manager will be hopeful that 
contractual outcomes can be achieved in the subsequent period. The positive 
emotion that is experienced by the manager will therefore lead to an 
increased motivation to work towards achieving the contractual outcomes 
(Weiner, 1986, 2018). Based on this insight, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The recognition that a failure to achieve contractual 
outcomes was caused by environmental factors positively affects 
achievement motivation. 
 
The causal search process that managers, which are confronted with 
a failure to achieve contractual outcomes due to non-collaborative buyer 
actions, go through can be visualized in the following manner: 
 
Outcome (failure to achieve contractual outcomes)        Cause (non-
collaborative buyer action)        Essential causal dimensions (locus: 
external, other-controllability: controllable)        Emotion (anger)        
Motivational effect (negative)   
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 Given the realization that the effect of non-collaborative buyer actions 
on contractual outcomes is under the control of the buyer, the manager will 
experience anger towards the buyer. These negative emotions will result in a 
decreased motivation to achieve contractual outcomes (Rudolph et al., 2004; 
Weiner, 2018). Based on this insight, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The recognition that a failure to achieve contractual 
outcomes was caused by non-collaborative buyer actions negatively 
affects achievement motivation. 
 
4.4.2 Attributional Biases 
Given that the causal search process of managers is affected by attributional 
biases, the classification of environmental factors and non-collaborative 
buyer actions along the causal dimensions is affected by their attribution style 
(Kent and Martinko, 1995a). That is, the essential causal dimensions that are 
ascribed to environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer actions differ 
by manager. Consequently, the motivational effects that are a result of the 
assigned essential causal dimensions are different across managers. When 
confronted with a failure to achieve contractual outcomes, managers with 
optimistic attribution styles generally believe that causes of the failure are 
‘external, unstable and uncontrollable’ (Abramson et al., 1978; Douglas and 
Martinko, 2001). Managers with pessimistic attribution styles tend to display 
the opposite pattern, as they generally perceive causes of failures to be 
‘internal, stable and controllable’. Previous studies have found that optimists 
are generally more effective in dealing with failure than pessimists in inter-
personal settings (Seligman and Schulman, 1986).  
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We argue that pessimists are more effective in dealing with failures 
than optimists in inter-organizational settings. While managers with 
optimistic attribution styles blame failures on external factors that are not 
under their control, managers with pessimistic attribution styles believe that 
they can exert control over causes of contractual outcomes. The latter type of 
managers will therefore engage in proactive actions to mitigate effects of 
environmental factors and non-collaborative buyer actions on contractual 
outcomes (Ellis, Schockley, and Henry, 2011). Take for example the weather 
conditions discussed in the exploratory case study. Having recognized that 
poor weather conditions require additional cleaning capacity, the cleaning 
services supplier started using weather forecast as an input for the capacity 
planning process. Similarly, the transition manager of the supplier engaged 
in proactive discussions with its counterpart to ensure that the buyer was 
aware of the effects of its non-collaborative buyer actions. Since such 
mitigative actions would only be initiated by managers with a pessimistic 
attribution style, we argue that pessimists will be more motivated to achieve 
contractual outcomes. Based on these insights we formulate the following 
moderation hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between ‘the recognition that 
a failure to achieve contractual outcomes was caused by environmental 
factors’ and ‘achievement motivation’ is stronger when the attribution 
style of suppliers’ managers is more pessimistic. 
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Hypothesis 4. The negative relationship between ‘the recognition that 
a failure to achieve contractual outcomes was caused by non-
collaborative buyer actions’ and ‘achievement motivation’ is weaker 
when the attribution style suppliers’ managers is more pessimistic. 
 
The hypothesized relationships are visualized in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Conceptual Model 
 
4.5 SCENARIO-BASED EXPERIMENT 
4.5.1 Experimental Design and Participants 
A scenario-based role-playing experiment allows us to test our hypotheses 
through clear temporal separation of cause and effect and randomization to 
rule out spurious causes (Rungtusanatham, Wallin, and Eckerd, 2011; 
Siemsen, 2011). Our experiment employs a 2 (contractual outcomes affected 
by environmental factors)  2 (contractual outcomes affected by non-
collaborative buyer actions)  2 (attribution style) mixed design. This design 
combines two between-group factors that are manipulated through the use of 
vignettes and a within-group factor (attribution styles), variation in 
Contractual outcomes 
affected by 
environmental factors
Contractual outcomes 
affected by 
non-collaborative 
buyer actions
Motivation 
to achieve contractual 
outcomes
Supplier’s decision 
maker pessimism
H2:  -
H1: +
H3: -
H4: -
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attribution styles occurs naturally due to personal differences between our 
participants. We followed the three-stage creation and validation process 
proposed by Rungtusanatham et al. (2011) to design and validate vignettes 
for our scenario-based experiment. First, we studied the research context for 
role playing and identified factors of interest by conducting an exploratory 
case study. Using the insights gathered, we then interviewed two 
practitioners (a consultant and a project manager) to identify roles that 
capture the research context and factors of interest, while at the same time 
being roles that a wide range of participants might be able to take on. During 
these interviews five potential roles were identified. One of which, the role 
of project manager, was selected since it best captured the research context 
and factors of interest. Second, we developed a series of vignettes for use 
with our practitioner sample, including one common module and four 
experimental cues modules that capture different levels of the between-group 
factors. Third, we asked six practitioners and five academics to review our 
vignettes for clarity and missing information. Some minor corrections were 
made based on the feedback we received. To test for issues relating to 
external and convergent validity (Bachrach and Bendoly, 2011), we then 
pilot-tested our experimentation protocol, the realism of our vignettes, and 
our manipulation checks with separate samples of 43 undergraduate students 
(recruited through the subject pool of a European business school) and 24 
practitioners (recruited through LinkedIn). While these pilot-tests revealed 
no issues concerning external and convergent validity, we did receive 
feedback on some minor mistakes in the instructions, and these were 
subsequently corrected.  
In the common module of our vignettes we asked participants to role-
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play a project manager in a decision-making role at a contract manufacturer 
of organic cosmetics. The organization had been tasked with developing and 
manufacturing a premium shampoo. A performance-based contract had been 
put in place that tied compensation to on-time (within one year) and within-
budget completion of the project. The project manager had been asked to 
manage the development of the shampoo so that the deadline and budget 
would be met. Participants were informed that the project manager had 
accepted the assignment and were provided with more detailed information 
on the project. They were subsequently given project updates containing 
information about other factors that could explain failures. Participants were 
then randomly assigned to one of four treatments captured in the 
experimental cues modules. Participants were confronted with static or 
changing regulations that the shampoo design had to conform to (contractual 
outcomes affected by environmental factors) and a manager who did or did 
not demand a change in the design due to personal preferences (contractual 
outcomes affected by non-collaborative buyer action). All participants were 
then informed that the shampoo design had not been completed within the 
set timeframe and that they would not receive the part of their compensation 
that was tied to the achievement of contractual outcomes. Having 
experienced this outcome in the first year, the project manager was given the 
option to salvage the project during the second year. We then measured the 
motivation of each participant to achieve contractual outcomes during the 
second year. The full instructions for the experiment, including the scenarios 
used, are available from the authors upon request.  
Participants were recruited through the Prolific online subject 
recruitment platform (prolific.ac) developed at Oxford University. Various 
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studies have demonstrated that data obtained through online subject 
recruitment platforms are at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional 
data collection methods (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011; 
Sprouse, 2011). However, the fact that widely used platforms such as MTurk 
were not explicitly designed for scientific research results in challenges 
relating to transparency (Palan and Schitter, 2018). Prolific addresses these 
challenges by explicitly informing participants that they are being recruited 
for participation in scientific research and by facilitating the use of 
transparent recruitment procedures. Therefore, the platform has attracted 
attention among supply chain scholars (Duhadway, Carnovale, and Kannan, 
2018).  
To recruit participants that would be suitable proxies for the real-
world roles in question and to thereby avoid possible confounds and ensure 
the generalizability of results, we recruited practitioners (individuals who 
had completed their studies and were employed at the time of the study) 
rather than students (Bachrach and Bendoly, 2011; Mir et al., 2017). Due to 
the diverse nature of organizations that act as suppliers, we chose not to use 
any additional filters. Based on these criteria, our participant pool consisted 
of 11,322 eligible participants. To minimize the impact of environmental 
distractions on the level of attention paid to the task (Palan and Schitter, 
2018), potential participants were informed that the study was to be 
completed in an environment where there would be no distractions. In 
addition, they were informed that their attention levels would be monitored 
throughout the study such that only those who paid adequate attention would 
be compensated for their participation ($10.55 per hour). This yielded 
completed responses from 405 participants. The 325 participants who passed 
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the attention check were aged between 20 and 61 (M = 35.33, SD = 8.75), 
and 187 of them were women (57.5%). The number of years of work 
experience of our participants ranged between 1 and 45 years (M = 12.68, SD 
= 9.31).  
4.5.2 Measures 
Manipulation Checks 
To test whether our manipulations were effective, we used an adapted three-
item measurement scale based on the environmental uncertainty scale 
developed by Celly and Frazier (1996). Participants were asked to indicate 
on a 3 item, five-point semantic differential scale whether the ‘environmental 
requirements’ and ‘buyer’s actions’: “make it less likely that your effort will 
result in you receiving a bonus – make it more likely that your effort will 
result in you receiving a bonus”, “make it more difficult to predict whether 
you will meet the product development deadline – make it less difficult to 
predict whether you will meet the product development deadline”, “decrease 
the likelihood of meeting the product development deadline – increase the 
likelihood of meeting the product development deadline”.   
Dependent Variable 
To measure motivation to achieve contractual outcomes, we used the five-
point Likert scale developed by Erez and Judge (2001). We asked 
participants to indicate to what extent they agreed with the following three 
statements: “I really want to succeed in this task,” “I look forward to doing 
the same task,” and “Because I am not motivated to do well, I will probably 
not perform well as a result (reverse-coded).”  
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Notes: Cronbach’s alphas are shown on the diagonal. 
* Correlation is significant at p ≤ .05 level (two-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at p ≤ 
.01 level (two-tailed). 
 
Moderator 
To measure the attribution style of our participants, we adopted the 
Member Attribution Style Questionnaire (Martinko et al., 2007a). This 
questionnaire contains nine negative employment scenarios. Participants 
were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert scales the extent to which 
they believed that the causes for each of the nine scenarios were either 
“completely due to me” or “completely due to other people or 
circumstances,” and the extent to which these causes were likely to exist in 
the future, ranging from “always present” to “never present.” The scores 
were summed such that lower scores reflected decision makers with more 
pessimistic self-attribution styles and higher scores reflected decision 
makers with more optimistic self-attribution styles. Descriptive statistics 
and correlations are provided in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Environmental factor   -    
  
2 Non-collaborative buyer actions 
 -.07 -     
3 Motivation  3.75 .81 .15** -.26** (.75)    
4 Pessimism 73.90 11.29 -.06 .09 .02 (.72)   
5 Self-controllability 6.10 1.67 -.20
** .16** -.20 .18** (.74)  
6 Other-controllability 3.61 1.60 .13
** -.29** .13* -.07 -.23** (.70) 
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Dependent Variable (Post-hoc Analysis) 
To measure perceived self- and other-controllability of causes we adopted 
the Causal Dimension Scale II (McAuley, Duncan, and Russell, 1992).  
4.6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.6.1 Manipulation Checks 
To establish whether our treatments were effective in capturing differing 
levels of our core constructs, we carried out manipulation checks (Bachrach 
and Bendoly, 2011; Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). Separate one-way 
ANOVAs yielded strong effects in the expected direction for our 
manipulations of contractual outcomes effected by environmental factors (M 
= 2.91 vs. 1.88, p = .000, η² = .231) and contractual outcomes affected by 
non-collaborative buyer actions (M = 2.94 vs. 1.63, p = .000, η² = .361) on 
the respective manipulation checks.  
4.6.2 Hypothesis Testing 
We used SPSS 25.0 combined with the PROCESS bootstrapping macro to 
conduct regression analyses to test our hypotheses. The regression results are 
presented in Table 4.4. First, we hypothesized that contractual outcomes 
being affected by environmental factors would be positively related to 
motivation to achieve contractual outcomes, whereas contractual outcomes 
being affected by non-collaborative buyer actions would be negatively 
related to motivation to achieve contractual outcomes. Our results provide 
support for both hypotheses 1 and 2. Contractual outcomes being affected by 
environmental factors was found to have a positive effect on motivation to 
achieve contractual outcomes (  = .14, p = .012). Conversely, contractual 
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outcomes being affected by non-collaborative buyer actions was found to be 
negatively related to motivation to achieve contractual outcomes (  = -.25, 
p = .000). 
 
Table 4.4 
Regression results  
 
Motivation to achieve 
contractual outcomes 
  
Predictor β SE t R2  R2 
Step 1    .09 .09 
   Environmental factors  .14* .09 2.52   
   Non-collaborative buyer actions -.25** .09 -4.71   
Step 2    .11 .02** 
   Environmental factors .22** .09 2.56   
   Non-collaborative buyer actions -.42** .09 -4.93   
   Attribution style .09 .07 1.31   
   Environmental factors * attribution   
   style -.23
** .09 -2.64   
Step 3       .09 .00 
   Environmental factors .23** .09 2.60   
   Non-collaborative buyer actions -.42** .58 -1.31   
   Attribution style -.07 .01 -1.13   
   Non-collaborative buyer actions *  
   attribution style .05 .01 .60   
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are reported.  
* p ≤ .05 level (two-tailed). ** p ≤ .01 level (two-tailed). 
 
Second, we hypothesized that the main effects would be moderated 
by decision maker optimism. Our results provide support for hypothesis 3, 
since the interaction between attribution style and contractual outcomes 
affected by environmental causes was found to be significant (F[1, 320] = 
6.98, p = .009, R2 = 0.019). In Figure 4.4, we plotted values across the range 
of motivation to achieve contractual outcomes scores for higher (i.e., one 
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standard deviation above the mean) and lower (i.e., one standard deviation 
below the mean) levels of decision maker optimism. While the slope for 
lower decision maker optimism was found to be positive and significant (b = 
.45, t = 3.71, p = .000), the slope for higher decision maker optimism was 
found to be negative and non-significant (b = -.01, t = -.07, p = .941).  
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Interaction 
Our results did not provide support for hypothesis 4, since the 
interaction between decision maker optimism and contractual outcomes 
affected by non-collaborative buyer actions was found to be non-significant 
(F[1, 320] = .36, p = .551, R2 = 0.001). 
4.6.3 Post-hoc Analysis 
We follow the recommendation of Hollenbeck and Wright (2017) to engage 
in post-hoc exploratory data analysis to explain findings that we did not 
originally expect. To further our understanding of how attribution styles 
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affect motivation to achieve contractual outcomes in the context of PBC, we 
develop additional theory-driven hypotheses that we then test.  
To operationalize the concept of attribution styles, scholars have 
developed several measurement scales that capture attributional biases by 
presenting individuals with distinct scenarios (Kent and Martinko, 1995a; 
Martinko et al., 2007a; Proudfoot et al., 2001). In developing these scales 
scholars have aimed to capture how attributional biases influence an 
individual’s perception of the locus, stability and controllability of causes. 
However, since they found their measurements of the locus and 
controllability dimensions to be highly correlated, they decided to collapse 
these two dimensions into a single dimension. That is, they dropped the 
questions used to measure perceptual differences on the controllability 
dimension. Based on a critical evaluation of the scale development processes 
employed, we posit that this step is problematic for two reasons. First, the 
relationship between the locus and controllability dimensions has been 
suggested to vary across contexts (Kent and Martinko, 1995b; Russell, 
McAuley, and Tarico, 1987); dropping questions that measure perceptual 
differences in the controllability of causes could therefore decrease the 
explanatory power of the attribution styles concept for specific contexts. 
Second, scholars appear not to have measured both sub-dimensions of 
controllability (self- and other-controllability) as the questions that were used 
appear to measure only self-controllability. If perceptual differences relating 
to other-controllability are ignored, the motivational effects thereof are 
unlikely to be captured.  
To test our insight that the attribution styles measurement scale 
developed by Martinko et al. (2007a) used in our scenario-based experiment 
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does not capture both sub-dimensions of controllability, we formulate two 
hypotheses. First, based on the insight that these scholars used questions that 
capture self-controllability, and that this measurement of ‘controllability’ 
correlates with locus, we formulate the following hypothesis (which we 
expect to accept): 
 
Hypothesis 5. Decision maker optimism is positively associated with 
self-controllability. 
 
Second, we seek to test the insight that no questions had been added 
that measured ‘controllability’ in terms of ‘other-controllability’. We 
formulate the following hypothesis (which we expect to reject) to test this 
insight: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Decision maker optimism is associated with other-
controllability. 
 
Table 4.5 
Regression Results Post-hoc Analysis 
Predictor     β SE t p R2 
      (Dependent variable: self-  
       controllability)     
.031 
Decision maker optimism .18** .01 3.19 .002  
      (Dependent variable: other- 
       controllability) 
    .004 
Decision maker optimism -.07 .01 -1.13 .257  
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are reported. 
** p ≤ .01 level (two-tailed). 
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As can be seen in Table 4.5, our results provide support for 
hypotheses 5 but not for hypothesis 6. Decision maker optimism is shown to 
be positively associated with self-controllability (  = .18, p = .002), and we 
find no significant association between decision maker optimism and other-
controllability (  = -.07, p = .257).  
4.7 DISCUSSION 
4.7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Our research makes three main contributions to the behavioral supply 
management and contracting literature. First, we demonstrate the need to go 
beyond behavioral assumptions propagated by established theories 
originating in the field of economics. Specifically, our findings reveal that 
suppliers’ managers are not (always) rational decision makers (Bendoly et 
al., 2006). Rather than responding rationally when confronted with negative 
contractual outcomes, these managers rely on cognitive processes to assign 
responsibility for causes of contractual outcomes. That is, through 
attributional activities supply chain managers determine the source of the 
cause, who has control over the cause, and whether it is persistent or 
temporary (Weiner, 1986). By applying these attributional dimensions to 
study PBC, we find that contrary to what the current contracting literature 
would predict (Eisenhardt, 1989a), not all sources of outcome uncertainty 
decrease the effectiveness of PBC. We find that environmental factors such 
as weather conditions and regulation do not decrease its effectiveness. On the 
other hand, buyers engaging in non-collaborative actions that adversely 
affect contractual outcomes do decrease the effectiveness of PBC since 
suppliers hold buyers responsible for shortfalls in performance (Steinbeck et 
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al., 2018). This finding implies that PBC can be used effectively in a far 
wider range of contractual settings than had been suggested by previous 
studies.  
Second, we reveal that attributional biases in suppliers’ managers 
conditions how they respond to factors that affect contractual outcomes. 
While managers with a pessimistic attribution style believe that they can 
mitigate the effects of environmental factors, those with an optimistic 
attribution style do not. Consequently, the effectiveness of PBC can vary 
across firms due to the attribution styles of suppliers’ managers. This means 
that in addition to contextual factors of contractual settings, effects related to 
attribution styles of managers should be taken into account when designing 
performance-based contracts. 
Third, we show that attribution styles as measured in previous studies 
fail to take account of an essential sub-dimension of controllability. In line 
with previous studies, we find that attributional biases that affect perceptions 
of self-controllability are indeed captured in the attribution styles framework 
(Kent and Martinko, 1995a; Martinko et al., 2007a; Proudfoot et al., 2001). 
However, our results reveal that attributional biases that affect perceptions of 
other-controllability are not captured in the current framework. Based on 
these insights, we argue that the attribution styles framework needs to be 
revised. We believe that the explanatory power of this concept could be 
increased considerably by including perceptual differences concerning the 
extent to which causes of contractual outcomes are under the control of 
others.   
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4.7.2 Managerial Contributions 
Although the findings we have presented would have to be replicated to allow 
firm conclusions to be drawn, the findings nevertheless have some 
preliminary managerial implications. If supply chain managers recognize the 
role that causal attributions and attribution styles play in how PBC affects 
supplier behavior, they can design and manage performance-based contracts 
more effectively. More specifically, our findings could enable supply chain 
managers to make an accurate evaluation of the contexts in which PBC is 
likely to be effective. This study reveals that non-collaborative buyer actions 
play a more prominent role than environmental factors, and that this should 
be taken into account when designing performance-based contracts. Most 
importantly, we show that effectiveness of PBC does not only depend on 
what causes outcome uncertainty, but also varies according to the individual. 
The attribution styles of decision makers in supply firms have been shown to 
have an impact on the effectiveness of PBC in uncertain contexts. More 
specifically, decision makers with a pessimistic attribution style are shown 
to deal more effectively when a failure to achieve contractual outcomes is 
caused by environmental factors. This is because managers with a pessimistic 
attribution style believe that they can exert control over the effects of 
environmental factors, whereas managers with an optimistic attribution style 
do not. For suppliers that employ pessimistic decision makers, PBC would 
be effective, even in uncertain contexts.  
4.7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite making contributions to both theory and practice, our studies have 
several limitations. Our first study was conducted in a single organization 
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whose specific characteristics could limit the generalizability of our findings 
to a broader set of organizations. First, the organization we studied is a semi-
public organization. The management style and organizational culture 
associated with public organizations could limit the generalizability of our 
findings to private organizations. Second, the study was conducted in a single 
country, the culture of which could affect how specific causes of outcome 
uncertainty are perceived. We addressed some of these limitations by 
conducting an experimental study. However, this study has limitations of its 
own. Findings based on experimental designs have been criticized for not 
being generalizable beyond the lab setting due to characteristics of 
experimental practices (low monetary stakes, high levels of scrutiny, and 
tasks that are abstract in nature) and the convenience samples used. We 
minimized the impact of these factors by conducting our studies with 
practitioners and designing a scenario based on input from experienced 
practitioners.  
We would like to propose three main avenues for future research. 
First, we would encourage researchers to explore how causal attributions 
other than those identified by Weiner (1985, 1986) affect whether PBC can 
be used effectively to govern supplier behavior. Eberly et al. (2011, 2017) 
find that ‘relational’ attributions are an additional dimension of locus of 
causes. Relational attributions capture the explanations made by an 
individual, as the individual assigns the cause of a performance related event 
to the relationship the individual has with another person. Relational 
attributions could be of immediate relevance to contracting research since 
our results reveal that the supplier’s ability to achieve outcomes is to a great 
extent dependent on the buyer’s actions. Harvey et al. (2014) identified 
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several additional dimensions that could extend our understanding of the way 
in which PBC affects supplier behavior: intentionality, globality, 
consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness. Dasborough and Ashkanasy’s 
(2002) discussion of intentionality suggests that this is another potential 
dimension of controllability which could provide valuable insights in terms 
of how non-collaborative buyer actions affect supplier behavior. More 
specifically, if it can be established whether suppliers perceive buyers to be 
acting intentionally, the effect of non-collaborative buyer actions can be 
studied in more detail. Second, we would like to propose that the relationship 
between perceptions of other-controllability and attribution styles should be 
investigated further. Our study reveals that, despite the claims made in 
previous studies, the measurement scale developed Martinko et al. (2007a) 
does not capture how attribution styles affect perceived other-controllability. 
Adding other-controllability as a separate dimension when measuring 
attribution styles could enhance the explanatory power of this concept. Third, 
in this study we have taken into account only the supplier’s attributions and 
attribution styles. Contracting scholars could examine the attributions of both 
buyers and suppliers to study effects of conflicting attributions (see Martinko 
et al., 2007a).
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CHAPTER 5  
 
Servitization: How property rights and obligations tied to selling 
performance outcomes drive manufacturers to engage in a supply 
chain realignment process 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The development by manufacturers of hybrid product-service offerings 
(Ulaga and Reinartz, 2011), or ‘servitization’, is now a prominent concern in 
practice (Visnjic et al., 2013) and in the operations management literature 
(Rabetino et al., 2018; Visnjic and Van Looy, 2013). To improve their 
competitive position, industry leaders such as Caterpillar, Hitachi, and Rolls-
Royce have moved to offering customer centric bundles of products and 
services (Cusumano, Kahl, and Suarez, 2015; Neely, 2009; Visnjic et al., 
2017). An illustrative industry example is the Power-by-the-Hour concept 
through which Rolls-Royce offers a bundle of engines and maintenance 
services to airlines (Visnjic and Van Looy, 2013). The move towards 
servitization has generally enabled manufacturers to improve their 
competitiveness by closely aligning the delivery of product functionality and 
performance to their customers’ core objectives (Wang, Lai, and Shou, 2018; 
Worm et al., 2017). However, failures to extract financial rewards from 
offering product-service bundles are widely documented in academic 
literature (Gebauer, Gustafsson, and Witell, 2011; Han, Kuruzovich, and 
Ravichandran, 2013; Neely, 2009; Suarez, Cusumano, and Kahl, 2013).  
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The extant servitization literature has emphasized a resource-based 
view to examine the manufacturers’ transition to integrated product-service 
offerings (e.g., Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp, 2008; Oliva and Kallenberg, 
2003). In broad terms, this literature is concerned with the (service) 
operations-related resources and capabilities that manufacturers need to 
develop, or access via their supply chain counterparts, to realize a successful 
transition to servitized offerings (Rabetino et al., 2018). Inherent in this 
literature stream is therefore the argument that servitization entails change 
within the manufacturing firm (e.g., in terms of resource / capability base, 
organizational structure and processes) and across its supply chain (e.g., in 
terms of SC positioning), and that such change needs to be managed (Reim, 
Parida, and Örtqvist, 2015). However, the extant literature appears to have 
underplayed another important aspect of change that servitization entails, 
which is, change in allocation of property rights and obligations resulting 
from shifting modes of product / equipment ownership. This is driven by 
changes in technological, market and commercial factors altering what is the 
most economically efficient distribution of rights and responsibilities 
between servitized manufacturers and their customers. Such developments 
enable, in theory at least, manufacturers to retain product ownership and 
focus on delivering product performance and / or a capability to their 
customers (Baines et al., 2011). A corollary to this argument is that alignment 
within the manufacturing firm and across the supply chain is required to 
address potential misfits between existing structure of ownership (and 
associated incentives) and operations processes, and the structure and 
processes that have become economically efficient due to above-outlined 
technological and market changes.  
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Despite the above, the existing OM research on servitization has 
hitherto paid only limited attention to the issue of ownership (a rare exception 
is Lay, Schroeter, and Biege, 2009) and its implications for firm-level 
operations strategies, processes, and the management of supply chain 
relationships (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Walker et al., 2015). This study 
addresses this literature deficiency by seeking to understand in-depth how 
considerations of product ownership and (re)allocation of associated rights 
and obligations trigger processes of alignment within the manufacturing 
firm, between manufacturer and customer, and further upstream the supply 
chain. To pursue this research objective, we adopt a property rights theory  
lens that helps explain how the partitioning of property rights and the 
distribution of income generated by a bundle of rights influence incentive 
alignment (or lack thereof) between supply chain counterparts (Coase, 1960). 
In addition, a property rights perspective emphasizes the dynamics of 
efficient allocation of property rights by considering adaptations to property 
rights distribution in response to technological and socio-economic changes 
(Kim and Mahoney, 2005). In line with our focus on the process of 
alignment, we employ a process research design to study how reallocating 
rights and obligations drive supply chain alignment over time (Langley, 
1999; Van De Ven and Poole, 1995). 
By engaging in theory elaboration (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014), we 
contribute to the existing servitization research in the following ways. First, 
we show that the structure of product ownership matters when it comes to 
alignment of objectives, incentives and operations processes across multiple 
supply chain tiers. Second, our empirical study shows how exactly 
ownerships matters: it reveals the mechanisms of alignment, but more 
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importantly the specific processes by which alignment occurs both within the 
manufacturing firm, but also between the manufacturing firm and its 
customers and suppliers. Third, we elaborate on a process view of supply 
chain alignment (see Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) by showing the sequence 
and interrelationships between manufacturing firm (internal) alignment, 
customer alignment and supplier alignment. Fourth, we make an empirical 
contribution by analyzing how issues concerning ownership of data (e.g., 
product usage data) influence the partitioning of property rights in relation to 
the product itself, and the most efficient allocation of associated risks and 
rewards between supply chain counterparts.  
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 Servitization of Manufacturing and Service-based business 
models 
The contemporary servitization literature has resulted from the convergence 
of two rather separate strands. One has its origins in a strategic concern for 
differentiation and value appropriation in capital equipment sectors subject 
to increasing competition from low-cost manufacturers. Early examples of 
this were Potts (1988), Wise and Baumgartner (1999) and, somewhat later 
and building on the latter, Davies (2004). The broad argument of this 
literature is that manufacturers need to extract value from the whole life-
cycle of capital goods by ‘moving down the supply chain’ (Wise and 
Baumgartner, 1999) to take over activities such as maintenance that their 
customers had hitherto undertaken. In some instances, the consequences of 
such moves for the structure of incentives is part of the argument: for 
example, Davies (2004) suggests that capital equipment manufacturers who 
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come to bear the cost of maintenance of these assets will be incentivized to 
design future products so as to reduce maintenance effort and costs.  
The second strand originates in industrial ecology (Beuren et al., 
2013). This is important for our present concerns because, whereas the 
strategic servitization literature emphasizes competitive positioning and 
vertical integration issues, this second strand is centrally concerned with 
‘dematerialization’ through access-based business models (Stahel, 2005; 
Stoughton and Votta, 2003). The emphasis here is on the incentivization of 
the producer to produce less to achieve the required outcome for the 
customer, and in other ways to reduce the environmental impact of the whole 
system. In some ways this has led to the recent interest in the circular 
economy (e.g., Spring and Araujo, 2017) and is part of a wider socio-
economic shift toward user accessing products rather than owning them 
(Rifkin, 2000). 
Baines and colleagues (e.g., Baines and Lightfoot, 2013) combine the 
ideas from these two strands in a typology of different forms of servitization: 
base services, intermediate services and advanced services. Within this 
scheme, based services are defined as “an outcome focused on product 
provision”, intermediate services are defined as “an outcome focused on 
maintenance of product condition” and advanced services are defined as “an 
outcome focused on capability delivered through performance of the 
product” (2013, p. 5). In advanced services, the manufacturer is responsible 
for and paid based on performance, and the progression from base to 
intermediate to advanced services is characterized in terms of the respective 
roles of each firm in activities such as operation and maintenance of the asset.  
It is notable, however, that this literature is much less concerned about the 
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implications of asset ownership, which is surprising, given the emphasis in 
classic examples such as Rolls Royce’s ‘Power by the Hour’ and in the other 
cases explored by Davies (2004) and Visnjic and Van Looy (2013) on the 
retention of ownership by the manufacturer, and some of the consequences 
that flow from this structural change. Although the question of ownership is 
touched upon in the servitization literature, then, it is typically not tackled 
head on as a key determinant of operations strategies, processes and supply 
chain relationships [not sure of this form of words]. 
5.2.2 A Property Rights Perspective on Servitization  
Despite the lack of a sustained examination of the implications of ownership 
in the empirical servitization literature, it has been argued conceptually that 
product or equipment ownership is a key defining characteristic of services 
(Spring and Araujo, 2009). Ownership can be understood more precisely as 
a particular allocation between the customer, supplier, and possibly other 
firms such as third-party maintenance providers, of property rights over the 
product. Typically, in advanced forms of servitization such as ‘advanced 
services’ (Baines and Lightfoot, 2013), the ownership of the product is not 
transferred to the customer who, instead, obtains rights to use the product for 
a specified period (Hypko, Tilebein, and Gleich, 2010). A simple example 
that illustrates differences in the allocation of property rights between 
customers and manufacturers is ownership versus leasing of a car. Owning a 
car gives customers the right to use it to their desire and to make alterations 
to it. Leasing a car on the other hand limits the ways in which customers are 
allowed to use a car (e.g., maximum mileage per year) and prohibits 
customers from making alterations to a car. At the same time, owning a car 
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makes customers responsible for the maintenance of the car whereas leasing 
a car obliges the supplier to maintain the car such that customers can use it. 
A property rights perspective is useful for explaining such reallocations of 
ownership-related rights and obligations and shifts of associated incentives 
(in terms of risks and rewards), as manufacturers move towards service-
based business models (Lay et al., 2009).  
The property rights perspective is a theory of contracting which 
postulates that economic activity entails the exchange of bundles of property 
rights (Coase, 1960). Property rights are defined as the rights to use, to earn 
income from, and to transfer or exchange the assets and resources (Kim and 
Mahoney, 2005). The ex-ante allocation of rights and the ex-post distribution 
of income generated by a set of property rights influences incentives and 
behavior of contracting parties. Bundles of property rights in theory should 
be formed such that owners of these bundles are the most capable and 
properly incentivized parties to achieve efficient production. In the context 
of performance-based service contracts which tie payment to product 
performance (e.g., equipment availability), for instance, manufacturers 
possess crucial product-related knowledge and are incentivized to optimize 
maintenance activities. They may also be motivated to make performance-
improvement-related investments if they can retain control and income rights 
over the product or equipment after contract end (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 
2015). 
An important insight of property rights theory is that different actors 
can hold partitions of rights to specific facets of the same resource (Kim and 
Mahoney, 2005), which implies that: a) different types of property rights 
exist, and b) shared ownership is an option, especially when different degrees 
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of ownership (e.g., acquisition vs. licensing) are possible (Mazzola et al., 
2018). The extant literature has identified several types of property rights 
which converge to the following main ones: 1) the right to use a resource, 2) 
the right to benefit financially from resource use, 3) the right to exclude 
others from resource use, 4) the right to change the form /substance of a 
resource (i.e., maintain and upgrade), and 5) the right to alienate or transmit 
(i.e., to transfer all/some rights and generate income) (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1972; Hart and Moore, 1990; Silver, 1989; Tietze, Pieper, and 
Herstatt, 2015).  
The last three types of property rights include the following important 
obligations: 1) the obligation to cover losses from resource use, 2) the 
obligation to maintain resource and 3) the obligation to dispose of the 
resource at the end of its useful life (Kim and Mahoney, 2005). All property 
rights and obligations are transferred to the customer in product-based 
offerings. However, when products are sold as services property rights tend 
to be divided between the customer and manufacturer. In advanced services, 
for example, manufacturers retain many of the rights (e.g., the right to 
exclude others from resource use, the right to change from/substance of a 
resource and the right to alienate or transmit) associated with the fact that 
they retain ownership of the product. Consequently, service-based business 
models provide organizations with far more flexibility to allocate rights and 
obligations and associated risks and rewards in a manner that minimizes 
economic inefficiencies.  
The existence of different types of rights that are divided between 
manufacturers and customers also suggests that shared ownership is an 
option. While in product-service offerings the customer, generally speaking, 
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waives ownership-related rights, different models of ownership are adopted 
in practice, one of which is joint ownership via special purpose vehicle or 
leasing models (Hypko et al., 2010). In addition, a distinction is drawn 
between ownership during, and ownership after, the contract period. 
Ownership after the use period include rights to upgrade and re-use, or sell 
equipment to others as well as responsibilities for disposal and recycling (Lay 
et al., 2009). In manufacturing industries, as compared to large construction 
projects, ownership of equipment is rarely transferred back to customers after 
contract end, albeit this is still an option (Hypko et al., 2010).  
Property rights analysis has traditionally focused on either the firm 
level or the institutional level (Hart and Moore, 1990; Kim and Mahoney, 
2005), and its application to the management of supply chains (and to 
Operations Management more broadly) has been very limited (see Walker et 
al., 2015). We suggest that property rights theory is suitable for addressing 
the critical question of ownership in relation to servitization. More 
specifically, a property rights perspective is useful for analyzing how 
customers, manufacturers and their upstream suppliers deal with the 
partitioning of rights and the separation between product ownership and 
control in a servitization context. 
5.2.3 Servitization and Supply Chain Alignment 
As result of the reallocation of property rights and obligations (and associated 
incentives), servitization has considerable implications for the structure and 
management of supply chain relationships and associated operations 
(Johnson and Mena, 2008; Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2017). The existing 
literature stresses the imperative role of alignment both within the 
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manufacturing firm and across the supply chain i.e. with customers and 
upstream suppliers (Alghisi and Saccani, 2015). Nonetheless, it also notes 
relevant challenges such as customer reluctance to increase supplier 
dependence, limited information sharing with upstream suppliers, 
component supplier visibility of product use patterns, and misaligned 
business models and contracts between manufacturers and their suppliers 
(Baines and Shi, 2015; Bastl et al., 2012; Finne and Holmström, 2013).   
More broadly, the concept of supply chain alignment originates in the 
operations strategy axiom that a firm needs to align its operations-related 
resources and capabilities with market requirements (Slack and Lewis, 
2002). This has been extended to the supply chain level meaning that a focal 
firm’s objectives and incentives, and those of its suppliers, should be aligned 
with the performance requirements and incentives of its customers (Lee, 
2004; Vachon, Halley, and Beaulieu, 2009). Several mechanisms can be 
deployed to achieve supply chain alignment: integration of processes across 
firm boundaries, sharing of data and information, inter-firm collaborative 
work, design of compatible performance metrics and measurement systems, 
and alignment of contractual incentives (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; 
Gunasekaran, Patel, and Tirtiroglu, 2001; Narayanan and Raman, 2004). 
Alignment of performance objectives and incentives across the supply chain 
is particularly relevant to service-based business models, especially to those 
that entail performance-based payment mechanisms. For example, 
availability contracts tie part of manufacturer’s compensation to equipment 
availability targets, thus transferring performance related risks to the 
manufacturer who now has an incentive to optimize maintenance /repair 
activities and costs (Datta and Roy, 2011).  
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Research on supply chain alignment tends to take a contingency view 
of alignment which occurs in response to customer requirements and supply 
and demand characteristics (Lee, 2002), and it has largely underplayed the 
process by which supply chain counterparts interact to align their objectives 
and incentives. Supply chain alignment can alternatively be thought of as a 
non-instantaneous, discontinuous process triggered by episodic events which 
entail learning and adaptation (Selviaridis and Spring, 2018). 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
We conducted a longitudinal single case study with embedded units of 
analysis in order to explore, understand, and explain the transition towards 
servitization and the complex interplay between objectives, processes and 
structures as rights and obligations are transferred between supply chain 
partners (Barratt et al., 2011; Barratt and Barratt, 2011; Soundararajan and 
Brammer, 2018; Stuart et al., 2002). We studied the supply chain of Health 
Tech International (HTI), a pseudonym, to elaborate theory on property 
rights and supply chain alignment (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). The healthcare 
sector is a dynamic sector undergoing substantial changes towards outcome-
based reimbursement in many countries. HTI is a multinational with 
European roots that designs and manufactures medical grade equipment and 
personal health products. HTI generates an annual revenue of about €20 
billion and employs over 50,000 people in over 100 countries. We studied 
the medical imaging division, which accounts for approximately 40 percent 
of the organization’s revenue. Our study focused on sales, maintenance, and 
operations management related to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
systems. MRI systems are extremely suitable for advanced services for two 
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reasons: (1) MRI systems are high-priced assets (approx. €1 million) and (2) 
MRI systems require extensive maintenance due to their complex nature. We 
were granted research access to employees, meetings, documents, and supply 
chain partners of this organization and this enabled us to capture in detail the 
context within which supply chain alignment occurred over time (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991; Narasimhan and Jayaram, 1998; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2009).  
5.3.1 Data collection 
This field study combines retrospective accounts of events between January 
2010 and April 2016 with real time tracing of events between April 2016 and 
January 2019. We utilized interviewing of key informants at the 
manufacturer, its customers, and its preferred suppliers as our primary data 
collection method. Due to the global nature of project teams at HTI, we 
conducted interviews with personnel located in the Netherlands as well as 
the United States of America. Relevant informants at HTI were identified 
and contacted with the help of our main contact person at the organization (a 
procurement engineer). We obtained additional data by observing a “town 
hall” meeting and social interactions at the manufacturer by spending an 
average of one day a week at the focal firm between April 2016 and January 
2019. Field notes were written at the end of each day to capture relevant 
events and emergent theoretical insights. Further data triangulation was 
achieved by collecting data from the additional sources listed in Table 5.1 
(Yin, 2009). Utilizing these diverse data sources increases data reliability 
(Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead, 1987; Boyer and McDermott, 1999; Hyer, 
Brown, and Zimmerman, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1990) and provides a 
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stronger substantiation of our research findings (Benbasat et al., 1987; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b; Voss et al., 2002).  
 
Table 5.1 
Data overview. 
Source Type of data Use in the analysis 
Interviews 4 customer interviews. Semi-
structured interviews with 
purchasers and radiologists at 
hospitals concerning corporate 
objectives, equipment 
requirement, types of services 
purchased, and allocation of 
rights and obligations tied to 
purchased services.  
  
Coded for customer 
alignment initiatives and 
reallocation of rights and 
obligations. 
 
45 manufacturer interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews 
with MR business units 
concerning reallocation of 
rights and obligations and 
realignment of objectives, 
structures and processes.  
  
Coded for reallocation of 
rights and obligations and 
customer, internal and 
supplier alignment 
initiatives.  
 
1 supplier interviews. Semi-
structured interviews with 
CEO concerning quality 
requirements, initiatives to 
improve quality of components 
and sub-systems, and rights 
and obligations of suppliers. 
   
Coded for supplier 
alignment initiatives and 
reallocation of rights and 
obligations.  
Internal 
documents 
7 marketing documents. 
Internal documentation 
concerning product and service 
offering. As well as 
contractual agreements used to 
sell products and services. 
   
Provides background 
information concerning 
products and services 
offered. Coded for 
customer alignment 
initiatives, rights and 
obligations.  
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600 procurement documents. 
Contractual agreements with 
all preferred suppliers.  
  
Coded for supplier 
alignment initiatives, 
rights and obligations. 
 
5 general documents. 
PowerPoint presentations 
concerning strategic priorities 
and improvement initiatives.  
  
Coded for customer, 
internal and supplier 
alignment initiatives.  
 
8 newsletters. Internal 
newsletters concerning the 
developments in the MR 
business unit. 
   
Coded for customer, 
internal and supplier 
alignment initiatives.  
 
63 pictures. Photographs that 
document town hall meeting, 
products offered, and 
production facilities.  
  
Provides background 
information concerning 
strategic priorities as well 
as products and services 
offered.  
Observations Town hall meeting. Field 
notes concerning CEO 
presentation on strategic 
priorities of organization. 
   
Provides background 
information concerning 
strategic priorities.  
 
Employee interactions. Field 
notes on social interactions 
between HTI employees.  
  
Coded for customer, 
internal and supplier 
alignment initiatives.  
External sources 33 news articles. News 
articles from various sources 
concerning product releases, 
case studies of product 
implementations, interviews 
with HTI employees, and 
financial firm performance.  
Provides background 
information concerning 
strategic priorities as well 
as products and services 
offered.  
 
5.3.2 Analytic method 
We systematically analyzed the data using analytic methods for process 
research as recommended by Langley (1999). Specifically, we started with 
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narrative strategy and identified three phases in HTI’s transition: customer, 
internal and supplier realignment. We identified episodes in the transition 
and characterized each episode as being of one episode type: customer, 
internal or supplier realignment. Episodes were defined as events, or 
connected series of events, that describe a change in objectives, processes or 
structures, or as external triggers for such changes. We then employed a 
process mapping strategy to visualize the sequence of episodes. The 18 
episodes identified were the basic unit of analysis in this study (see Berends, 
Van Burg, and Van Raaij, 2011). The different stages of the analytic method 
used are summarized in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 
Data analytic method. 
Stage Process 
1 a) We iteratively analyzed the interview data related to the 
transition towards servitization to develop a chronological 
narrative that captured key events that customers, the 
manufacturer's business functions and suppliers experienced. 
From this narrative, we identified three phases: customer, 
internal and supplier alignment. 
 
b) We used internal documentation and news articles to add 
context to the narratives. This assisted us in tracing the sequence 
of events and in understanding the contextual nuances of events.  
2 We employed a systematic coding process to ensure a high degree of 
reliability and traceability of our data (McCutcheon and Meredith, 
1993; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
 
a) We created a coding scheme (Appendix E) based on concepts 
derived from existing literature to capture events related to 
customer, internal and supplier alignment at objective, process 
and structure levels. 
 
b) We used Atlas.ti to construct a case study database such that we 
were able to maintain a chain of evidence (Yin, 2009). 
 
c) Using Atlas.ti we coded our data by employing a combination of 
open and closed coding. More specifically, sensitizing concepts 
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were used to enable us to apply a structured coding approach yet 
leave room for the identification of additional constructs 
(Blumer, 1954; Van den Hoonaard, 1997). 
 
d) Each alignment episode type (i.e., customer, internal and 
supplier alignment) was coded individually using the process 
described above. 
3 The analysis at episode level was followed by an analysis to determine 
the sequence of episodes. This enabled us to determine in which 
manner rights and obligations trigger and facilitate the supply chain 
alignment episodes. The result of this analysis was captured in a 
process map (Langley, 1999). 
4 To ensure the reliability and validity of our findings we engaged in the 
following activities.  
 
a) We iteratively transgressed between the formulated narratives, 
our interview transcripts, our codes and relevant literature. 
 
b) We consulted internal documentation and news items to verify 
the validity of our findings. 
 
c) During our presence at the organization we presented emerging 
theoretical insights to key informants to check the validity of our 
findings.  
 
d) We continuously discussed emerging theoretical insights within 
our research team and with fellow academics to verify the 
robustness of our findings. 
 
e) We asked senior staff of the organization to thoroughly read the 
manuscript and provide us with feedback on the narratives, the 
process map, the constructs and the theoretical framework.  
 
5.4 FINDINGS 
5.4.1 Case Description 
In many developed economies around the world, the financial sustainability 
of the healthcare system has become a serious concern for governments and 
society. It has become clear that improving performance and cost-
effectiveness of healthcare delivery depends on creating shared objectives 
that align interests and activities of stakeholders in healthcare supply chains. 
Before 2010 healthcare providers had numerous, often conflicting goals, 
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including profitability, quality, safety, convenience, patient-centeredness, 
and satisfaction. A lack of alignment of objectives had led to inefficient care 
delivery, a focus on production, gaming of the system, and slow progress in 
performance improvement. Over the past ten years or so, delivering value for 
patients became the overarching goal of health care supply chains in more 
and more countries. To achieve this goal, healthcare payers, such as 
insurance companies, and healthcare providers have begun to implement 
value-based healthcare since about 2010. Consequently, health outcomes 
achieved per dollar spent were becoming the main objective for healthcare 
providers. Recognizing that these changes in the healthcare sector created 
new business opportunities, HTI’s marketing function decided to launch 
intermediate services in 2011. In addition to buying diagnostic imaging 
equipment outright, hospitals were offered the option to lease equipment 
bundled with a diverse offering of maintenance services. This episode is the 
starting point of our case analysis since it initiated various change episodes 
that led up to supply chain alignment.  
As the market responded favorably to the introduction of intermediate 
services, HTI’s marketing function saw an opportunity in 2013 to further 
expand its portfolio by introducing advanced services focused on improving 
operational performance of radiology departments. These long-term 
contracts (minimum duration of 15 years) involve extensive collaboration 
between HTI and hospitals to improve hospital operations of radiology 
departments. That is, the focus of these contracts is no longer solely on the 
performance of equipment but rather the effectiveness of operations in place 
to diagnose ailments.  
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While intermediate and advanced services were well received in the 
market, HTI soon realized that the payment models had resulted in 
considerable financial risk. As the promises made to customers in the form 
of uptime guarantees (and other performance measures) had not been based 
on actual performance but rather on what the market demanded, it was 
unclear whether these targets could be met. An internal investigation based 
on field performance data soon revealed that reliability fell short of the 
promises made to customers. As few customers monitored performance of 
its equipment before 2015, actual financial risk exposure was limited. And if 
customers did monitor performance, they were offered discounts on their 
service rates as compensation. Overall, the financial impact of poor 
performance was thus negligible during the first years after the introduction 
of service-based business models.  
However, due to an increasing focus on cost containment, hospitals 
started to engage in more extensive monitoring of performance delivered by 
suppliers. At the same time, a legislative change in a core market in 2015 
meant that discounts to compensate for performance shortfalls were no 
longer acceptable. Failing to meet agreed-upon performance targets therefore 
began to hurt profitability of intermediate and advanced services. Given that 
HTI’s internal objectives had long focused on cost containment and not on 
the reliability of equipment, considerable changes were needed. Recognizing 
the importance that reliability of equipment played in the future success of 
the business, HTI’s executive team made reliability a core objective for the 
design, procurement, supply chain, marketing and quality functions.  
To guide the internal transformation towards an organization that was 
focused on delivering reliable diagnostic imaging equipment, a reliability 
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team was created in 2016. This team began to build reliability models based 
on sensor data to gain a better understanding of the reliability of the imaging 
equipment at the sub-system level (in 2016) and component level (in 2018). 
These models were subsequently used to provide input for design teams such 
that design flaws in components could be remedied. Reliability models and 
notifications based on sensor data also enabled HTI to further improve 
proactive and predictive maintenance processes that had been implemented 
in 2015.  
Recognizing that reliability targets could only be achieved in 
collaboration with its component suppliers, the procurement function began 
to formalize contractual requirements for its suppliers in 2016. All preferred 
suppliers were required to sign an umbrella purchasing agreement and a 
quality agreement in 2016 to formalize warranty claims and minimum 
quality requirements. This was followed by the implementation of change 
agreements in 2018 to formalize the process required to make changes to 
components supplied to HTI. Insights gained from the reliability models that 
had been built were used to identify component suppliers that caused system 
reliability issues. These suppliers were either replaced or were visited by a 
supplier quality improvement team, which had been created in 2016. Finally, 
to elevate advanced services to a strategic level, the strategic ambition was 
formulated to grow advanced services to account for 35 percent of total 
revenue by 2020. To achieve this target, a solutions delivery organization 
was created at the corporate level to equip business functions with 
capabilities to develop, market, sell and deliver advanced services.  
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The case concludes with the release of a redesigned MRI scanner in 
September 2018, which had been designed to meet obligations (and 
associated financial risks) tied to offering advanced services.   
Our analysis of the events highlighted in this case description resulted 
in the identification of three main alignment episode types that led up to 
supply chain alignment: (1) customer alignment, (2) internal alignment and 
(3) supplier alignment.  Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the change 
episodes that took place during each of the three episode types and how these 
change episodes are connected. 
In the following sections we analyze how the events that occurred 
during each of the supply chain alignment episode types affected the 
alignment of objectives (i.e., goals), structures and processes. We then 
determine the sequence of these alignment episodes to shed light on the 
interdependencies of episodes.  
5.4.2 Customer Alignment – Redistributing Rights and Obligations 
between Customer and Manufacturer  
In customer alignment episodes, HTI sought to align its corporate objectives 
with (changing) requirements of its customers. To illustrate how changes in 
customer requirements drove HTI to realign its corporate objectives by 
engaging in servitization, we discuss an objectives change episode. No 
structure and process change episodes related to customer alignment 
occurred.   
Objectives change episode (2011): HTI introduces intermediate services.  
As the competitive environment of hospitals changed, more and more 
hospitals adapted their objectives to focus on delivering value to patients. 
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This resulted in considerable changes in requirements for manufacturers of 
diagnostic imaging equipment: “As healthcare rapidly change[d] around the 
world, so [did customer] requirements for MR scanning. … More services 
and faster delivery are the name of the game. … Elevated clinical 
performance, accelerated patient management and improved economic value 
[have become the primary requirements] – all for the life of the system” (HTI, 
Marketing Document, 2011). This meant that equipment reliability became 
an important customer requirement and that unscheduled downtime of 
equipment was no longer an option.  
To realign its service offering with these altered customer 
requirements, HTI’s marketing function decided to introduce intermediate 
services in 2011. The introduction of these new business models was the first 
evidence of a shift in marketing strategy, which was geared towards selling 
“MR as a service” (HTI, Marketing Document, 2016). Customers were given 
the option to purchase equipment in one of three ways. First, customers could 
opt to purchase imaging equipment outright (base services), which meant that 
all property rights and obligations were transferred to the customer. Based 
on this arrangement, customers were free to purchase maintenance services 
from a supplier of their choice. Second, customers could opt to purchase 
equipment bundled with performance-based maintenance services 
(intermediate services). Based on this arrangement, the customer remained 
owner of the equipment but shifted the property rights and obligations tied to 
delivering equipment performance to HTI. Third, customers could opt to 
purchase services geared towards improving performance of their radiology 
department. Based on this arrangement, all property rights and obligations 
(other than the right to use a resource) are transferred to HTI. Table 5.3 
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provides an overview of the allocation of property rights and obligations and 
associated financial rewards and risks of HTI’s service offering.   
 
Table 5.3 
Allocation property rights and obligations for service types 
 
Base 
services 
Intermediate 
services 
Advanced 
services 
Right to    
Use a resource Customer Customer Customer 
Benefit financially from 
resource use Customer Customer Manufacturer 
Change form/substance of 
resource Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer 
Exclude others from resource 
use Customer Customer Manufacturer 
Alienate or transmit resource Customer Customer Manufacturer 
Financial rewards 
manufacturer Low Medium High 
Obligation to    
Cover losses from resource 
use Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer 
Maintain resource Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer 
Dispose of resource at end of 
life Customer Customer Manufacturer 
Financial risks manufacturer Low Medium High 
 
While property rights that HTI had acquired by offering intermediate 
and advanced services offered it the opportunity to reap financial rewards, 
associated obligations exposed HTI to financial risk if uptime guarantees 
(between 96 and 99 percent) were not met. “[W]hen you are in such kind of 
situation, what you need to ensure is the pure reliability of your system. 
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Because you are kind of … [in a] turnkey deal also with your customer. So, 
your [profit] margin can be diminished by downtime” (HTI, Supplier 
Account Manager, 2016). This is because HTI had to cover maintenance 
costs (obligation to maintain resource) and financial penalties of up to 15 
percent of the service fee, if uptime guarantees were not met (obligation to 
cover loss from resource use).  
However, right after the introduction of intermediate services the 
effective financial risk exposure was limited. “We were not yet held 
responsible … if they have downtime and we do not hit the 99 percent 
guarantee. … So, we used to offer 99 percent uptime guarantee, customers 
did not mind, and they never wrote it down. What I see is they are becoming 
more demanding, so I think we will [be held accountable]” (HTI, Business 
Developer, 2016). Customers began to monitor performance of intermediate 
services and began to require compensation when agreed uptime targets were 
not met. This coincided with a legislative change that prohibited discounts to 
compensate for performance shortfalls. Since actual “reliability was around 
95-96 percent” (HTI, Head of Global Marketing, 2017), financial risk tied to 
obligations had increased considerably. 
5.4.3 Internal Alignment – Assigning Responsibility for Obligations to 
Business Functions  
In internal alignment episodes, HTI sought to align the objectives of its 
business functions with its changed corporate objectives. That is, it sought to 
minimize financial risk associated with obligations that are tied to offering 
intermediate and advanced services. To illustrate that obligations tied to 
offering intermediate and advanced services changes objectives for business 
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functions we discuss an objectives change episode. This is followed by a 
discussion of a structure and process change episode to illustrate how 
changing objectives affected the internal organization of the manufacturer. 
Objectives change episode (2016): Reliability of MRI becomes a core 
objective of business functions.  
The increasing financial risk associated with offering advanced services 
drove the management team to evaluate whether changes to internal 
operations were needed. “There is now a development towards [uptime] 
contracts. The market pressure to offer [uptime] contracts is very high, which 
means that it is very important to arrange our internal operations properly 
such that we are not exposed to the [financial] risk [associated with these 
types of arrangements]” (HTI, Head of Global Marketing, 2017). For years, 
HTI had focused on developing the latest innovation to its customers, while 
at the same time reducing bill of material (BOM) cost. Due to the 
introduction of intermediate and advanced services, these objectives were no 
longer in line with obligations tied to the new service offering. Therefore, the 
corporate objectives had been reformulated to incorporate equipment 
reliability as a central goal of HTI. Translating this corporate objective to the 
business unit level, proved to be challenging, however. “That had a lot to do 
with the silos within HTI. And that they all had their own targets and KPIs 
to adhere to. So, and the weird thing is that, the net result is, that HTI as a 
whole of course suffers from [this lack of alignment in objectives]” (HTI, 
Manager Customer Excellence, 2016). 
It had become apparent to the top management team that business 
unit objectives had to be adapted to deal with this new reality. “We have been 
too feature driven [in the past]. We need to think about customer needs when 
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developing solutions. We should think about the outcome so that solutions 
are exactly right” (HTI, Town Hall Meeting: Keynote Chief Executive 
Officer, 2017). To ensure that this new direction was implemented 
successfully, a change in objectives of business functions was required. 
Quality and reliability became core objectives for all business functions in 
2016 in order to increase “system uptime and first-time right imaging while 
reducing cost of non-quality” (HTI, Strategic Priorities Document, 2017).  
Structure change episode (2016): Reliability team created to improve 
reliability.  
To coordinate quality and reliability initiatives among business functions, a 
reliability team was created. “The consequences for [HTI] of offering service 
contracts stay and fall with a system’s reliability. Service costs decrease with 
very reliable systems. This is why [HTI] started investing much more in the 
trustworthiness, of a system” (HTI, Product Manager, 2016). A core function 
of the reliability team was to assist business functions by providing them with 
information such that reliability targets could be achieved. “An important 
step to improve quality is the translation that needs to be made from 
marketing requirements to system requirements such that those can be 
translated to [Parts per million] (PPM) requirements” (HTI, Procurement 
Engineer, 2017). The reliability team played an important role in such 
translations and in institutionalizing “a totally different quality mindset” 
(HTI, Reliability Manager, 2018).  
Process change episode (2016): Reliability models constructed to determine 
reliability at sub-system level.  
To initiate improvements in reliability, a better understanding of the field 
performance of equipment was required. However, stress testing of MRI 
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equipment had been a challenge due to the prohibitive BOM costs of MRI 
equipment. “They are just too valuable. [MRI equipment costs at least 1 
million euro.] … So, it has been difficult to determine the actual reliability 
of our equipment” (HTI, Reliability Manager, 2017). Therefore, the 
reliability team had developed an alternative manner to determine equipment 
reliability. By utilizing field performance data collected by sensors integrated 
in MRI equipment, reliability models were constructed. Not only did these 
reliability models provide business functions with an understanding of field 
reliability, they also enabled the reliability team to establish which sub-
systems were weak points as they decreased system reliability. Having the 
right to use sensor data thus became a central concern for the reliability team. 
“Of course, it is of importance to have access to the sensor data and that you 
analyze these data properly. That enables you to find root causes so that you 
can make adjustments and implement those in the field” (HTI, Reliability 
Manager, 2018). The output of reliability models therefore became on 
important input for processes across several business functions.  
5.4.4 Supplier Alignment – Transferring Responsibility for 
Obligations to the Supply Base 
In supplier alignment episodes, HTI’s procurement function sought to realign 
the objectives of its suppliers with its altered business function objectives. 
This critical episode is geared towards further minimizing the financial risk 
associated with the obligations tied to offering intermediate and advanced 
services. To illustrate the manner in which responsibilities for obligations are 
transferred to suppliers, we discuss an objectives change episode. This is 
followed by a discussion of a structure and process change episode to 
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illustrate how changing supplier objectives affected the manufacturer’s 
interaction with its suppliers.     
Objectives change episode (2016): Quality purchasing agreements 
implemented to formalize supplier objectives.  
As business functions began to focus on improving equipment reliability, it 
became apparent that suppliers played a central role in reliability 
improvement. Given the initial focus on cost containment, contractual 
agreements created by HTI’s purchasing function had previously focused on 
reducing BOM cost. “What I think that [HTI] has classically had a lot of 
attention for … is the initial cost of components. … over time, we want to 
decrease that BOM cost quite a bit. Uhm, what we also in some cases do 
pretty well and in others we forget it, is to put requirements to the supplier 
for the reliability. So, what kind of reliability do we expect from these parts? 
Well, sometimes, we just did not specify it” (HTI, Manager Customer 
Excellence, 2016). As business function objectives changed to incorporate 
reliability, not contractual agreements that specified quality and reliability 
requirements became a point of concern. “[I]nformation needs to move from 
downstream to upstream. That is move from the customer needs, what we 
have agreed with them through a contract, [the] same needs to be translated 
down the supply chain” (HTI, Business Developer, 2016). To realign 
supplier objectives with business function objectives, quality agreements 
were rolled out across the supply base. These contractual agreements 
specified minimum quality and reliability targets that had to be met by 
suppliers. “[W]hat became relevant in my agreement with my suppliers, is to 
ensure, uhm, minimum failure rate where the suppliers need to comply” 
(HTI, Supplier Account Manager, 2016). In addition, an overarching quality 
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policy was formulated as part of these agreements to communicate the 
importance of component quality to suppliers. The following paragraph is a 
section taken from the quality agreement template used by HTI’s 
procurement function: 
 
 “With our hearts and minds we:  
▪ delight our Customers and deliver our brand promise  
▪ design and deliver safe, reliable, and effective products and 
services  
▪ drive a culture of continuous improvement  
▪ comply with applicable internal and external regulatory and 
compliance requirements  
▪ maintain an effective and efficient quality management 
system” (HTI, Quality Agreement, 2018) 
 
The implementation of quality purchasing agreements drove 
suppliers to increasingly focus on component quality. “We currently 
undertake efforts to change together with our customers toward providing 
better services to end-customers. One example is a recent effort to receive a 
certificate of complying with an ISO norm. In fact, the customer required us 
to obtain this ISO norm in order to continue our business relationship. We 
recognize the need for us to be part of the industry’s change toward offering 
services. We will need to take on more responsibilities in the future” 
(Preferred Supplier, Chief Executive Officer, 2016).  
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Structure change episode (2016):  Supplier quality improvement team added 
to improve production processes.  
Due to the considerable shift in supplier requirements, several suppliers were 
faced with challenges to meet targets specified in quality agreements. 
Consequently, HTI created a supplier quality improvement team to assist 
suppliers in achieving quality and reliability targets. “What we generally do 
is have a lot of, dedicated teams … that regularly visit suppliers. For example, 
… we have supplier development team. That can go to suppliers, if for 
example the quality concern is, is seen after an audit, or if we think the 
supplier has productivity issues. Then they really can go to the suppliers … 
they look at the production, and … try to help them really improve [their 
production processes]” (HTI, Cost Manager, 2018). 
Process change episode (2016): Supplier quality review process formalized 
through implementation of quality monitoring system.  
An additional challenge faced by HTI concerned the sharing of component 
performance information with suppliers. After having implemented the 
quality purchasing agreements it became of considerable importance to share 
such information. “Obtaining information about what is happening in our 
customer’s markets is not easy. … This is partly because there is no single 
point of contact to share information. Information is shared on an ad-hoc 
basis between employees” (Preferred Supplier, Chief Executive Officer, 
2016). Obtaining information on field reliability of components was of 
considerable importance to suppliers for two reasons. First, “[t]esting of 
components is a problem because suppliers are not able to do full testing with 
their specific component as they do not have access to the full MRI system. 
That is, parameters are provided by [HTI] against which the component is to 
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be tested but these parameters are not always accurate. That means that the 
component might meet the parameters but does not work properly as part of 
the system” (HTI, Manager Customer Excellence, 2017). Second, suppliers 
had little understanding of the reason for their component being replaced in 
the field as they were not able to analyze defective components. “We do not 
manage, uhm, return from field for warranty, we do not have reverse 
logistics” (HTI, Supplier Account Manager, 2016).  
To address these issues the supplier quality review process was 
formalized by implementing a quality monitoring system. “Ensuring that 
suppliers perform as they should is done through yearly performance 
reviews. For those we measure different aspects among which quality. … 
And certain boundaries exist beyond which we say that we no longer want to 
collaborate with suppliers. So, suppliers are very much aware that they need 
to deliver a certain quality, otherwise they will not be qualified to work with 
[HTI]” (HTI, Cost Manager, 2016). When supplier account managers 
constituted that quality and reliability targets were not met, suppliers were 
asked to take corrective actions and eliminate the issue within 30-60 days. 
5.4.5 Episode Sequences 
To gain a better understanding of the dynamic evolution of supply chain 
alignment, we analyzed sequences of alignment episode types. While 
customer, internal and supplier alignment largely take place in parallel, these 
alignment episode types occur in distinct sequences. Customer alignment 
initiates the overall supply chain alignment process as rights and obligations 
are acquired by a manufacturer through the offering of intermediate and 
advanced services. Particularly the obligation to ‘cover losses from resource 
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use’ and ‘maintain resource’ play a central role in determining the sequences 
of alignment episode types. Acquiring these obligations exposed HTI to 
considerable financial risk for two reasons. First, a part of its compensation 
had been tied to the availability of imaging equipment. Second, all costs 
related to delivering agreed upon availability of imaging equipment such as 
maintenance and replacement cost had to be covered by HTI. It is through 
financial risk that the acquired obligations acted as a ‘trigger’ of internal and 
supplier alignment. As HTI went through these alignment episodes it became 
clear that the right to ‘use sensor data’ acted as a ‘facilitator’ in initiating 
supplier alignment. That is, the right to use sensor data became imperative to 
the understanding of component performance in the field. These insights 
enabled HTI to identify suppliers that acted as culprits in system reliability 
issues. This in turn led to targeted improvement initiatives with suppliers.  
What we have not touched upon in previous sections is how internal 
and supplier alignment fed back into customer alignment. Since the 
marketing function had started offering advanced services based on market 
demands, there initially was little understanding of the role that customers 
played in the financial risk that HTI became exposed to. As internal and 
supplier alignment occurred, this understanding increased and let to three 
distinct changes through customer alignment episodes. First, realizing that 
customer actions were an important determinant of equipment performance, 
the marketing function began to specify customer responsibilities in 
operating imaging equipment. The following section was added to the 
intermediate and advanced services contracts to minimize negative impact of 
customer actions on equipment performance.   
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“During the term of agreement, Customer will (HTI advanced services 
contract, 2017):  
▪ Attend a start-up meeting at Customer’s facility, prior to the 
Effective Date of this Agreement, so [HTI] can explain the Services 
to the Customer’s management and selected staff 
▪ Provide [HTI] at each System Site, at all times during the term of 
this Agreement, a dedicated broadband Internet access node. 
▪ Maintain operating environment within [HTI] specifications for the 
Site (including temperature and humidity control, incoming power 
quality incoming water quality and fire protection system) 
▪ Use the System in accordance with the published manufacturer’s 
operating instructions”.  
 
Second, customers were involved more extensively in the 
maintenance of the imaging equipment. “[R]eliability improvements do not 
only regard the hardware but also services. Customers can facilitate this 
themselves by engaging in self-service, report problems more clearly, and 
such” (HTI business developer, 2016). And solutions were developed to 
improve customer involvement. “We have solutions – for example [HTI] e-
alert – that is another one that we just launched. It is a solution where we e-
mail the customer or SMS, they can choose, whenever something is wrong 
with their [system], with the environment around their system. So that they 
can take action. For example, a customer is, eh, responsible to take care of 
the power, humidity, and temperature around their system. If that is wrong, 
it could have a negative impact on the MR system and cause downtime” (HTI 
business developer, 2016). 
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Third, as the business functions had recognized the importance of the 
right to use field performance data in optimizing maintenance processes, the 
marketing function adjusted pricing such that a risk premium had to be paid 
by customers if the right to use field performance data was not transferred to 
HTI. “We are working on a [pricing] model based on which we tell the 
customer: if you do not want to connect your imaging equipment, that will 
result in a higher service fee” (HTI reliability manager, 2018). Through these 
three customer alignment episodes HTI sought to further decrease the 
financial risk that it was exposed to. 
The overall supply chain alignment process consisting of the 
described episodic sequences is shown in Figure 5.2 and summarized in 
Appendix F. It becomes evident that property rights and obligations play a 
central role in these episode sequences and the overall supply chain 
alignment process.  
 
Fig. 5.2. Supply chain alignment process: episode sequences.  
 
It is important to note that these sequences occurred several times as 
we studied this case. The observed episode sequences were initiated the first 
Customer 
alignment
Internal 
alignment
Supplier 
alignment
Obligation to 
maintain assets 
and cover losses
Right to 
use big data
(1) (2)
Triggers Facilitates
(3)
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time when HTI introduced intermediate services. And a second time when 
HTI introduced advanced services, since the introduction of this type of 
advanced services further increased financial risk.  
5.5 DISCUSSION 
As changes in competitive environments drive organizations that purchase 
equipment to adjust their corporate objectives, so do their requirements 
towards equipment manufacturers (Cusumano et al., 2015). An increasing 
number of organizations moves away from purchasing equipment outright, 
to purchasing equipment performance in the form of advanced services 
(Visnjic and Van Looy, 2013). Our longitudinal research reveals that when 
equipment manufacturers shift towards servitization, an alignment process is 
triggered that has far-reaching implications for supply-chain-wide 
operations. We find that property rights and obligations (and associated 
financial rewards and risks) tied to servitization, are important determinants 
of the manner in which this supply chain alignment process unfolds (Alghisi 
and Saccani, 2015). While the prospect to appropriate financial rewards from 
property rights initiates the supply chain process, obligations tied to offering 
intermediate and advanced services (Baines and Lightfoot, 2013) trigger 
further stages of supply chain realignment. Based on these insights we 
formulate the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. The reallocation of property rights and obligations 
associated with servitization triggers a process of supply chain 
realignment.  
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We find that the supply chain alignment process takes place in three 
main alignment episodes in which objectives, incentives and operations 
process are realigned: customer alignment (between customers and 
equipment manufacturers), internal alignment (among manufacturers’ 
business functions) and supplier alignment (between manufacturers and their 
suppliers) (Alghisi and Saccani, 2015). We find that a supply chain alignment 
process is initiated as a response to changing customer requirements 
(Cusumano et al., 2015). During customer alignment episodes that follow, 
manufacturers engage in servitization to realign their product and service 
offering with customer requirements (Baines et al., 2017; Baines and 
Lightfoot, 2013). By adding intermediate and advanced services to their 
portfolio, manufacturers are able to deliver the equipment performance that 
is sought by their customers. We find that it is the potential to appropriate 
additional financial rewards, through acquiring specific property rights 
(Coase, 1960; Kim and Mahoney, 2005), that drives manufacturers to engage 
in servitization. More specifically, when customers decide to purchase 
advanced services, they surrender the rights to ‘benefit financially from 
resource use’, ‘change form/substance of resource’, ‘exclude others from 
resource use’ and ‘alienate or transmit resource’ to manufacturers. The 
acquisition of these property rights provides manufacturers with far more 
control over equipment when compared to basic services. Most importantly, 
it grants manufacturers the exclusive right to maintain equipment, which 
means that these property rights provide manufacturers with the opportunity 
to appropriate additional rewards from the exchange.  
While reliability shortcomings have little negative impact on 
manufacturers’ bottom line when offering basic services, equipment 
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reliability is a key determinant of the financial rewards that can be extracted 
when offering advanced services (Baines and Lightfoot, 2013). This is the 
case because poor reliability leads to considerable expenditures for 
manufacturers. Not only do manufacturers need to pay fines to their 
customers when agreed upon reliability targets are not met, manufactures 
also need to cover all costs resulting from the maintenance activities required 
to service equipment. We find that the resulting financial risk makes that 
quality and reliability of equipment become central corporate objectives for 
manufacturers. Therefore, we propose that:  
 
Proposition 1a. Changing customer demands and the opportunity to 
appropriate additional financial rewards through a reallocation of 
property rights drive equipment manufacturers to engage in 
servitization to realign their corporate objectives with the objectives of 
their customers.  
 
By studying alignment of objectives, incentives and operations 
processes as manufacturers engage in servitization, we show that obligations 
tied to servitization (and associated financial risks) trigger internal alignment 
episodes. Such internal alignment episodes lead to operational changes in 
business functions, targeted at increasing quality and reliability of equipment 
(Alghisi and Saccani, 2015). We find that internal alignment takes place at 
three levels: objectives, structure and processes. As quality and reliability of 
equipment become core objectives at the corporate level, these are translated 
to the business function level. Subsequently, to attain targets tied to these 
objectives business functions begin to realign their structure and processes 
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with these objectives (Oliva and Watson, 2010). For example, we show that 
a reliability team is created (structure) that creates reliability models to feed 
other business functions with information on component reliability (process). 
These insights lead us to formulate the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1b. The reallocation of obligations (and associated 
financial risks) tied to servitization drives equipment manufacturers to 
realign the objectives, structures and processes of their business 
functions with their changing corporate objectives. 
 
We show that, as manufacturers’ business functions are confronted 
with changing objectives, they seek to realign the objectives of component 
suppliers with their business function objectives (Petersen et al., 2005). To 
align supplier objectives with business level objectives, manufacturers’ 
procurement functions adopt their contracting strategy by implementing 
quality agreements (Samson and Terziovski, 1999). Such agreements oblige 
manufacturers to deliver components meeting specified quality and 
reliability requirements. We find that this is followed by manufacturers 
procurement functions implementing a supplier quality review process to 
ensure that suppliers meet their obligations (process) (Carr and Pearson, 
1999). And manufacturers seeking to develop their supply base towards 
achieving quality and reliability objectives, create a supplier quality 
improvement team (structure) (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Therefore, we 
propose that: 
 
Chapter 5 
 
177 
 
Proposition 1c. The reallocation of obligations (and associated 
financial risks) tied to servitization drives equipment manufacturers to 
realign the objectives of their suppliers with their changing business 
functions’ objectives. 
 
“For some, servitization is simply an information revolution” (Baines 
et al., 2017, p. 269). We find that information about equipment performance 
is imperative to achieve the most efficient allocation of property rights and 
obligations among supply chain actors (Porter and Heppelmann, 2015). This 
is because information about equipment performance acts as a main enabler 
of three alignment episodes through which manufacturers fulfil their 
obligations to customers (Opresnik and Taisch, 2015). First, information 
about equipment performance enables manufacturers’ design teams to 
identify weaknesses in equipment design such that reliability can improved 
through design iterations. Second, manufacturers’ service organizations can 
considerably improve efficiency of maintenance operations by having access 
to information about equipment performance (Kache and Seuring, 2017). 
Third, the procurement function of manufacturers can use information about 
equipment performance at the component level to identify suppliers that 
negatively affect equipment performance (Rai, Patnayakuni, and Seth, 2006). 
Taken together, all three alignment episodes enable manufacturers to 
increase the uptime of equipment considerably, which means that it enables 
them to meet their obligations tied to servitization.  
However, given that equipment is located at customers’ premises it 
had long been a challenge to acquire information about equipment 
performance. Recent technological developments have enabled 
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manufacturers to gain access to field performance data by adding sensors to 
their equipment (Kache and Seuring, 2017). We find that the right to access 
and use such performance field data is necessary to engage in the three 
identified alignment episodes. Therefore, this property right is a crucial 
enabler of the supply chain alignment process. Based on these insights we 
formulate the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. The right to access and use performance field data of 
installed equipment facilitates the supply chain alignment process and 
is therefore necessary to achieve the most efficient allocation of 
property rights and obligations.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
5.6.1  Theoretical Contributions 
Our study makes four important contributions to servitization literature by 
introducing a new strand that focusses on equipment ownership and the 
implications of ownership rights on firm-level operations strategies, 
processes, and the management of supply chain relationships. First, our 
longitudinal study reveals that the structure of product ownership matters 
when it comes to alignment of objectives, incentives and operations 
processes across multiple supply chain tiers (Alghisi and Saccani, 2015; 
Oliva and Watson, 2011; Selviaridis and Spring, 2018). That is, the allocation 
of property rights and obligations (Coase, 1960; Kim and Mahoney, 2005) 
associated with basic services causes equipment manufacturers to have 
profoundly different objectives than does the allocation associated with 
intermediate and advanced services (Baines and Lightfoot, 2013). While 
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selling basic services incentivizes manufacturers to focus on cost 
containment, selling intermediate and advanced services incentivizes 
manufacturers to focus on quality and reliability of equipment. We find that 
these corporate objectives drive manufactures to adopt different operational 
strategies to align operations across the supply chain.  
Second, our study shows exactly how ownerships matters: it reveals 
the mechanisms of alignment, and more importantly the specific processes 
by which alignment occurs both within the manufacturing firm (Oliva and 
Watson, 2011), but also between the manufacturing firm and its customers 
and suppliers (Selviaridis and Spring, 2018). We find that the opportunity to 
appropriate additional financial rewards through a reallocation of property 
rights drives equipment manufacturers to engage in servitization. At the same 
time, financial risks introduced by obligations tied to offering advanced 
services act as a mechanism that triggers internal alignment and supplier 
alignment episodes. These alignment episodes are particularly focused on 
optimizing operations and aligning objectives and incentives in order to 
increase the reliability of equipment. Manufacturers can derive some 
financial rewards by delivering subpar reliability when offering basic 
services, as customers will be interested in buying maintenance services 
(Baines and Lightfoot, 2013). However, when selling advanced services, 
subpar reliability exposes manufacturers to considerable financial risk since 
costs associated with maintaining equipment hurt their bottom line. This shift 
in responsibilities drives manufacturers to realign objectives and incentives 
of their business functions and their suppliers with adapted corporate 
objectives.  
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Third, we elaborate on a process view of supply chain alignment (see 
Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) by showing the sequence and interrelationships 
between manufacturing firm (internal) alignment, customer alignment and 
supplier alignment. We find that a distinct sequence of supply chain 
alignment episodes unfolds when manufacturers engage in servitization of 
their business. Offering advanced services triggers a customer alignment 
episode in which the manufacturer’s corporate objectives are aligned with 
the objectives of their customers. To manage financial risk associated with 
obligations tied to advanced services, this is followed by internal alignment 
episodes. During these episodes, objectives, incentives, structures and 
operational processes of business functions are realigned with corporate 
objectives. As many manufacturers nowadays rely heavily on their suppliers 
(Van Weele and Van Raaij, 2014), internal alignment episodes are followed 
by supplier alignment episodes during which objectives and incentives of 
suppliers are aligned with manufacturers’ corporate objectives.  
Fourth, we make an empirical contribution by analyzing how issues 
concerning ownership of data (e.g., product usage data) influence the 
partitioning of property rights in relation to the product itself, and the 
allocation of associated risks and rewards between supply chain counterparts. 
Ownership of data has hitherto received little attention in OM literature and 
property rights literature (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Walker et al., 2015). 
However, our study reveals that the right to use performance field data 
facilitates the supply chain alignment process. That is, acquiring the right to 
use performance field data enables manufacturers to optimize supply-chain-
wide operations. More specifically, through utilizing field performance data 
manufacturers can implement predictive and preventive maintenance 
Chapter 5 
 
181 
 
operations (Ostrom et al., 2015; Porter and Heppelmann, 2015). This 
considerably increases control over performance of equipment located at 
customer facilities and thereby increases uptime of equipment while at the 
same time decreasing maintenance cost (Opresnik and Taisch, 2015). In 
addition, manufacturers can determine which components cause reliability 
issues. Consequently, specific suppliers can be targeted with more stringent 
quality requirements and if necessary, manufacturers can assist such 
suppliers in improving their quality assurance processes (Modi and Mabert, 
2007).  
5.6.2  Managerial Contributions 
Based on our study we can offer several practical recommendations for 
manufacturing firms adopting servitization. Our study illuminates the 
mechanisms through which servitization can bring value to all supply chain 
parties. By engaging in servitization, manufacturers can extract additional 
financial rewards from their product offering, while at the same time 
delivering superior performance to their customers. However, to reap the 
rewards of servitization, manufactures need to undergo a considerable 
change process to optimize operations such that obligations tied to service-
based business models can be met. First, these obligations need to be 
assigned to business functions by adopting relevant performance objectives 
throughout the organization. That is, system reliability should become a core 
objective for all business functions. Second, these obligations need to be 
(partly) transferred to the manufacturer’s supply base by designing 
contractual agreements that formalize reliability and quality requirements. 
Subsequently, performance management processes need to be implemented, 
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to ensure that suppliers adhere to the formulated requirements. Where 
necessary, suppliers need to be assisted in improving their operations such 
that reliability and quality targets can be met. Third, requirements to be 
adhered to by customers need to be formalized to clearly define obligations 
between customers and manufacturers. This is crucial to ensure that 
manufacturers are not made responsible for system reliability issues that are 
caused by counterproductive customer behavior, such as improper use of the 
system or inappropriate environmental conditions. By increasing supply 
chain alignment through these operational changes, financial rewards that 
can be extracted through servitization can be maximized.  
Paradoxically, by adopting servitization manufacturing firms are 
driven to optimize their operations towards delivering highly reliable 
products. While the outcomes of this change process initially benefit 
manufacturing firms’ bottom lines, over time it reduces the financial rewards 
that can be appropriated from servitized offerings. More specifically, when 
products become more reliable, advanced services (particularly maintenance 
services) become of less relevance as products require less maintenance over 
time. Thus, as the extent of supply chain alignment increases, the allocation 
of property rights and obligations becomes less efficient from a supply 
perspective. It is therefore of importance that manufacturing firms offering 
advanced services provide value to customers beyond maintenance services 
to sustain the business model over time.   
5.6.3  Limitations and Future Research Directions  
Our study of supply chain alignment in the context of servitization is only a 
starting point of this literature stream. We develop several testable 
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propositions that will require further investigation. More research is needed 
to develop an in-depth understanding of the manner in which organizations 
can align supply-chain-wide operations. For example, future studies could 
investigate the most effective manner to align objectives, incentives and 
operations processes across the supply chain based on a design science 
approach (Van Aken, Chandrasekaran, and Halman, 2016). During the time 
of data collection, the organization that we studied was confronted with three 
main design challenges. First, the organization faced challenges in 
determining with payment method (e.g., output-based and outcome-based) 
would be most effective to achieve customer alignment and superior in 
extracting financial rewards. Second, the organization faced challenges in 
aligning interests of business functions, which resulted in suboptimal 
collaboration as business functions acted as silos (Oliva and Watson, 2010). 
Third, considerable challenges arose in realigning objectives and incentives 
of suppliers. To enforce quality agreements, the manufacturer’s procurement 
function filed financial claims against suppliers. This resulted in a 
deterioration of the buyer-supplier relationships. Future research could 
develop design propositions to inform organizations about the most effective 
operations strategies to address these challenges.  
We used interviews as the primary method of data collection to 
capture the supply chain alignment process over time. Since conducting 
interviews at intermediate points in time would limit our understanding of 
messy day-to-day interactions between supply chain actors, we 
complemented this form of data collection with non-participant observation. 
This provided us with detailed insights concerning changes in day-to-day 
interactions between supply chain actors. However, as we were unable to 
Chapter 5 
 
184 
 
trace events real-time for the first four and a half years under study, we had 
to rely on interviewees’ retrospective accounts of events. As this limitation 
may decrease the accuracy and completeness of our interview data, we 
complemented these accounts with various company documents and news 
articles. These rich and varied data sources enabled us to verify and 
complement retrospective accounts of events through triangulation. 
Nonetheless, future studies could rely more extensively on ethnographic 
methods to reveal team and individual level alignment of objectives, 
incentives and operations processes (see Pagell and LePine, 2002).  
Finally, due to fact that our findings are based on a single case study, 
the generalizability of our findings is arguably limited. While our strong 
theoretical grounding and embedding of findings in extant literature leads us 
to believe that the core insights of our study are applicable to a wide range of 
manufacturers, further research is needed to explore the boundary conditions 
of our model. Scholars could study the same phenomenon in supply chains 
other than the healthcare sector to establish whether supply chain alignment 
is affected by industry specific factors. Further, future studies could 
investigate whether country specific factors such as culture affect supply 
chain alignment practices.
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CHAPTER 6  
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While outsourcing of services has generally strengthened the customer value 
proposition of organizations (Maglio and Spohrer, 2008), it has presented 
organizations with challenges in terms of how to manage outsourcing 
relationships (Modi, Wiles, and Mishra, 2015). Academic literature has 
proposed the use of performance-based contracting (PBC) as a tool to address 
challenges related to opportunistic actions of suppliers (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Ouchi, 1979). In her seminal article, Eisenhardt (1989a) reviewed 
extant agency theory literature to develop a framework that explicates the 
relationships between characteristics of contracted tasks and the 
effectiveness of PBC in mitigating opportunism. The insights captured in this 
framework have assisted buyers in deciding for which types of services PBC 
should be used. However, continued misapplication of PBC by buyers (e.g., 
Ng and Nudurupati, 2010; Ssengooba, McPake, and Palmer, 2012) has raised 
questions as to whether agency theoretic ideas (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and extant literature grounded in these ideas could be ignoring critical aspects 
of outsourcing relationships. To develop more fine-grained knowledge about 
the application of PBC in outsourcing relationships, this dissertation had two 
primary objectives: (a) to investigate how buying organizations can 
effectively contract uncertain performance outcomes that pose a considerable 
financial risk to suppliers, and (b) to investigate how suppliers can minimize 
the financial risk associated with selling uncertain performance outcomes.    
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 To achieve these objectives, the studies in this dissertation investigate 
practices during two distinct phases of the contracting process: the contract 
design phase and the contract management phase (Brown and Potoski, 2003). 
Thereby, this dissertation moves beyond the prevailing (albeit implicit) 
approach in contracting literature, to focus primarily on the contract design 
phase (e.g., Argyres and Mayer, 2007). By focusing on the contract design 
phase, extant literature has studied the role that contracts play in incentivizing 
suppliers to act in line with buyer interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1967). 
What has received little attention, is how buyer and supplier actions can 
influence the effectiveness of contractual incentives during the contract 
management phase (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). Contracting literature 
provides no clear reasoning as to why this neglect has been commonplace. 
We posit that there are two main aspects that have led extant literature to 
predominantly focus on contract design. First, studies grounded in grand 
theories such as agency theory and transaction cost economics have 
approached contracting from a strategic perspective (e.g., Harmon, Kim and 
Mayer, 2015; Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011). The most dominant literature 
streams focus for instance on how different types of contracts affect trust in 
inter-organizational relationships. Due to the strategic perspective that 
scholars have adopted on contracting, operational processes that take place 
after the contract has been implemented have largely been ignored. That is, 
contract design has received extensive attention, whereas contract 
management has not. Second, contracting scholars have faced challenges in 
operationalizing and measuring contract management practices. When one 
studies contracting literature it becomes apparent that constructs have been 
measured at the contract level. Measurement is carried out by either 
Chapter 6 
 
188 
 
analyzing contractual clauses or by conducting surveys among managers, in 
which respondents are asked to characterize contracts on defined 
measurement scales. Few previous studies have attempted to operationalize 
and measure constructs capturing contract management practices. We 
believe that the complex nature of contract management practices has acted 
as barrier for data collection about this phase of the contracting process. In 
this dissertation we have sought to overcome these challenges to move 
beyond the focus on contract design. Focusing on practices during the 
contract design and contract management phases has resulted in the 
following theoretical advancements.  
First, this approach has enabled us to study whether buyers should 
combine PBC and BBC during the identified contracting phases (Carson, 
2007), to mitigate opportunistic supplier behavior (Ross, 1973; Wang and 
Yang, 2013). Traditional theories on contracting such as agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and theories on organizational control (Ouchi, 1979) 
suggest that PBC will not be effective in contracting services characterized 
by outcome uncertainty, and that in such situations behavior-based 
contracting (BBC) will be more effective in achieving satisfactory 
performance outcomes. However, contemporary studies have revealed that 
PBC and BBC act as complements rather than substitutes (Nielsen et al., 
2018; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2018). By building on these insights, we 
established whether PBC and BBC should be combined during the contract 
design and contract management phases. While we found no evidence that 
combining PBC and BBC during the contract design phase mitigates 
opportunistic supplier behavior, our results reveal that combining these 
contracting approaches during the contract management phase can mitigate 
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such behavior (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 2). This finding 
indicates that monitoring and evaluation activities, carried out during the 
contract management phase, are an important mechanism by which buyers 
can mitigate unwanted supplier behavior (Van der Valk and Iwaarden, 2011). 
Moreover, these findings reveal that contract management practices should 
receive more attention in academic literature since they play an important 
role in services contracting.  
 Second, moving beyond focusing solely on the contract design phase 
has enabled us to adopt a more dynamic view on contracting in three ways. 
First, Eisenhardt’s (1989) framework (see Table 1.1) provides useful insights 
in the effectiveness of PBC and BBC in relation to several task 
characteristics. However, one implicit assumption, which this framework is 
based on, is that task characteristics are constant during a contracting period. 
While this assumption simplifies the selection of contractual controls during 
the contract design phase, our studies reveal that task characteristics can 
change considerably during the contract management phase. Take for 
example outcome uncertainty. Our studies reveal that buyers can fulfill a 
wide range of roles through which they interact with the supplier during the 
service production process. Through the fulfillment of some roles, buyers 
provided suppliers with crucial inputs that are needed to produce the service. 
Fulfilling such roles in an ineffective manner can considerably increase the 
level of outcome uncertainty that a supplier is faced with. At the same time, 
buyers can attenuate the relationship between inadequate role fulfillment and 
outcome uncertainty, by engaging in contract management activities. By 
altering their actions buyers can thus decrease or increase outcome 
uncertainty significantly (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 3). 
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Thus, PBC can become more or less effective based on changes that occur 
during the contract management phase. These insights reveal that a more 
dynamic view on PBC effectiveness in relation to the task characteristics 
identified by Eisenhardt (1989) should be adopted. Second, when studying 
behavioral consequences of incentives, contracting literature grounded in 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has adopted a static view. Take 
for example a service contract that lasts five years. Previous studies would 
have investigated how a supplier responds when faced with outcome 
uncertainty during either of these five years. What such studies ignored, is 
how success or failure during a previous year (year 1) affects supplier 
behavior in a subsequent year (year 2). Building on Weiner’s (1989) work 
we find that supplier behavior in year 2 is affected by emotions that are 
triggered by the success or failure a supplier had been confronted with in year 
1 (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 4). Consequently, when 
behavioral consequences of incentives are studied it is important to adopt a 
dynamic view on contracting based on past and current events. Third, the 
static view on contracting by literature grounded in agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) is based on the assumption that contracts are complete. 
Property rights theory (Coase, 1960) presents arguments against this 
assumption that are rooted in the insight that buyers cannot foresee all 
contingencies during the contract design phase (Kim and Mahoney, 2005). 
Alchian (1965) and Coase (1960) argue that organizations reallocate property 
rights to deal with unforeseen contingencies. Building on this insight we 
study how the selling of performance outcomes reallocates property rights 
among supply chain actors, and how such reallocations initiate operational 
changes. We find that a dynamic process occurs through which financial risks 
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and rewards are reallocated across supply chain actors (for a more detailed 
discussion see Chapter 5). The findings show that the opportunity to 
appropriate additional financial rewards through a reallocation of property 
rights drives first tier suppliers to sell performance outcomes. At the same 
time, financial risks introduced by obligations tied to offering such services 
act as a mechanism that triggers alignment of responsibilities between 
buyers, first tier suppliers, and second tier suppliers. Such alignment is 
particularly focused on optimizing operations and aligning objectives and 
incentives in order to improve performance outcomes.   
Overall, the theoretical advancements presented in this dissertation 
provide us with a better understanding of how to contract and sell uncertain 
performance outcomes in an effective manner. The following sections 
discuss the managerial implications of the findings discussed in this 
dissertation and the limitations and directions for future research. 
6.2 MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
The findings presented in this dissertation offer important insights for two 
types of supply chain actors: buyers of performance outcomes and suppliers 
of performance outcomes.  
The presented findings have three main implications for buyers of 
performance outcomes. Firms, our studies reveal that buyers of performance 
outcomes should allocate adequate resources to the contract management 
phase. During this contracting phase contractual controls take effect and their 
adequate use is pertinent to successful outsourcing of services. This insight 
might appear rather unsurprising: Why would an organization award a 
contract and subsequently not verify whether obligations specified in the 
Chapter 6 
 
192 
 
contract are met by a supplier? Our studies reveal that there are two main 
challenges in executing contract management activities. First, organizations 
are faced with challenges in assigning responsibility for contract 
management activities to relevant business functions. Contract design is a 
core task for the purchasing function, which means that the responsibility for 
this phase of the contracting process is naturally assigned to this business 
function. On the other hand, responsibility to carry out contract management 
activities can be assumed by the purchasing function, the business function 
that consumes the good/service, or a combination thereof. Second, carrying 
out contract management activities requires access to supplier performance 
data. Given that the purchasing function contracts the supplier, but that the 
goods/services are delivered to another business function (or third party), a 
structured process needs to be put in place to collect supplier performance 
data.  
That is not to suggest that managers should ignore the contract design 
phase. While our studies provide no evidence that contractual controls 
specified during the contract design phase mitigate problems during 
outsourcing relationships, this contracting phase is of importance to reach a 
clear allocation of responsibilities between supply chain parties. However, 
engaging in monitoring and evaluation activities during the contract 
management phase are critical to reap rewards of the agreed upon contract.   
Second, the findings of this dissertation suggest that buyers of 
performance outcomes should combine the contractual controls that underlie 
PBC and BBC. Combining contractual controls enables managers to 
motivate suppliers to achieve the desired outcomes, while at the same time 
engaging them in constructive discussion on how future outcomes can be 
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improved. When selecting appropriate contractual controls to contract 
uncertain performance outcomes, it is of importance to strike a right balance 
between PBC and BBC. Our findings reveal that managers should primarily 
focus on exercising performance-based controls. When combining 
performance-based controls with some basic behavior-based controls, the use 
of controls mitigates problems with supplier behavior. However, combining 
performance-based controls with extensive use of behavior-based controls, 
is found to be counterproductive. The latter restricts suppliers’ freedom to 
optimize their operations, which means that financial risks cannot be 
effectively managed.  
Third, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest that actions 
of buyers that interfere with the service production process can be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of PBC. Such actions can considerably 
increase the risk that suppliers will not be compensated for their efforts. 
Consequently, if such buyer actions are undertaken in an inefficient manner, 
they can drive suppliers to engage in adverse behavior. Buyers should be 
aware of the roles that they fulfill in a service production process. For any 
role that restricts the supplier’s freedom to optimize its operations it is 
imperative to reconsider whether it is necessary for the buyer to fulfill the 
role. If role fulfillment is deemed necessary, utmost care needs to be 
exercised to optimize the process through which the role is fulfilled. In 
addition, buyers can engage in monitoring of performance and behavior to 
establish why performance shortfalls have occurred and how the causes 
thereof can be alleviated.    
 The findings of this dissertation have three main implications for 
suppliers of performance outcomes. First, the findings reveal that suppliers 
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should investigate to which extent performance outcomes are under their 
control, before they agree to deliver certain performance outcomes. The less 
performance outcomes are under the control of suppliers, the higher the 
financial risk that suppliers are exposed to. Therefore, it is of importance to 
assess the financial risk tied to delivering specific performance outcomes to 
determine whether the project is financially viable. If the project is deemed 
financially viable, our findings suggest that suppliers should engage in 
constructive discussion with buyers to determine the extent of the 
involvement of the buyer in the service production process. By creating 
awareness of the roles that buyers and suppliers play in creating the service, 
each party can optimize their operations in coordination with one another.  
Second, findings presented in this dissertation suggest that 
considerable operational changes throughout the supply chain are needed 
when suppliers transition to selling performance outcomes. Suppliers need to 
initiate internal changes and make their suppliers (partly) responsible for 
performance outcomes. Through internal changes, business functions need 
to be made responsible for obligations tied to selling performance outcomes. 
This can be done by adopting relevant performance objectives throughout the 
organization. At the same time, second tier suppliers need to be made 
responsible for obligations tied to selling performance outcomes. This can be 
done by designing contractual agreements that for instance formalize 
reliability and quality requirements of components. Subsequently, 
performance management processes need to be implemented, to ensure that 
second tier suppliers adhere to the formulated requirements.  
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6.3 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
While each study in this dissertation discusses its own limitations, the 
findings of this dissertation should also be viewed in the light of the 
following limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data used in 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) and the fact that single informants were used prevents us 
from making strong causal claims (Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). We have 
sought to address this limitation by using qualitative methods in Study 2 
(Chapter 3) and experimental methods in Study 3 (Chapter 4) to gain a better 
understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the findings presented 
in study 1. Particularly the experimental methods used in Study 3 strengthens 
our conviction that the results of Study 1 are not negatively affected by 
endogeneity issues. More specifically, through the experimental design used 
in study 3, causal relationships between outcome uncertainty inducing 
factors and supplier behavior could be tested. Second, there are some 
limitations for each of the four studies concerning the empirical context. All 
four studies were conducted in Western Europe, which means that the 
findings might be specific to Western European culture. While Western 
cultures typically rely more on contractual controls, (some) Eastern cultures 
rely more on trust building. This could limit the generalization of the findings 
to other cultural regions could be limited. We have sought to improve 
generalizability of the findings beyond the Western European context by 
grounding each study in established theories and topic specific literature. 
Third, since the level of analysis of Study 1 and Study 2 is the organizational 
level, these studies could have ignored important aspects that occur at the 
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departmental, team or individual level. We have sought to address this 
limitation by conducting Study 3 at the individual level. We found that 
emotions experienced by individuals and individual differences play an 
important role in relationships studied in Study 1 and Study 2. Therefore, we 
would encourage scholars to conduct further studies at the departmental, 
team and individual level to study whether factors specific to these levels 
have been ignored by previous studies.  
 In addition to addressing the aforementioned limitations, future 
research can also explore the following research areas. First, future research 
could investigate how the use of big data can foster the use of PBC. In our 
fourth study (Chapter 5) we find that equipment performance data derived 
from sensors (Internet of Things technology) acts an important facilitator for 
supplier alignment. Both buyers and suppliers can benefit from this 
technology. Buyers can monitor real-time whether suppliers deliver 
performance outcomes in accordance with specified performance targets. 
Therefore, the use of this technology can considerably increase outcome 
measurability and should be able to improve coordination efforts between 
buyers and suppliers. A big question, however, remains how the right to use 
such data should be allocated among supply chain actors. The exact 
implications of the use of this technology in combination with PBC warrant 
further investigation. Second, we believe that adopting behavioral theories 
can lead to considerable advancements in the field of contracting. Our third 
study (Chapter 4) reveals that by ignoring behavioral consequences of 
emotions and cognitive biases contracting literature has reached empirically 
invalid conclusions. More specifically, contracting literature had assumed 
that any factor that increases outcome uncertainty, will have negative 
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behavioral consequences. Our findings reveal that this not the case, since 
behavioral consequences are (in part) determined by emotions and not 
rational decision making. We would like to stimulate scholars to broaden 
their theoretical toolkit by incorporating behavioral theories to critically 
evaluate behavioral assumptions underlying their conclusions. Third, we 
believe that the new literature strand concerning implications of ownership 
rights on firm-level operations strategies, processes, and the management of 
supply chain relationships that we have introduced in Study 4 (Chapter 5) 
can make significant contributions to servitization literature. Investigating 
implications of ownership provides future studies with a promising avenue 
to future research. More specifically, servitization literature has often been 
criticized for lacking theoretical grounding. We would like to encourage 
scholars to ground their work in property rights theory since it provides a 
well theorized foundation for servitization studies.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. Measurement of constructs 
Constructs, Sources and Measurement Items Factor Loadings 
Bivariate 
Correlations 
Outcome uncertainty (OUTCUNC, CR = .84, 
CA = .78, AVE = .57); adapted based on Celly 
and Frazier (1996), Eisenhardt (1989a), Nilakant 
and Rao (1994) 
  
These questions concern the extent to which 
external factors cause uncertainty as to the 
delivery of agreed-upon performance. To what 
extent do you agree with the statements below: 
 
 
1. Many external factors affect the service 
delivery performance experienced by the end-
customer. 
.80 
 
2. The performance experienced by the end-
customer can fluctuate extensively over time. .83 
 
3. The performance experienced by the end-
customer is difficult to predict. .78 
 
4. The relationship between the performance 
experienced by the end-customer and the effort 
expended by the supplier is unclear.  
.60 
 
Buyer satisfaction (BUYSATIS, formative 
construct); developed based on Edvardsson and 
Olsson, (1996), Grönroos (1982), Nyaga et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
These questions concern the extent to which your 
organization is satisfied with the service delivery 
process. 
 
 
1. My organization is satisfied with the service 
delivery process.  
.678** 
 
These questions concern the extent to which your 
organization is satisfied with the service. My 
organization is satisfied with: 
 
 
2. The quality of the service provided.  .728** 
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3. Contributions made to the improvement of 
processes or services.   
.745** 
4. Realized cost reductions associated with the 
service.  
.774** 
5. Positive contributions concerning the margin, 
revenue or return.   
.711** 
Responsibility shirking (RESPSHIR, CR = .84, 
CA = .74, AVE = .63); adapted based on Wang et 
al. (2010) 
 
 
If problems arise, how often does the supplier act 
in the following manner:  
 
1. The supplier does not stick to its promises.  .85  
2. The supplier is not available. .77  
3. The supplier does not keep us updated.  .76  
Performance specification (PERFSPEC, 
formative construct): developed based on Martin 
(2007) 
 
 
These questions concern contract provisions. 
Classify each item based on the extent to which 
expected performance has been specified in the 
contract:  
 
 
1. Performance criteria concerning the end-
customer (e.g., end-customer satisfaction).  
.702** 
2. Performance criteria concerning my 
organization as the buyer (e.g., optimization of 
processes). 
 
.619** 
3. Specific targets to be achieved in service 
delivery to the end-customer (e.g., customer 
satisfaction score of at least 8 out of 10). 
 
.719** 
4. Specific targets to be achieved in service 
delivery to my organization (e.g., cost reduction 
of 5%). 
 
.567** 
5. Financial bonus linked to the achievement of 
end-customer performance targets.  
.718** 
6. Financial penalty linked to a failure to achieve 
end-customer performance targets.  
.820** 
7. Financial bonus linked to the achievement of 
my organization’s performance targets.  
.735** 
8. Financial penalty linked to a failure to achieve 
my organization’s performance targets.  
.822** 
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9. Conditions taken into account when deciding 
whether to pay the bonus or levy the penalty 
(provisions that specify exceptions). 
 
.731** 
Behavior specification (BEHSPEC, formative 
construct); developed based on Martin (2007), 
Argyres and Mayer (2007) 
 
 
These questions concern contract provisions. Rate 
each item based on the extent to which 
procedures and processes have been specified in 
the contract:  
 
 
1. Operational activities to be carried out by the 
supplier.  
.647** 
2. Management and control activities to be carried 
out by the supplier.  
.866** 
3. Provisions concerning the procedures used to 
measure the supplier’s performance.  
.818** 
4. Frequency, type and content of management 
reports and discussions submitted to/between 
supplier and my organization. 
 
.801** 
Performance evaluation (PERFEVAL, 
formative construct); adopted from Dekker and 
Van den Abbeele (2010) 
 
 
These questions concern the extent to which the 
supplier’s performance is monitored and 
rewarded. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements:  
 
 
1. We monitored the extent to which the supplier 
achieved the performance goals.   
.778** 
2. If performance goals were not met, the supplier 
was required to explain why.  
.664** 
3. We provided feedback about the extent to 
which the supplier achieved the goals.  
.726** 
4. The supplier’s rewards were based on 
performance in relation to the goals.   
.872** 
5. We pay bonusses and levy fines in accordance 
with what is specified in the contract.   
.852** 
Behavior evaluation (BEHEVAL, formative 
construct); adopted from Dekker and Van den 
Abbeele (2010) 
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These questions concern the extent to which the 
supplier operates according to specified 
procedures. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
 
 
1. We monitored the extent to which the supplier 
followed established procedures.  
.840** 
2. We evaluated the procedures the supplier used 
to accomplish a given task.  
.773** 
3. We tried to modify the supplier’s procedures 
when the desired results were not obtained.     
.733** 
4. We provided feedback on the manner in which 
the supplier had accomplished the performance 
goals.  
 
.728** 
5. So that we could evaluate the methods used by 
the supplier, the supplier had to report to us 
periodically. 
 
.811** 
Buyer size (BUYSIZE, single-item scale, number 
of employees); adopted from Carey et al, (2011), 
Stouthuysen et al. (2012) 
 
 
1. How many individuals does your firm employ?   
Buyer dependence on supplier (BUYDEP, CR = 
.87, CA = .80, AVE = .64); adopted from 
Hernández-Espallardo and Arcas-Lario, 2008, Jap 
and Anderson (2007) 
 
 
These questions concern the dependence of your 
organization on the supplier. To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
 
 
1. If the relationship with this supplier were to 
end, it would be challenging to serve the end-
customer.  
.87 
 
2. We depend on this supplier.  .85  
3. It would be challenging to replace this supplier.  .81  
4. We do not have a good alternative to this 
supplier. .64 
 
Relationship continuation (RELCON, single-
item scale, yes/no); Stouthuysen et al., 2012  
 
1. Has your organization conducted business with 
this supplier prior to this contractual relationship?  
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Service importance (SERVIMP, formative 
construct); Cannon et al., 2000, Carey et al., 2011, 
Stouthuysen et al., 2012 
 
 
These questions concern the importance of the 
contracted service for the overall value 
proposition of your organization. This service: 
 
 
1. Is essential to the end-customer as a part of the 
overall offering of goods and/or services by my 
organization. 
 
 
2. Accounts for a large part of the goods and/or 
service offering of my organization to the end-
customer.  
 
 
3. Contributes a great deal to the distinctiveness 
of the overall goods and/or service offering of my 
organization to the end-customer.  
 
 
Marker variable, end-customer dependence on 
supplier (formative construct); adapted from Jap 
and Anderson (2007) 
 
 
1. The customer is dependent on the supplier.   
2. It would be difficult for the client to replace the 
supplier.  
 
3. The client does not have a good alternative to 
the supplier.  
 
Notes: CR = composite reliability; CA = Cronbach’s alpha; AVE = average variance 
extracted.  
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APPENDIX B. Coding scheme 
Concepts Sub-concepts Explanation 
Supply chain 
roles of the 
buyer 
Design 
engineer 
Buyer designs products and production 
processes 
 
Production 
manager 
Buyer plans and executes the conversion 
of inputs into outcomes  
Labor Buyer provides production effort 
 
Component 
supplier 
Buyer provides essential process 
components 
 Inventory Buyer buffers mismatches between supply 
and demand  
Product Buyer is the object of production 
 
Quality 
assurance 
Buyer assures the quality is acceptable 
Contract 
management 
activities 
Monitoring Activities executed to monitor the 
supplier's performance 
 Enforcing Activities executed to enforce the contract 
based upon the supplier's performance  
Coordinating Activities executed to coordinate the 
buyer's and supplier's operations  
Cooperating Activities executed to align the buyer's 
and supplier's interests 
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APPENDIX C. Validation of case study results 
Quality 
Criterion 
Definition Tactic 
Integrity: 
Internal Validity 
The extent to which 
conclusions can be 
drawn for causal effects 
and a causal relationship 
can be established 
• Pattern matching 
• Explanation building  
• Rule out rival explanations  
• Establish a chain of 
evidence 
  
Credibility: 
Measurement 
Validity  
The extent to which the 
research instruments 
measure what they are 
supposed to measure 
• Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
• Presentation of findings to 
case organizations 
Transferability: 
External 
Validity 
Extent to which the 
research results can be 
applied to the 
populations and the 
settings of interest 
• Specification of the 
population of interest 
• Purposeful sampling  
• Use replication logic in 
multiple case studies 
• Establish boundary 
conditions for study 
findings 
Dependability: 
Reliability 
Extent to which the 
findings demonstrate 
repeatability 
• Transcribing of interviews 
• Use case study protocol 
• Develop case study 
database 
Adapted from Borsboom, Mellenbergh and Van Heerden, 2004; Yin, 2009; Beverland & 
Lindgreen, 2010; Tate et al., 2010 
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APPENDIX D. Case context comparison 
 
Train operator University hospital 
Mix of performance- 
& behavior-based 
clauses 
Yes Yes 
Partnership Yes Yes 
Joint venture No Yes 
To be cleaned 2,800 carriages & locomotives 175,000 m
2 
Cleaning personnel 600 200 
KPIs Quality, safety & personnel 
Quality & performance 
managing partner 
Bonus Annually: max 1.5 % of net revenue 
Quarterly (quality): max €6,000 
net 
Biannually (performance 
managing partner): max €6,000 
net 
Fine Quarterly: max 1.5 % of net revenue 
Monthly: max 30 % of cleaning 
fee for specific object & 
max 25 % of management fee 
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APPENDIX E. Coding tree 
 
  
Customer 
realignment
Internal 
realignment
Supplier 
realignment
Supply chain 
realignment
Realignment of objectives
Realignment of structures
Realignment of processes
Realignment of objectives
Realignment of structures
Realignment of processes
Realignment of objectives
Realignment of structures
Realignment of processes
Reallocation of 
obligations
Reallocation of rights
Reallocation of 
obligations
Reallocation of rights
Reallocation of 
obligations
Reallocation of rights
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APPENDIX F. Overview of episodic sequences 
 
 
  
Summary 
236 
 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation contributes to theory and practice by studying how 
organizations can effectively contract uncertain performance outcomes. This 
dissertation reports on four empirical studies, which have been conducted to 
investigate how contractual controls can be used and property rights can be 
distributed to allocate responsibilities for performance outcomes across 
supply chain actors.  
In Chapter 2, I study whether supplier shirking in response to 
uncertainty concerning outcomes can be mitigated by combining 
performance-based contracting (PBC) and behavior-based contracting 
(BBC). I distinguish between the contract design and contract management 
phases. Using a survey data set, I find that buyers can mitigate shirking by 
combining PBC and BBC during the contract management phase. I find no 
evidence that combining PBC and BBC during the contract design phase 
mitigates shirking. Based on these findings I recommend that purchasing 
managers invest resources in the application of monitoring and evaluation 
activities to contain adverse behavior by suppliers.  
In Chapter 3, I study which factors cause the achievement of 
performance outcomes to be uncertain, and how buyers can attenuate the 
effects of these factors by en gaging in contract management activities. Based 
on a multiple case study, a conceptual model is developed that explains how 
outcome uncertainty relates to the roles and activities of buying organizations 
in the service exchange. Based on these findings I recommend that on the 
one hand, contract managers need to learn to ‘let go’ and give the supplier 
room to take its expert role. On the other hand, contract managers need to 
remain engaged and in touch, in order to facilitate the supplier.  
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In Chapter 4, I study how emotions, which are triggered by a failure 
to achieve performance outcomes, affect suppliers’ future motivation to 
achieve uncertain performance outcomes. Based on an experimental 
methodology, I find that in contrast to what previous studies predicted, 
environmental factors do not decrease the effectiveness of PBC. This is the 
case because suppliers’ managers are hopeful (positive emotion) that the 
effects thereof will subside. On the other hand, buyers engaging in non-
collaborative actions is shown to decrease the effectiveness of PBC since 
suppliers hold buyers responsible (negative emotion) for performance 
shortfalls. Based on these findings, I recommend that purchasing managers 
take into account the emotions that are triggered by context specific factors 
to determine whether PBC will be effective.  
In Chapter 5, I study how distributions of property rights associated 
with selling performance outcomes drive supply chain actors to align their 
incentives and operational activities. Based on a longitudinal case study, I 
develop a process model that reveals the specific processes by which 
alignment occurs both within the manufacturing firm, but also between the 
manufacturing firm and its customers and suppliers. Based on these findings, 
I recommend manufacturers’ to invest resources in aligning incentives and 
operations across supply chain actors such that obligations tied to selling 
performance outcomes can be met.  
Taken together, the research presented in this dissertation makes 
important contributions to theory and practice concerning the use of 
contractual controls and distributions of property rights to align goals across 
supply chain actors. In addition, the highlighted recommendations for 
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practitioners, provide buyers and suppliers with detailed insights concerning 
how to effectively contract uncertain performance outcomes.
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan zowel theorie als praktijk door te onderzoeken 
hoe organisaties onzekere uitkomsten effectief kunnen contracteren.  
Het proefschrift doet verslag van vier empirische studies die zijn uitgevoerd 
om te onderzoeken hoe contractuele controlemechanismen kunnen worden 
gebruikt en eigendomsrechten kunnen worden verdeeld om 
verantwoordelijkheden voor prestaties toe te wijzen aan verschillende 
partijen in de supply chain.  
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik of opportunistisch gedrag van 
leveranciers in reactie op onzekerheid rondom uitkomsten kan worden 
beperkt door performance-based contracting (PBC) en behavior-based 
contracting (BBC) te combineren. Ik maak onderscheid tussen de fase van 
contractontwerp en contractbeheer. Gebaseerd op een survey dataset, ontdek 
ik dat inkopers opportunistisch gedrag kunnen beperken door PBC en BBC 
te combineren tijdens de contractbeheerfase. Ik vind geen bewijs dat het 
combineren van PBC en BBC tijdens de contractontwerpfase opportunistisch 
gedrag vermindert. Op basis van deze bevindingen adviseer ik 
inkoopmanagers middelen te investeren in de toepassing van monitoring- en 
evaluatieactiviteiten om opportunistisch gedrag van leveranciers te beperken.  
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik welke factoren het behalen van prestaties 
onzeker maken en hoe inkopers de effecten van deze factoren kunnen 
verminderen door contractbeheeractiviteiten uit te voeren. Op basis van twee 
casestudies wordt een conceptueel model ontwikkeld dat uitlegt hoe 
uitkomstonzekerheid verband houdt met de rollen en activiteiten van 
inkopers. Aan de hand van deze inzichten zou ik contractmanagers erop 
willen wijzen dat het voor hen van belang is om te leren de leverancier de 
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ruimte te geven om zijn expertrol te vervullen. Daarnaast is het essentieel dat 
contractmanagers de leverancier ondersteunen in het leveren van de dienst.  
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik hoe emoties die veroorzaakt worden door 
het niet bereiken van prestaties, de toekomstige motivatie van leveranciers 
beïnvloeden om prestaties te leveren. Aan de hand van een experimentele 
methodologie, ontdek ik dat in tegenstelling tot wat eerdere studies 
voorspelden, omgevingsfactoren de effectiviteit van PBC niet verminderen. 
Dit is het geval omdat leveranciersmanagers hoopvol zijn (positieve emotie) 
dat de effecten in de toekomst niet zullen spelen. Daarentegen wijst dit 
onderzoek uit dat belemmerend gedrag van de inkopende partij de 
effectiviteit van PBC vermindert. Dit is het geval omdat leveranciers de 
inkopende partij verantwoordelijk stellen (negatieve emotie) voor 
tekortkomingen in de prestaties. Op basis van deze bevindingen adviseer ik 
inkoopmanagers rekening te houden met de emoties die worden veroorzaakt 
door context specifieke factoren om te bepalen of PBC effectief zal zijn.  
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek ik hoe verdelingen van eigendomsrechten 
die samenhangen met het verkopen van prestaties de partijen in de supply 
chain motiveren om hun operationele activiteiten op elkaar af te stemmen. 
Op basis van een longitudinale casestudy ontwikkel ik een procesmodel dat 
de specifieke processen waardoor afstemming plaatsvindt binnen het 
productiebedrijf, maar ook tussen het productiebedrijf en zijn klanten en 
leveranciers, beschrijft. Op basis van deze bevindingen beveel ik fabrikanten 
aan om te investeren in het afstemmen van activiteiten tussen alle actoren in 
de supply chain. Door deze afstemming zullen leveranciers kunnen voldoen 
aan de verplichtingen die verbonden zijn aan de prestatieafspraken.  
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Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat het onderzoek dat in dit 
proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd belangrijke theoretische en praktische 
bijdragen levert aan het gebruik van contractuele controlemechanismen en 
de verdeling van eigendomsrechten om doelen van supply chain actoren op 
elkaar af te stemmen. Daarnaast geven de besproken aanbevelingen 
inkopende partijen en leveranciers gedetailleerde informatie over het 
effectief contracteren van onzekere uitkomsten.
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Effective contracting of 
uncertain performance
outcomes
Allocating responsibility for performance outcomes to  
align goals across supply chain actors
FABIAN MANFRED EDGAR NULLMEIER
This dissertation contributes to practice and literature by studying how organizations can effectively 
contract and sell uncertain performance outcomes. In Chapter 2, I study whether supplier shirking in 
response to outcome uncertainty can be mitigated by combining performance and behavior specification 
and evaluation. Based on the findings of this study, I advise purchasing managers to invest in the 
evaluation of performance and behavior to contain suppliers’ opportunistic behavior. In Chapter 3, I 
study what causes performance achievement to be uncertain, and how buyers can attenuate the effects. 
Based on the findings, I explain that outcome uncertainty is related to the roles and activities of buying 
organizations in the service exchange. To remedy the negative effects, I advise buyers to coordinate 
relevant activities of their organization with suppliers. In Chapter 4, I study how emotions, which are 
triggered by a failure to achieve performance outcomes, affect suppliers’ future motivation. Based on 
the findings, I advise purchasing managers to take into account the context specific factors and resulting 
emotions in determining when and how to use performance-based contracting. In Chapter 5, I study 
the supply chain-wide implications of acquiring property rights and obligations associated with selling 
performance outcomes. Based on the findings, I advise manufacturers to minimize the subsequent 
financial risks by investing resources in the alignment of incentives and operations across supply chain 
actors. Overall, this dissertation makes important theoretical advancements concerning goal alignment 
across supply chain actors through the use of contractual controls and distributions of property rights.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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